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It is now widely acknowledged that the solutions to many, if not most,
natural resource and environmental problems do not lie solely in the natural
sciences or engineering, but entail modifying institutional arrangements that
determine how individuals and organizations interact with the natural
environment.  To fully understand the workings of natural resource institutions
requires an understanding of the many human and non-human components
associated with given situations and the manner in which these components
interact to facilitate or impede the achievement of management objectives.  This
is a formidable intellectual challenge, spawning a variety of distinct terms,
assumptions, and methodological tools found in disciplines such as law,
economics, political science, public administration, and many related social
sciences.  
In order to more effectively meet the challenge of institutional analysis,
new techniques and concepts are needed to evaluate alternative institutional
arrangements in a more consistent, comprehensive and rigorous manner than is
typically observed.  Tools are particularly needed to better predict the
functioning of evolving and prospective institutions, and to address what is
becoming an alarming trend in the natural resources literature: to endorse or
denounce various institutional problem-solving strategies based on dogma rather
than intellectually sound analysis.  In this country and era, “advocacy research”
of this type is most typically associated with the so-called a ternative problem-
solving strategies emphasizing collaboration, negotiation and/or market
processes, efforts which can be distinguished from many of the more
“traditional” institutional problem-solving strategies, particularly regulation and
litigation, by their emphasis on voluntary action and “positive” (i.e., the carrot
rather than the stick) incentives.  Alternative problem-solving strategies currently
enjoy broad political support in the West and elsewhere, as evidenced by recent
policy statements of the Western Governors’ Association, the National
Performance Review, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Western Water
Policy Review Advisory Commission, and dozens of other public and private
entities.  
This report is a preliminary step toward identifying appropriate
conceptual and methodological tools for institutional analysis in the natural
resources and environmental realm.  The era of lternative problem-solving
provides a stimulus and a context for this endeavor.  
Tools for Institutional Description and Analysis:
Basic Concepts
The approach to institutional analysis featured in this report is largely
derived  from  the  institutional  analysis  and  development  (IAD)  framework
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developed through the work of Elinor Ostrom and colleagues at Indiana
University’s Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  At the heart of
the conceptual framework is the notion of institutions as set of rules that specify
who is involved in resource management and use, what roles they can play, what
actions they can (and cannot) take, what subject matters they can (or are
expected to) deal with, the information and resources they can draw upon in
performing their roles, the ways in which they can make individual and
collective decisions, and the benefits (and costs) they can expect to receive.
Institutional rules, together with actors and the environment, comprise an actio
situation, the appropriate unit of institutional analysis.  In this report, a variety
of concepts and terms useful in the analysis of natural resource and
environmental action situations are organized within the IAD framework, then
applied to case studies to compare various problem types and solution strategies.
The various components of natural resource a tion situations interact to
form different classes of resource problems.  For purposes of institutional
analysis, it is useful to distinguish among four problem types.  The first is
depletion problems, which describe situations in which the rate of consumption
of a given resource is perceived to be too high (e.g., overgrazing, groundwater
declines).  Depletion problems are frequently associated with so-called open
access and common pool resource (CPR) situations, circumstances in which
institutional rules poorly control access to resources and/or levels of use.  The
second, and closely related, problem type is underinvestment problems, in which
the anticipated future availability of a given resource is smaller than desired,
presumably due to inadequate investments in resource management.  This
phenomenon is most typical of so-called  public good situations, which involve
resources that, once provided to one party, are automatically available to all (e.g.,
clean air, biodiversity).  In such situations, ensuring that all potential
beneficiaries pay for the possible benefits can be a difficult challenge.  The third
and most ubiquitous problem type discussed herein is maldistribution problems,
situations in which the existing distribution of a given resource is insufficient to
satisfy the needs of all potential users (e.g., water scarcity).  A special sub-set of
maldistribution situations are externality problems, which occur when resource
use by one type of user diminishes its availability (or quality) for other user types
(e.g., most pollution situations).  Institutional rules that allocate rights and/or
costs and benefits poorly—either in terms of equity or efficiency—can contribute
to these problem types. 
This typology of problems derives heavily from the economics literature,
which is primarily concerned with those institutional rules describing the direct
interaction of actors and resources.  This level of the institutional rules is known
as the operational choice level.  Two additional (higher) levels also exist: the
collective choice and constitutional choice levels.  In the evaluation of problem-
solving strategies, the collective choice level rules demand particular attention,
as  these  rules  describe  the  group  (i.e., “collective”) processes  available  for
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modifying the operational choice level rules, and thus, for solving the four
problem types identified.  These collective choice processes include such familiar
mechanisms as agency rule-making, litigation, market exchanges, and bargaining
and collaboration.  In utilizing these tools, managing conflict is a primary
concern.  Value conflicts arise when participants share fundamentally different
value structures; interest conflicts describe situations when the overall goals of
participants are not in question, but the allocation of costs and benefits is of
primary concern; and cognitive conflicts involve situations in which inadequate
knowledge or understanding slows progress.  The selection of appropriate
problem-solving strategies is largely dependent upon considering the
opportunities and constraints provided by the operational choice level and
collective choice level rules.
Lessons from the Case Studies
Three case studies are presented to demonstrate the utility of the
institutional analysis concepts described herein, and to identify a few different
ways in which the tenets of alternative problem-solving have found expression
in modern natural resource and environment conflicts.  The first case examines
problems associated with groundwater overdrafting in the South Platte Basin of
Colorado.  In that region, the failure of Colorado law to adequately manage
groundwater usage resulted, for a time, in a situation in which senior surface
water rights holders were vulnerable to reduced flows due to water table declines
attributable to unregulated groundwater pumping.  This essentially created a
spatial and temporal externality situation, in which the water demands of junior
groundwater appropriators were elevated above those of senior surface rights
holders.  Groundwater overdrafting also created d pletion problems affecting
groundwater pumpers.  While scientific uncertainty about the surface
water/groundwater connection slowed efforts to address these highly related
problems, legislative action eventually established a framework of rules under
which technical expertise and a new collaborative group—Groundwater
Appropriators of the South Platte (GASP)—have produced a solution heavily
reliant on cooperative action, negotiation, and market incentives, all nested
within a framework of private property rights and regulatory oversight.  
The second case study addresses issues of forest management in the
Applegate region of Oregon.  The Applegate region is utilized to provide a
specific context for an issue that is widespread in the West: determining
appropriate timber harvesting levels.  In this case, the depletion problem takes
on a special character as a high-profile endangered species controversy is
injected into the debate, highlighting underinvestment and externality problems
characteristic of the modern environmental movement.  While enactment of the
Northwest Forest Plan of 1994 is the culminating event in the institutional
history
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provided, it is the role and presence of collaborative groups in the region that is
of particular interest, as many natural resource scholars see the Applegate region
as an important laboratory in alternative problem-solving—a perception that is
only partially accurate.  As shown by the case study, it is the relationship
between the alternative problem-solving strategies and the traditional means of
conflict resolution that is of particular analytical interest.
The most complex of the three cases involves environmental restoration
in the Truckee-Carson River Basins.  In that region, the distribution (or
maldistribution) of a limited water resource has created a host of problems,
including underinvestment problems associated with endangered species and
migratory waterfowl.  The interplay of water allocation regimes and species
protection is a problem found throughout the West; the Truckee-Carson case
provides one specific context for analyzing a set of issues that is discouragingly
universal to the region.  In order to focus on the most illuminating aspects of this
situation, the case study primarily focuses on events surrounding the Truckee-
Carson Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, but places this event
in a nearly 100 year context beginning with the initial development of the region
under the auspices of the prior appropriation doctrine and the Reclamation Act.
Prior to this time period, an open access situation presumably existed—just as
it did for water resources in the South Platte before enactment of the prior
appropriation doctrine and for forests in the Applegate region prior to
establishment of national forest reserves.  Major post-Settlement Act strategies
employed for environmental restoration prominently involve alternative
problem-solving techniques, including water marketing and collaborative
watershed management.
The case studies presented provide some insights into the nature of
alternative problem-solving and, more specifically, the type of institutional
environment within which this class of solution strategies can best flourish.  Two
factors appear to be most salient in creating an environment conducive to
success: (1) the prior resolution of fundamental value conflicts, and (2) the
existence of adequate problem-solving incentives.  In the Applegate and
Truckee-Carson cases—as well as dozens of similar cases throughout the
West—the passage of the Endangered Species Act, and its enforcement by the
courts, was the essential action needed to resolve the valu conflict, paving the
way for alternative problem-solving strategies.  This is more than a little ironic
given that many of the proponents of alternative problem-solving see these
strategies as the preferred alternative to the regulation/litigation model embodied
by the Endangered Species Act and similar value-oriented legislation.  
The salience of the second factor, incentives, in each of the mechanisms
lumped under the heading of alternative problem-solving strategies derives from
the fact that each is highly dependent upon achieving agreement among all key
participants.  In various ways, each of the case studies illustrates the importance
of  incentives in modifying behavior.  In the South Platte case, a fear  of  losing
ix
water rights was a key behavioral consideration, while in the Applegate and
Truckee-Carson cases, the costs of environmental regulation were a strong
stimulus for reform.  In addition to these incentives imposed by problem-solvers,
the problems themselves feature important incentive structures, perhaps best
described using the concept of symmetry.  In symmetrical situations, such as
depletion and underinvestment problems, all parties have at least a partial
incentive to resolve problems; whereas in asymmetrical situations, such as
maldistribution and externality problems, some parties are benefitted by the
status quo.  It is expected that al ernative problem-solving strategies will not
emerge in the asymmetrical situations unless additional incentives (either
positive or negative) are provided, but may independently emerge in the
symmetrical situations.  This is the pattern shown by the case studies.
Concluding Thoughts
This report reflects a growing desire among many parties in the natural
resources community to bring a greater level of scientific scrutiny to the
description, analysis and, ultimately, the design of institutional arrangements.
The conceptual framework described herein, while far from perfect, is an initial
step in that direction.  However, while not minimizing the potential contribution
of institutional analysis to improved resource management, it must be
acknowledged that even the most informed and academically rigorous processes
of institutional design will not be sufficient to craft arrangements stable over
long time periods—especially at the operational choice level.  Many of the
factors prompting natural resource and environmental problems—such as
growing demands on resources, technological innovations, changing social
values, and the consequences of past rule-making exercises—are not easily
controlled, and to the extent that their ramifications can be managed, this activity
must be viewed as an ongoing challenge, much as we accept government to be
a permanent fixture of modern civilization. 
Increasingly, a diverse coalition of policy-makers and advocates are
encouraging the use of alternative problem-solving approaches to address natural
resource and environmental problems.  There is reason to be optimistic about
these approaches emphasizing voluntary, incentive-based decision-making, often
occurring in collaborative or market settings.  In many geographic and
substantive areas, these approaches are making a positive contribution to
management regimes, providing problem-solvers with a bigger and better
toolbox.  The enthusiasm for alternative problem-solving strategies, however,
is somewhat disconcerting.  The three case studies reviewed in this report were
sufficient to illustrate two major limitations on the use of these tools: first, when
significant value conflicts are unresolved; and secondly, in situations primarily
featuring problems with asymmetrical incentive structures.  Further analyses will
x
likely identify additional insights into the proper, and improper, application of
these approaches.  The discipline of institutional analysis is the proper setting for
these investigations, utilizing concepts and methodologies drawn from a wide
variety of academic pursuits.
    1   Note that the terms organization and institution (and institutional arrangements) are not
equivalent in the language of institutional analysis.  An organization is a specific agency,
interest group, or similar body, and is one of many players that have a role in an institution,
which is best described as the set of rules associated with a particular subject area or




Purpose and Scope of this Research
The rules that govern the allocation and management of western natural
resources are of special concern to many parties, given the wide variety of uses
and values associated with the regions land and water resources.  By formally
defining the limits of acceptable and unacceptable action, laws are a key
component of the institutional arrangements that control these resources.  An
understanding of the law, consequently, is an essential prerequisite to the
evaluation of natural resource institutions.  Institutional arrangements, however,
always involve more than just the formal rules known as law.  They normally also
include a maze of informal rules codified, for example, in cultural and social
norms, in agency practices, in disciplinary biases, in business norms, and in
behavioral patterns, evolving over time in an incremental and largely
uncoordinated manner through the normal functioning of governmental and
socioeconomic processes.  These rules help determine which people and
organizations are involved in the use and management of resources and largely
determine how they interact.  
 It is now widely acknowledged that the solutions to many, if not most,
natural resources problems do not lie solely in the natural sciences or
engineeringalthough these disciplines will continue to play a major role in
explaining and shaping the physical environment.  The solutions largely reside in
the modification of those institutional arrangements that specify the manner in
which people and organizations interact with each other and with the natural
environment.1  This is where the attention of the Natural Resources Law Center,
and several other public policy research organizations, is focused.  To fully
understand the workings of natural resource institutions requires a clear
understanding of the many human and non-human components associated with a
given natural resource situation and the manner in which these components
interacta formidable challenge.  To accomplish this in an academically rigorous
fashion can require the application of conceptual and methodological tools found
in a variety of social science disciplines, including political science, public
administration, economics, and more specialized sub-disciplines such as public
choice and organization theory.  Very few individuals or organizations have the
necessary background or inclination to effectively evaluate institutional
arrangements from such a broad perspective, even though the careful description
    2   In other locations and time periods, different problem-solving approaches have enjoyed
similar popular support.  For example, the preference of socialist societies for centralized
planning and regulation, as opposed to decentralized market institutions of the capitalist
West, is well know.  Dogma of either sort preempts sound analysis and biases the search for
solutions to real problems. 
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and analysis of institutional arrangements is perhaps the most pressing current
research need in the realm of natural resources. 
In order to more effectively meet this formidable challenge, new
techniques and concepts are needed to evaluate alternative institutional
arrangements in a more consistent and rigorous manner than is typically observed
(Francis, 1990).  These tools are particularly needed to better predict the
functioning of evolving and prospective institutions, and to address what is
becoming an alarming trend in the natural resources literature: i.e., to endorse or
denounce various institutional problem-solving strategies based on dogma rather
than intellectually sound analysis.  In this country and era, advocacy research
of this type is most typically associated with institutional strategies associated with
collaboration and/or markets, efforts which can be distinguished from many of the
more traditional institutional problem-solving strategies, particularly regulation
and litigation, by their emphasis on voluntary action and positive (i.e., the carrot
rather than the stick) incentives.2 
Several authors have recognized this transformation in natural resource
problem-solving strategies, away from inflexible command-and-control regulatory
programs to efforts that stress flexibility, efficiency, pragmatism, and perhaps
most importantly, voluntary action.  For example, John (1994) has coined the
term civic environmentalism to refer to a broad class of suddenly popular
problem-solving tools that prominently feature bottom-up and collaborative
strategies in environmental problem-solving.  This substantive area is also the
focus of research by Hockenstein et al. (1997), who review the application of
market-based tools to resolve pollution problems.  In a much more diverse range
of subject matters, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) describe the emergence of
entrepreneurial governments that rely heavily on incentives and techniques
drawn from the private sector.  
In this report, the term alternative problem-solving is used to describe
those strategies being utilized in the American West (and elsewhere) to bring
greater creativity, efficiency, and voluntary action to the resolution of natural
resource problems.  In the 1980s, this trend was perhaps most frequently
expressed by calls for privatization and resource markets; in the 1990s, the most
salient development has been the rapid proliferation of watershed
initiatives/councils,  forestry  partnerships,  and  other  types  of  collaborative
    3   Several detailed reviews of collaborative resource management are available.  Useful
watershed group case study inventories are provided by the Natural Resources Law Center
(NRLC, 1996), Yaffee et al. (1996), and Kenney (1997).  Forestry group case studies are
provided by Wondelleck and Yaffee (1994).  These increasingly common groups are
typically ad hoc, voluntary, and regionally-oriented public/private partnerships organized in
hopes of addressing and resolving resource management problems that established
institutions and organizations have failed to solve. Both the market-based and collaborative
strategies are “institutional” in nature in that they call for modifying the rules that specify
how people and agencies interact in the control and use of natural resources. 
    4   Much of this “framework” is applicable to the description and analysis of other types of
institutions, including those in frequently studied and diverse sectors such as health care,
transportation, and national defense.
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groups seeking innovative and voluntary problem-solving.3   Also important has
been the emergence of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) tools in the natural
resources realm, often drawing upon the bargaining orientation so characteristic
of the market-based strategies as well as the multi-party focus typical of the
collaborative groups (Bacow and Wheeler, 1984; Bingham, 1997).  While each
of these classes of problem-solving tools is distinct in structure and often reside
in different locales on the spectrum of political ideology, proponents of alternative
problem-solving strategies generally share a faith in decentralized control and
voluntary (incentive-based) action, ideas which have found an increasingly
receptive audience in the West and elsewhere.
Report Organization
By emphasizing voluntary and localized action, these new strategies may,
in fact, be the panacea for most of the chronic and seemingly intractable resource
management disputes in the West, or they may be additional tools to be suitably
used only in specific types of problem-solving exercises.  To answer this
fundamental research question in an effective manner will require less ideology
and more scholarship, utilizing concepts increasingly being categorized within the
evolving literature of institutional analysis.  
This project provides an initial step in fulfilling this need by outlining (in
Section II) an integrated approach to institutional description and analysis, based
in part on an approach known as the institutional analysis and development (IAD)
framework (Ostrom et al., 1994).4  The concepts identified are then applied (in
Section III) to a general discussion of institutional problem-solving
techniquesincluding the so-called alternative approachesapplicable in the
natural resources and environmental realm, followed by a review of three case
studies (in Section IV) from the western United States useful in highlighting
various approaches.  In the concluding pages (Section V), the focus of the report
turns to issues associated with institutional analysis at a macro level, primarily
focusing on the analytical challenge of investigating broad trends in institutional
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arrangements and problem-solving.  Preliminary conclusions are provided
regarding the use of the institutional analysis framework presented herein and the
role of alternative problem-solving strategies.  Some remaining research needs are
also identified.
An Introduction to Institutional Analysis
The analytical framework presented in this paper is unavoidably complex,
and requires the use of a variety of concepts and terms that are unfamiliar to many
parties involved in natural resources research.  To better assist the reader in
navigating through this complex maze, the following paragraphs provide an
overview of the major concepts that will be encountered on this journey.  A more
complete discussion of these and related concepts and terms is featured in
Section II.
Fundamental Terms and Concepts  
Many social scientists have found that given the many components of
institutional arrangements, the variety of resources (and other considerations) they
are designed to deal with, and the wide range of problems that they are expected
to address, the description of institutions can be extremely difficult to do in a
manner that is comprehensive, useful, and standardized.  Most of the techniques
currently used focus on one or more discrete elements of institutional functioning,
often featuring unique terms and assumptions not readily transferrable to the other
approaches.  While many excellent ideas can be found within this body of
conceptual and methodological tools, a need persists for a comprehensive
analytical approach.  Some efforts, such as the body of work known as the policy
sciences (Brunner, 1997), are an attempt to integrate ideas into a coherent and
comprehensive framework.  A major contribution of the policy sciences is to
underscore the value of frameworks that provide structure without losing sight of
the significance of each cases unique context.  While many ideas from the policy
sciencesespecially this emphasis on contextare relevant to the study of
institutional arrangements, the study of institutions is notably different in that the
institutional analyst is not just concerned with investigating decision-making
exercises per se, but primarily focuses on describing and analyzing the different
salient qualities of the institution before and after these transitional periods.
Fortunately, several important advances have been made in recent years to foster
a more integrated and coherent conceptual approach to the study of institutional
arrangements (Gregg et al., 1991; Ostrom et al., 1994).  This report builds upon
these recent advances.
Describing institutional arrangements requires, at a minimum, the use of
terms and concepts to account for all those formal and informal rules that
specify  who  is  involved in resource management and use, what  roles  they can
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play and what actions they can (and cannot) take, what subject matters they can
(or are expected to) deal with, the information and resources they can draw upon
in performing their roles, the ways in which they can make individual and
collective decisions, and the benefits (and costs) they can expect to receive
(Ostrom, 1986).  All this information, specified in various types of rules,
combine to form an institution, or more generally, institutional arrangements.
Describing institutional arrangements also requires terms and concepts describing
the broader environment in which these institutional rules function.  Of particular
significance is a consideration of the physical and actor/behavioral environments,
which when combined with the institutional rules, constitute a particular action
situation. 
Once all components of the action situation are given appropriate labels,
it then becomes possible to systematically organize information gained from case
studies and the war stories of parties involved in resource management and use.
These data can be used to identify general types of natural resource problems and
solution strategies, illuminating linkages and relationships among situations that
may otherwise appear to have little in common.  Distinct types of institutional
problems can be identified, based largely on considerations such as resource
access and behavioral patterns, rather than the more genericand analytically
limitedproblem schemes based on substantive criteria, such as water supply
or air quality problems.  Similarly, various types of institutional structures
emerge.  For example, some may be characterized by highly decentralized and
individualistic decision-making (e.g., an unfettered water market); others by more
centralized control exercised through rigid hierarchical processes (e.g., national
forest planning); still other institutions may be best characterized by their use of
positive or negative incentives (i.e., rewards, such as tax breaks, or penalties, such
as fines).  
By reviewing the functioning of different types of institutional
arrangements under different stresses, the descriptive terms begin to take on an
analytical value, giving rise to models which are not only useful in describing
existing situations, but in identifying those types of arrangements that may have
the greatest potential applicability in related or future situations.  Identifying
appropriate arrangements, however, is only half the challenge in an institutional
problem-solving analysis.  The other need is to consider the mechanism by which
institutional arrangements change in response to natural resource problems,
something which requires an appreciation of the multi-level quality of institutions
(Ostrom, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1994; Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1970).  To fully describe
and understand how problem-solving occurs, the analyst must account for the
movement of issues among hierarchal institutional levels, and must also be
cognizant that different types of issues and conflict resolution strategies are
available at each level.
Several academic disciplines recognize the multi-level character of
institutional arrangements.  While it can be extremely difficult to precisely define
the boundaries between levels, and different authors utilize different assumptions
    5   Several authors utilize various forms of the levels concept, complete with different
terminologies (e.g., Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1970; Ostrom et al., 1994; Gregg et al., 1991).  Most
recognize the utility of using an “operational” level, describing the interaction of resource
users with the resource, and a “constitutional” or policy level, where the basic parameters of
the sociopolitical system are described.  It is the intervening level (or levels) where different
conceptual approaches are most commonly seen, as this is the level (or levels) where the
greatest variety of policy/administrative innovations occur. 
    6   To recap, institutions can be conceptualized as sets of rules, organized within a three-
tiered system of levels, that describe how activities and relationships are ordered among
parties involved in a given substantive and geographic area.  These rules comprise one of
three components of a particular action situation, which also includes a consideration of
human behavior and the qualities of the physical environment. 
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about the total number of levels, it is relatively common to acknowledge the
existence of three primary institutional levels.5  Rules at the first level, known
herein as the operational choice level, are those that describe the relationship
between resource users/managers and the resource itself.  Institutional rules (also
known as rule sets) at the operational choice level are a subject matter frequently
addressed in the economics literature, where the interaction of human enterprise
and natural resources (as an input of production) is of primary concern.  The next
highest level is the collective choice level, where policy-makers, interest groups,
and other involved parties establish the rules which guide activity at the
operational choice level.  The rules for such collective rule making are established
at the even higher constitutional choice level where the basic characteristics of the
American political system are codified.  Constitutional choice level rules can
generally be considered to be immutable in most case studies.  Activity at the
collective choice and constitutional choice levels is generally sparked by the
existence of a natural resource problem that cannot be resolved by utilizing
existing operational choice level rules.  Political science, public administration and
related policy sciences are among the academic disciplines that focus on these
higher levels of institutional activity, where the issues of concern are likely to have
as much to do with concerns such as determining who has the right to make
decisions or what processes or forums they will use, than simply the substance of
the operational choice level rules that these parties eventually establish.  
These basic ideas are central to the institutional analysis framework
described throughout this report.6  While a complete understanding of these
concepts is not essentialnor is it expectedat this point, the reader should
appreciate that these ideas reflect the above assertion that institutional analysis
demands a broad focus, drawing concepts from a variety of scholarly endeavors.
This is a formidable cognitive challenge, requiring the integration of seemingly
distinct terms, concepts, assumptions, and related elements comprising academic
inquiry.  This challenge is the primary subject of the following two sections.
    7   “Formalism” refers to research methodologies that rely on the standardized testing of
explicit theories, while “empiricism” describes research methods that are primarily reliant
on observation and experience.
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SECTION II:
CONCEPTS IN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The Rhetoric of Science
A primary responsibility of academic inquiry is to promote the examination
of information and ideas in a manner guided by precise, reproducible, and
presumably value-neutral, criteria and procedures, in contrast to the more
explicitly political exercises driven by ideology, dogma, and undoubtedly, self-
interest.  To approach this ideal requires scholars to be very clear about
methodological assumptions and tools, something that can be particularly
challenging in those social sciences that are not readily amenable to well-
established quantitative techniques such as statistical analysis.  This general
observation is particularly relevant to the evaluation of those alternative problem-
solving approaches featuring voluntary, ad hoc collaboration, which are
commonly evaluated using largely unsophisticated case study techniques.
The way in which all scientists go about their business of making the world
understandable changes over time, in response to the ebb and flow of prevailing
conceptual and methodological assumptions.  One of the ways of conceptualizing
scientific activity which appeals to the post-modern intellect has come to be
known as the rhetoric of scientific activity (McCloskey, 1990).  This
conceptualization has the merits of encompassing scientific theorizing, empirical
testing, and applying scientific knowledge to practical problems, all without
forcing a choice between formalism and empiricism.7  It distinguishes between
fact, logic, metaphor (or models), and storytelling, while relating them to each
other.  To these four categories we add language, which is the basic prerequisite
for thinking and communicating, and without which fact, logic, metaphor, and
storytelling would be meaningless.
Language
Language is the first essential in all scientific or practical discourse.  A
language names the variables (i.e., the subject matter of concern) and provides the
terms for describing relationships between them.  It also provides some syntax,
or structuremore precise in quantitative (e.g., mathematical) than non-
quantitative (e.g., verbal) modes of communication.  Without adequate language,
there is no possibility of precise communication or analysis.  The choice of
language can be highly salient as it sets the direction and tone of subsequent
inquiry, naming only what is deemed important enough to be investigated while
failing to name other elements of the situation which will then be ignored or
    8   Mathematics is the epitome of a specialized language, whose terms have no empirical
referents until we assign them.  This is not true of common languages, the referents of
which are established by common usage.  Mathematics also has the most powerful, if
limited, syntactical relationships.
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overlooked.   Inadequate language is a prevalent problem in institutional analysis.
Scientific discourse uses both common language and specialized
languages, which are, hopefully, less ambiguous, albeit less comprehensive, than
common language.8  The natural sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, and biology)
make liberal use of specialized terms or jargon, such as electron, enzyme, and
epithelium, which have no meaning in common language, although these sciences
also make liberal use of terms from common language.  Some professions, most
notably medicine and law, use Latin terms, thereby avoiding the ambiguities
inherent in common language.  The social sciences, perhaps unfortunately, mostly
use common language terms, but give them specialized meanings, thereby inviting
confusion and misinterpretation.  Like all social science research, this report uses
such common terms frequently, but where they are given specialized and
restrictive meanings, they are defined accordingly. 
Fact
Facts are the "real world" elements with which we deal.  Some
methodologists have called them sensory impressions, others data.  In any case,
the point is that they represent the external and objective reality which our
analyses attempt to explain.  Philosophers may argue over whether there is an
objective reality, but the working scientist, like the man in the street, finds this
argument impractical, if not downright meaningless.
Of course, the facts which we observe are only those aspects of reality
which our language, our concepts, and our experience lead us to notice.  They
represent some of what is "out there," however partial and biased the perception.
The old parable about the three blind men describing an elephant in very different
terms corresponding to their very different experiences of the elephant applies in
equal measure to all of us.  Facts are tricky, because they derive not just from
objective reality but also from the experience and knowledge of the observer.
This phenomenon can be particularly salient in social science research reliant on
second-hand data provided through interview research.  Nonetheless, there is a
hard and unforgiving edge to fact which we may mistake, but cannot ignore. 
Logic 
Logic refers to those rules and working assumptions (axioms) of a
particular analytical process which must be obeyed. There may be different
logicse.g., Euclidian versus Lobachevskian-Riemannian-Bolyain (i.e., non-
Euclidian) geometriesbut each such set of rules must be internally consistent,
and whichever logic is chosen must be followed consistently throughout the
analysis.  Without logic there is no discipline, no consistency, and no
predictabilityessential qualities of true academic inquiry.  The Euclidian logic
    9   A detailed review of major frameworks in logic are well beyond the scope of this
research.  This subject is perhaps most directly explored in historical summaries of
mathematical thought.  One concise introduction to this material is available at
<http://kalypso.cybercom.net/~rbjones/rbjpub/maths/math003.htm>. 
9
of the engineer, the Riemannian logic of the astronomer, and the Boolean logic
of the computer programmer are close to the surface and readily acknowledged
in these fields.9  But most of us, social scientists included, are not explicit, and
perhaps not even conscious, of the logics which undergird our thinking.  This can
be particularly disconcerting in the early stages in a disciplines evolution, as
methodological advances cannot be readily pursued without critical review of the
underlying logic.
Metaphors 
Metaphors, also known as models, are sets of variables and relationships
between those variables which, together, "explain" the workings of certain classes
of phenomena. The variables and relationships must be included in the terms of
the chosen language, and the relationships between variables must obey the rules
of the chosen logic.  Metaphors introduce the crucial if, then propositions which
tie facts together and make sense of empirical observations.  They enable us to
predict what may happen under selected and specified conditions. 
Metaphors are general, in the sense that their terms refer to classes of like
individuals, not to particular individuals.  For example, a model of how bees fly
must apply to all bees, not just one bee.  Similarly, metaphors are not specific to
individual situations, but are intended to apply to all situations of a particular kind.
Medical researchers, for example, are concerned with developing better models
of this or that disease, knowledge that medical practitioners must then extrapolate
to the treatment of specific individual patients.  One creates, revises, or expands
metaphors, while the other applies those metaphors to individual cases.
Stories
Stories represent the grand culmination; the integration of facts, logic, and
metaphors which attempt to interpret sense data and account for the workings of
the real world in specific contexts.  Stories, unlike metaphors, are situation-
specific.  They refer to particular individualsperhaps many individualsbut not
to abstract classes of individuals.  History is storytelling, for it recognizes facts
and interprets those facts through the use of (perhaps inexplicit) metaphors.
When different metaphors are utilized, two historians can interpret the same event
in radically different terms.  For the social scientist heavily reliant on case study
and interview data, an appreciation of the underlying metaphors utilized in the
presentation of that information is essential.
Scientific stories are told in combinations of common language and the
appropriate specialized language(s).  We all tell stories, but the difference between
the stories we tell as scientists and those which we tell as non-scientists lie not
only in the language employed, but also in the degree to which we are explicit
    10   Philosopher Michael Polanyi, 1891-1976.
    11   This tripartite characterization of the action situation is somewhat different than the
approach described by Ostrom et al. (1994:28), which defines action situations more
generally as the “social space where individuals interact, exchange goods and services,
engage in appropriation and provision activities, solve problems, or fight ...”  Seven types of
variables are used by Ostrom et al. to fully describe action situations.  The scheme utilized
in this report seeks to more concisely capture the range of variables that interact to create
problems within this “space,” and in doing so, blends concepts described by Ostrom et al.
using both the action situation and action arena terminology.
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about the facts, logic, and especially, the metaphors upon which those stories are
based.  Non-scientists rely heavily on anecdote, but seldom acknowledge the
underlying metaphors when storytelling.  Indeed, Polanyi10 suggests that we may
be able to recognize and articulate only about ten percent of the knowledge (i.e.,
metaphors) which underlie our everyday discourse.  Scientists, on the other hand,
distrust anecdote and decry anecdotal evidence, although often remaining highly
dependent upon these information sources.
The Institutional Analysis and Development
(IAD) Framework
Of the many possible approaches to institutional analysis, perhaps the most
complete and promising derives from the work of Elinor Ostrom and her public
choice colleagues at Indiana University.  Expanding on Ostroms earlier work
entitled An Agenda for the Study of Institutions (Ostrom, 1986), this group of
researchers has more recently expanded their thinking to form an institutional
analysis and development (IAD) framework (Crawford and Ostrom, 1993;
Ostrom et al., 1994).  This body of research, when combined with related and
derivative investigations (e.g., Gregg et al., 1991), has resulted in a framework
that provides an overarching way of looking at resource management and other
societal activities.  It supplies the language which is the first requisite for
institutional analysis, and provides a way of relating the facts, logic, metaphors
(models), and stories which, together, constitute institutional analysis.
Consequently, this framework, augmented by a variety of related concepts, is at
the heart of the institutional analysis approach described in this report.
The Action Situation
At the core of the IAD framework is the notion of an action situation,
mentioned earlier, which is defined herein to consist of three broad and
interrelated components: the physical environment, the actors (and their
behavior),  and  the  institutional rules.11  Every case study, at every significant
    12    Several additional salient qualities of the physical environment are provided in the
discussion of operational choice level problem types.
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point in time, presents a unique action situation comprised of these core elements.
Of these three components, it is the institutional rules that are the primary focus
of institutional analysis and, more specifically, the IAD framework.  This is not to
imply, however, that the institutional rules are the overriding factor in determining
resource conditions.  To the contrary, the action situation concept is predicated
on the belief that these outcomes are determined by more than rules, but are also
controlled in part by the nature of the physical environment in which people and
groups find themselves and by the innate behavioral characteristics of individuals
and groups.  The emphasis in institutional analysis is upon rulesrather than
environmental science and engineering on the one hand or upon biology and
sociology on the othersimply because institutional rules are explicitly human
creations, subject to deliberate modification through individual and, more
commonly, collective action.  The physical environment and the actor/behavioral
component provide a context within which these rules operate and are changed.
Institutional Rules in Context: The Physical and Actor/Behavioral
Components of the Action Situation
The environmental component of the action situation can, in theory, be
defined to include the full range of variables that somehow affect (and are affected
by) outcomes of the actions taken, and are neither actors nor institutional rules.
However, in the realm of natural resource studies, this component is best defined
quite literally as the physical environment of land, water, air, and biota organized
within discrete landscapes and featuring well established biophysical processes.
Among those processes that may prove influential in particular situations is the
tendency of water to flow downhill, a gravitational reality that typically results in
upstream water users impacting downstream users, but not vice versa (McDonald,
1997).  These and other important qualities of the physical environment may
derive from natural landforms and processes, or may be associated with the built
environmente.g., a stream regulated by impoundments and diversion
structures.12  In either case, the qualities of the physical environment in any
particular action situation must be assumed to exert an influence over, and be
influenced by, the actor/behavioral component and the institutional rules.
The set of actors involved in an action situation includes both individuals
and organizations associated with a given subject matter, such as a particular
natural resource.  Determining what types of roles these actors may play is
primarily an issue addressed by the institutional rules.  In evaluating the
actor/behavioral component, it is important to make some assumptions about the
    13   Examples of these rule types are provided later in this section.
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expected behavioral patterns of these actors.  Social scientists treat this issue in
a variety of ways, most of which have to do with the psychology of individuals,
the behavior of organizations, and the importance of learned behavior (Brunner,
1997).  Three perspectives are most pervasive: the adaptive, problem-solving
animal characterization of biology and psychology; the rational decision maker
construct of economics; and the socialized and rule-bound actor (or organization
man) of sociology.  The model (or metaphor) of human behavior which seems
most useful for institutional analysis is an amalgam of these three that recognizes
the overriding importance of self-interest, but which also acknowledges the
importance of learning and socialization in determining behaviora consideration
known as embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985).  This behavioral metaphor is
further refined by considering the constraints on rational decision-makers
attributable to limited time, money, capability, and other resources, factors that
lead to the satisficing behavior described by Simon (1982) as bounded
rationality.  The advantage of such an eclectic view is that the human actor is
seen as powerfully influenced by rules, but capable of evaluating those rules and
changing them rationally, as experience and social learning accumulate.
Institutional Rules and Levels 
Institutions can perhaps best be envisioned as sets of rules that constrain
and expand the behavioral options available to various actors in a given
environment.  Institutional analysis, therefore, is the review of how well these
rules lead to desired outcomes, something that is most easily measured using the
problem-solving orientation featured in this report.  To do this in a consistent and
rigorous fashion requires the development of a taxonomy (i.e., a language) of
different rule types.  It also requires an appreciation of institutional levels.  Both
needs can be satisfied within the IAD framework.
Ostrom (1986) has distinguished seven types of institutional rules: scope,
position, boundary, authority, information, aggregation, and payoff rules.  The
first type is the scope rules, which define the domain of applicability (i.e., the
substantive focus) of the rule set.  The second type is the position rules, which
define the positions (i.e., roles) which actors may occupy.  Position rules are
closely related to the third rule type, boundary rules, which define how actors can
enter or leave positions.  The fourth rule type is the authority rules, which define
the actions which occupants of positions may, may not, must, or must not take.
Fifth is information rules, which define what information shall be provided by
whom and to whom.  The sixth rule type is aggregation rules, which map the
actions of occupants of individual positions into collective or aggregate outcomes.
Finally, the seventh type is payoff rules, which define how outcomes or impacts
(i.e., benefits and costs) are to be distributed.  These rule categories supply a key
component of the vocabulary for institutional analysis.13
    14    For example, it is unlikely for a natural resources dispute to lead to changes in basic
governmental structures, such as the existence of three branches of government.  
    15   Note that it is possible and common for a particular individual or group to be active at
more than one institutional level.  For example, a person holding the position of “resource
user” at the operational level may be a member of an interest group active at the collective
choice level.  Since each position (or role) has its own set of associated rules, it is
analytically useful to consider this as two separate components of the institution—even if,
from the standpoint of the individual involved, the roles are viewed as part of the same
overall activity.
13
Another key concept is that of institutional levels.  As mentioned earlier,
it is useful to distinguish between three general levels: operational choice,
collective choice, and constitutional choice levels.  The first, or lowest, level of
decision-making and action is the operational choice level.  The decisions made
at this level directly determine how resources are used.  Decision-makers at the
operational choice level are often natural resource users of some sort.  They
decide upon actions to divert and store water, to operate reservoirs, to maintain
minimum streamflows, to graze cattle or sheep, to cut timber, to recreate, and
other on-the-ground activities.  In taking these actions, they are guided by the set
of operational choice rules associated with a given institution, which may contain
such familiar elements as water rights, grazing lease terms, timber sale contracts,
mining permits, and other rules that specify accepted patterns of interaction
between humans and natural resources.
Operational choice rules are made and revised at a second, and higher,
decision-making level.  It is called the collective choice level.  Rule-making
activity at the collective choice level normally occurs in group settings (hence its
name), unlike the frequently individual decision-making which occurs at the
operational choice level.  A variety of such group settings can be found, including
legislatures, courts, committees, and collectives of various kinds.  The kind of
behavior which occurs in these settings usually involves bargaining, voting,
litigating, or other interactive modes.  Natural resource planning is, itself, an
activity carried out at the collective choice level.  Market transactions are also
collective choice level activities, although of a different kind.  Here the decision-
making group may consist of only sellers, buyers, and enforcers of contracts.
The collective choice rules, which define the mechanisms for making
operational choice rules, are in turn made and changed at the third, or
constitutional choice, level.  The name given to this level reflects the analytical
assumption that this is the highest decision-making level to be considered.
Furthermore, the constitutional choice rules are not considered to be open to
change.  Basic constitutional elements are technically open to change, of course,
but not normally within the context of natural resource planning and decision-
making.14  Legislatures and courts will frequently appear as participants in
constitutional choice level action situations in many analyses.15
    16   The term problematic situation (Dewey, 1938) should not be confused with the tern
action situation.  As discussed later, a problematic situation refers to a condition in which
one or more parties is dissatisfied, but where no problem-solving activity has yet been
initiated.
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Description and Preliminary Analysis of the Action Situation: An
Example
Any particular action situation at any given moment is best analyzed in a
bottom-up fashion, considering only a single level of decision-making and action
at a time.  This is not to say that the three levels are independent of each other;
nothing could be farther from the truth.  However, for analytical purposes, it is
easiest to first analyze an action situation by focusing only on the operational
choice level rules.  Undoubtedly in a problematic situation16 amenable to an
institutional solution, one or more deficiencies will be identified in the operational
choice level rules.  In such a case, a subsequent analysis is then called for of the
collective choice level rules, which is where action must be taken to resolve the
operational choice rule inadequacy.  Should those rules also be shown to be
inadequate, then the opportunities for action at the still higher constitutional
choice level must be examined, as it is that level where the collective choice level
rules can be changed.  How many such individual analyses may be required will
depend upon the nature of the identified problems and the opportunities for
problem-solving.  
In order to complete an institutional analysis, the rules (or rule sets) that
comprise the institution must be investigated and described.  To show how this
can be done, consider a simple hypothetical example of the control of a developed
stream system that supplies water to a municipality (M&I uses) and which also
supports an aquatic/riparian ecosystem with both intrinsic and recreational values.
Begin the review of this situation with a consideration of the scope rules at the
operational choice level.  The scope rules define the domain of the rule set, in this
case the water supply of the region and how it is used.  Note that this particular
scope rule includes management of a municipal water supply system as well as the
non-consumptive, instream-flow needs of the environment and community.  This
particular scope rule thus does not include a number of elements which are found
in many other water management casese.g., commercial navigation activities.
Nor does it include all manner of existing rules which are not directly relevant to
water resources management, such as automobile traffic laws and the procedural
regulations of local civil courts.  
The position rules determine what roles are available for participants.  At
this level, we are concerned with the stakeholders (water users) of various kinds,
focusing primarily in this case on the M&I consumptive users and non-
consumptive users of instream flows.  The reservoir operator is another
obvious and necessary position, as is the manager of the municipal water
providing utility and also the monitor of instream flows.  A position must exist
for every type of decision-maker at the operational choice level.  All of the
    17   What a position holder may do is commonly called a right.  The lack of a right
indicates that the party must not take the action in question.  What a position holder must do
is commonly called a duty.  The absence of specific and critically important duties is a
common source of water resource policy disputes, whereas the violation of a right is
typically a litigious matter.
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occupants of a single position type are subject to exactly the same set of other rule
types (i.e., scope, boundary, authority, information, aggregation, and payoff
rules).  In other words, all occupants of a single type of position are homogeneous
from the point of view of institutional analysis, otherwise more than one position
type should be recognized.  
The boundary rules determine how people and organizations can enter or
leave positions.  For example, adequate protection of instream flows might require
that a representative of the state fish and game department fill the position of
monitor of instream flows, while a technically-trained official representing the
entity owning the dam would likely be designated to fill the position of reservoir
operator.  In theory, some individuals may fill two or more positions.  For
example, a water resources engineer may be selected to fill both the reservoir
operator and instream flow monitor positions.  Regardless of the arrangement in
use, the institutions boundary rules specify the requirements for filling positions,
and may include information about the needed (or prohibited) qualifications,
affiliations, and employment/service terms of the particular individuals.
The authority rules define what these various players may do, must do,
may not do, and must not do.17  For example, the very title of the reservoir
managers position implies that (s)he controls storage and releases from the
reservoir.  In a particular case, the authority rules for the reservoir operator might
dictate, for example, that the occupant of this position may make hourly releases
from the reservoir, that (s)he must empty the reservoir by May 1, that (s)he may
not release sufficient water to meet municipal requests if minimum instream flow
requirements are thereby imperiled and if the municipality has not implemented
water conservation programs and, that (s)he must not release less than the amount
of water required to meet minimum instream flow requirements.  These rules may
be codified in statutes, operations manuals, and other formal sources, or may
derive from more subtle origins such as disciplinary codes of conduct, unofficial
standard operating procedures of an organization or network of individuals, or
even social mores.  
The information rules describe what information is produced and
transmitted between the various parties in an institution.  Although information
rules are often not shown in system models, they can be very extremely important
in describing how an institution functions.  In our hypothetical water management
case, for example, information rules will be important when municipal water
conservation measures must be invoked, because people must be taught how and
when  to  conserve  water  in  order  to make this a viable component of a water
    18   The ET (evapotranspiration) watering schedule displayed on Denver television
stations during the summer months is an effective information rule of this type.
    19   Compare this aggregation rule to the proportional sharing philosophy that guides
action in riparian systems (Lord and Kenney, 1993).
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management scheme.18  Similarly, information on the streamflow rate at critical
locations downstream of the reservoir must be collected and transmitted to the
reservoir operator as a normal part of resource management.
The aggregation rule maps individual decisions into an aggregate
outcome.  This is often a difficult rule type to understand, but a good example is
the situation-specific application of the  first in time, first in right principle of the
doctrine of prior appropriation, through which scarce water supplies are allocated
among competing demands.19  The rules of reservoir operation may also be of
particular salience.  In the hypothetical example, the aggregation rule would
determine how the actions of the reservoir manager, water utility manager, and
instream flow monitor combine to produce an outcome composed of water
deliveries and instream flows.  Our example suggests that the minimum instream
flow requirement will be satisfied first, that the flood control objective of
emptying the reservoir by May 1 will be satisfied next, and that the municipal
water supply demands will be satisfied last.
Payoff rules can also be difficult to describe, especially at higher
institutional levels.  The payoff rules determine the distribution of benefits and
costs in particular outcomes.  Payoff rules are particularly salient in influencing
behavior, as they are likely to specify winners and losers of various management
schemes.  In our hypothetical example at the operational choice level, both
consumptive and non-consumptive water users receive benefits and bear
costsalthough in times of shortage, it appears as if non-consumptive users will
receive the majority of benefits.  More explicit types of payoff rules include
municipal water rate structures and cost-sharing rules for project construction or
maintenance.
To complete the preliminary analysis of the action situation at the
operational choice level will require some effort to consider the context provided
by the physical and the actor/behavioral environments.  Given the focus in this
example on a water system, it is likely that a hydrologic model (or metaphor),
perhaps utilizing an input/output approach, could be appropriate and useful.  Of
course, a different set of metaphors would likely be sought in a case involving the
management of a forest, which has many different physical qualities than the water
resource, such as a lack of mobility.  The nature of the actor/behavioral
environment can be generally assumed, as mentioned earlier, to be governed by
bounded   rationalityi.e.,  individual   self-interest   tempered   somewhat  by
    20   As explained by Dubnick and Bardes (1983:171), a “decision-maker behaving under
conditions of bounded rationality will not seek to achieve a maximization of given goals and
objectives . . . but rather will select that course of action which will be satisfactory in its
attainment of that goal or objective.”  
    21   Mark Twain is normally credited with the saying, “Whiskey is for drinking, water is
for fighting.”
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sociocultural constraints (Simon, 1982).20  This assumption can be applied to
natural resource institutions of all types, although there is considerable historical
evidence to suggest that western water conflicts evoke behavior that is abnormally
passionate and contentious.21  
Management options may be thought of as sets of operational rules which
influence the behaviors of resource users and managers interacting with a given
physical environment.  Water lawwhether court-made riparian sharing,
administrative permitting, or historically-based appropriationis a good example
of such rules.  Contractual assignment of storage or water deliveries from federal
reservoirs, along with the reservoir operating rules which implement them, is
another good water-related example, as are the set of water pricing policies and
possible water conservation measures in use by a municipal water utility.
Similarly, management options pertaining to land management are often best
characterized in terms of property rights, or more limited forms of tenuresuch
as grazing leases or timber sale contracts.  The projected outcomes, or impacts,
of adopting and implementing a particular set of rules in a given action situation
are determined by the interaction of all seven types of rules with the other
elements of that situation, namely the characteristics of the physical environment
and the actor/behavioral component.
In most situations and time periods, the set of operational level rules
associated with a particular institution satisfactorily operates to manage the
human-environment interface.  In some cases, however, problems exist in resource
use or management.  In order to identify the needed institutional reforms in those
cases, a more detailed institutional analysis is required.  This analysis must include
a consideration of problem types and problem-solving options, and must also
feature a consideration of the rules at the higher institutional levelsparticularly
the collective choice levelin addition to those at the operational choice level.
Natural Resource and Environmental Problems 
The IAD framework is a static one, which is to say that it enables us to
describe, analyze, and design institutions at specific points in time.  Institutional
change  is  primarily  a  result of problem-solving activityindividuals  and/or
    22   Long-term institutional innovation in natural resource institutions is discussed by
Munro (1988), who identifies paradigmatic change as the key driving factor.  This
phenomenon is briefly discussed in Section V.
    23   Perhaps the most classic text exploring decision heuristics is Wildavsky’s (1987)
review of the federal budgeting process.
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groups encounter situations which they deem to be unsatisfactory, and they act,
not always successfully, to change those situations for the better.22  In most
natural resource situations, the perceived nature of the problems or potential
solutions hinges, in some way, on interrelationships between actors, thereby
necessitating some degree of collective activity. 
John Dewey (1938) called the initial experience of dissatisfaction, prior to
any attempt to analyze and improve upon it, a problematic situation.  As those
who experience such a problematic situation attempt to understand and resolve
it, they do so by defining one or more problems. This problem definition step may
be overtly intellectual, in which case at least some of the metaphors employed are
explicit and recognized, or it may be largely non-intellectual, in which case
habitual ways of thinking are invoked, with the underlying metaphors remaining
unrecognized.  Some authors (e.g., Schneider, 1989) refer to these habitual
mechanisms of simplifying otherwise complex decision-making efforts as decision
heuristics, something which may need to be included in the inventory of
institutional rulesespecially the information and aggregation rules.23  
Problem definition has been called the most important step in problem-
solving, because the way the problem is formulated shapes the nature of the
potential solutions which are conceived, evaluated, and ultimately tried.  A water
shortage, for example, might be defined by an economist as deriving from
inadequate (too low) pricing regimes; an engineer may see the problem as a lack
of storage facilities; a geographer might cite the inappropriateness of development
in an arid region.  Problem definition is followed by the search for options
(potential solutions), the evaluation of those options, selection of one or more
options to be acted upon, implementation, and perhaps eventual evaluation of the
outcome.  This sequence, or something very much like it, is widely recognized as
the appropriate process of problem-solving.  
Problems at the Operational Choice Level  
Problematic situations can occur at any of the three levels of decision-
making and action. At the operational choice level, we distinguish four types of
natural resource and environmental problems.  They are depletion,
underinvestment, maldistribution and externalities.  All four are fundamentally
alike, in that they describe situations in which some party or parties are not
receiving the benefits of resource management to which they aspire.  They may
then bring the perceived inadequacy to established resource management agencies,
to legislatures,  to  conflict resolution forums (such as courts), or they
    24   Examples include the harvest of timber at a rate exceeding natural regeneration and
the withdrawal (or “mining”) of groundwater at a rate exceeding recharge.  These
“unsustainable” practices are problematic only when there is a concern over future
shortages.
    25   An example includes concerns over inadequate fiscal or legal attention devoted to the
preservation of endangered species.
    26   Depletion and underinvestment problems share the common quality of symmetry,
while maldistribution and externality problems are symmetric.  The meaning and
significance of these terms are described in Section III.
19
may devise ad hoc instruments for problem resolution, such as the use of
collaborative groups.  Many operational choice level problematic situations
contain elements of one or more of these problem types. 
Depletion describes a condition in which current resource use threatens
to diminish future use.   It may be defined technically as a shift in the time-
weighted distribution of use rates towards the present (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1970),
Conservation, the opposite of depletion, may be defined as a shift in the time-
weighted distribution of use rates towards the future.  Neither depletion nor
conservation is intrinsically good or bad, per se, when they are defined in this way.
When depletion is perceived as a problem, it is because there is disagreement
among parties who prefer high current use rates and those who advocate a shift
in use rates to the future (conservationists) or those promoting an agenda of non-
use (preservationists).24  
Depletion and underinvestment are closely related, and often accompany
each other as aspects of a problem situation involving natural resources.
Underinvestment describes a condition in which the anticipated future provision
of resource-related goods and services is smaller than desired, presumably due to
failure to invest sufficient capital and/or labor in resource management.25
Underinvestment problems are generally associated with renewable resources, as
future flows of these resources can be augmented by current investments.
Conflict may occur over appropriate levels of current investment and implied
future levels of availability of resource-related goods or services, just as conflict
may occur over the appropriate state of conservation/depletion.
The final two types of operational choice level problems, maldistribution
and externality problems, are also closely related.26  In fact, externalities can be
considered to be a special sub-set of the maldistribution category (Schmid, 1978).
Any situation in which the allocation of a finite resource-related good or service
is perceived by one or more parties to be inadequate is a maldistribution.  In
common parlance, maldistribution problems are frequently described as scarcity
situations, indicating that the available quantity of the good or service in question
is inadequate to satisfy all demands.  Inevitably in such situations, an allocation
    27   For example, the demand for hunting licenses, rafting permits, and/or water supplies
far exceeds the supply in many cases, forcing the use of various allocation systems that
inevitably favor some parties at the expense of others.
    28   Despite the widespread use of the externality terminology, particularly in the
economics literature, a standardized definition remains elusive, with each author defining
the term with regard to that feature they deem most significant (Baumol and Oates, 1988). 
As discussed in Section III, it is the concept of asymmetry that is central to the definition of
externalities in this framework.  
    29   Unregulated pollution is the classic example of an environmental externality.  For
example, a factory in an urban area discharging smoke is using the atmosphere for waste
disposal, which reduces the ability of city residents to use the atmosphere for clean (healthy)
respiration.  In an uncontrolled situation, the factory has no obvious incentive to consider
this unintended impact. 
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mechanism of some sort must be employed.27  Those parties most disadvantaged
by the nature of the allocation mechanism are most likely to indicate the existence
of a maldistribution problem.  
The special case of externality problems occur when the use of a resource-
related good or service by some parties diminish the availability of other goods
and services received by different parties (Pigou, 1938).  This relationship is often
not recognized by existing institutional rules, in part since the cause and effects
may be separated by space (a spatial externality), time (temporal externality), or
both.28  Externalities typically happen when more than one kind of good or service
is produced by a single resourcea condition described by economists using the
term joint production, which refers to the interrelatedness of two or more
different kinds of goods or services.  Normally, some level of use by the first party
and some level of external cost suffered by the second party will be viewed as
reasonable, but a higher than appropriate external cost is actually incurred because
the first party need not take such costs into account (Baumol and Oates, 1988).29
Problems at the Collective Choice Level  
The resolution of operational choice level problems typically requires
action at the institutions collective choice level.  While this is sometimes a
relatively mundane and simple exercise, problematic situationsof fundamentally
different typescan also arise at the collective choice level, as participants seek
to change the operational choice level rules.  Parties acting at the collective choice
level can encounter one or more of three general types of problems, or more
accurately, types of conflicts: interest conflict, value conflict and cognitive
conflict (Lord, 1979).  These types of conflicts are primarily shaped by the unique
nature of the particular field-level management problem and by the characteristics
of the collective choice level rules.
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The Procedural Focus of Collective Choice Level Rules
In order to understand the nature of these conflicts, it is necessary to first
appreciate the types of arrangements described by the seven rules categories at the
collective choice level, which unlike the operational choice level, have more to do
with the process of decision-making than the substance of such deliberations.  The
collective choice level scope rules, for example, describe the set of operational
level rules that can be reviewed, revised, replaced, or added through collective
action.  They do not directly address the human/resource interface.  For example,
in a market-oriented water institution, the collective choice scope rules are likely
to be those that describe the rules of marketing, contracting, and related
components associated with multiparty free market transactions, while the
operational choice level rules would focus on how rights holders (and non-rights
holders) can actually utilize the regions water resources.
Collective choice position rules are likely to specify positions for policy-
makers (including program administrators and regulators) and, in those situations
where rights to natural resources are privately held, for buyers and sellers.
Positions for policy advocates, such as interest groups, and advisory bodies are
also common at this level.  
Of particular concern at the collective choice level are the boundary rules,
since they determine who has a seat at the decision-making table.  Many of the
most salient modern innovations in natural resources governance have been those
that have modified the collective choice level boundary rules to provide
environmental interests with a greater role in decision-making (MacDonnell and
Bates, 1993).  Examples of such innovations include modern planning processes
requiring public participation, a broadened legal definition of standing in natural
resource disputes, public interest regulations limiting the exercise of private rights,
and the proliferation of collaborative groups that welcome broad participation in
problem-solving.  Traditional extractive users have long been recognized at this
level, through mechanisms such as grazing boards and by virtue of holding private
property rights (or leases) for various resources or resource uses.  
Conceptually, authority rules at the collective choice level are generally
much less diverse and complicated than those at the operational choice
levelalthough the administrative law attorney may disagree with this
characterization in practice.  At the collective choice level, authority rules
typically focus on the obligations and powers of participants in collective decision-
making processes, such as the right to vote, the obligation to disclose information,
the opportunity to attend meetings, and perhaps the requirement to provide dues.
Information rules, like boundary rules, are often particularly crucial to the
success of collective choice level processes.  Various forms of group interaction
at the collective choice levelfrom bargaining and collaboration at one extreme
to litigation and regulation at the otherare highly dependent upon the provision
of  information that  is  accurate,  credible,  comprehensive,  and  perhaps  most
    30  A variety of potentially important qualities of the natural and built environments can
be described using the concept of “spatial linkages,” a framework developed by White
(1961).
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importantly, universally available.  Many different mechanisms and tools can be
used to provide this information: these arrangements are specified in the collective
choice level information rules.
Aggregation rules at the collective choice level are also frequently of high
importance.  For example, an institution reliant on a unanimity decision-rule is
likely to feature very different qualities than one utilizing majority-rule or some
other system.  As discussed later, the nature of the aggregation rule is normally
highly influential in determining what types of issues a collective choice level
institution can, and cannot, address.  
The final category of payoff rules can be difficult to identify, in large part
because two fundamentally different types of benefits can be ascribed to
participation in collective choice processes.  The first class of benefits are
associated with the actual act of participation, and can include such nebulous
rewards as the good feeling and sense of participation that can derive from
group action.  Of course, these benefits can be offset by costs such as the
frustration and expense often associated with collective actionespecially those
actions that do not result in real problem-solving.  The other and presumably more
important class of benefits are the changes in operational level rules resulting from
collective choice action which, ideally, result in the solution of those field-level
problems that likely initiated the collective choice action.  It is this class of
benefits that are primarily featured by the bottom-up problem-solving orientation
described in this report.
The focus at this level on collective, rather than individual, action also
influences the selection of metaphors useful in the analysis of the other
components of the action situation.  For example, at this level, the characteristics
of the natural environment are likely to prove less important than at the
operational choice level.  Instead, qualities of the built (i.e., manmade)
environment may be particularly salient, such as the physical distance between
participants, the structural characteristics of meeting place facilities, and the
quality of technologies used to support communication and bargaining.30
Similarly, collective choice level analysis may require the use of different
metaphors relating to behavior than those used at the operational choice level,
primarily since models of independent individual action may fail to consider
interdependence between actors, the very essence of collective choice level
activity.  Economics supplies some models of two-person negotiation and
bargaining, but perhaps the most promising models of n-person interaction, in
which the actors are both cooperative (all want to solve the problem) and
competitive (they prefer different solutions) are found in the mathematical theory
of games (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1964; Luce and Raiffa, 1957).
    31   For example, parties involved in a water development scheme will each likely be in
competition with each other for favorable cost-sharing terms and related issues relating to
the allocation of project benefits. 
    32   The language and metaphors of mathematics, and more specifically, game theory, are
particularly well-suited to the analysis of collective decision making.
    33   A special sub-set of positive-sum outcomes are the Pareto optimal solutions.  A
positive-sum outcome is one in which the collective benefits to all parties exceed the
collective costs, whereas a Pareto optimal outcome is one in which all individual
participants either receive net benefits, or are at least not harmed by an action.  In some
situations, a positive-sum outcome may not be Pareto optimal if one (or more) specific
individuals are required to bear the majority of the costs, or are disproportionately excluded
from receiving the benefits.
    34   The best national example of value conflict, however, does not come from the natural
resources or environmental realm.  It is the conflict over abortion rights, an issue that
features relatively little interest or cognitive conflict.
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The Problem of Conflict at the Collective Choice Level
Having now described the typical content of the collective choice level
rules, it is possible to return to the discussion of the three conflict types
experienced at this level.  Perhaps the most obvious type of conflict is interest
conflict, in which it is the economic and other direct impacts upon stakeholders
which cause disagreements over how resources should be allocated, managed and
used.31  In some situations, gains to one side may come only at the expense of
corresponding losses to another, a so-called zero-sum game.32  In some of these
situations, forging agreement may require finding options which provide benefits
to all, or converting the zero-sum game to a positive-sum one.33  As discussed
later, whether or not this modification of the payoff rules is a prerequisite to
problem-solving is largely dependent on the type of problem-solving strategy
employed at the collective choice level.  
A related type of conflict occurring frequently in natural resource and/or
environmental problem-solving is value conflict.  As the name implies, this type
of conflict occurs when participants do not share common values.  In the natural
resources realm, value conflict is perhaps best illustrated by preservationist
statutes such as the Endangered Species Act, which is based on the controversial
philosophy that the existence value of a species is inherently greater than any
economic or other anthropocentric value that may be constrained through species
protection (Kenney et al., 1998).34  In this and other value conflicts, opposing
sides disagree fundamentally about what is morally right and wrong, a quality that
can make value conflict particularly difficult to resolve in a satisfying manner. 
The final major category of collective choice level conflict occurs when
people simply disagree about the facts of the case.  This can be termed a
cognitive conflict.  Nobody ever has complete and accurate information about
    35   For example, recent debates regarding global warming have indicated a lack of
common understanding about the existence, magnitude, and potential causes of the
phenomenon.  
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many of the complex situations which characterize natural resource and
environmental problems.35  In fact, the notion of complete and accurate
information may itself be illusory.  Furthermore, we all tend to believe those
explanations which are consistent with our own preferences and self-interest.
Consequently, cognitive conflict is almost always a complicating feature of natural
resource and environmental problems.  
    36   This fact has long been recognized by political scientists, who utilize the term “forum
shopping” to describe how parties strategically select those collective choice processes
which are most likely to result in operational choice level rules of greatest benefit to their
interests.  Along a similar vein, dispute resolution theorists use the concept of BATNA (Best
Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement) to describe the strategic thinking utilized to
determine when a negotiated solution is a strategically appropriate option for a given party
(Fisher and Ury, 1981).
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SECTION III:
SOLVING NATURAL RESOURCE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
The conceptual framework described in Section II provides a consistent
set of terms and concepts that can be used to describe various action situations
and problems characteristic of the natural resources and environmental realm.  In
this section, the focus is on problem-solving strategies.  As discussed below,
several types of problem-solving strategies are currently available to the resources
management community, with the so-called alternative strategies currently
enjoying the greatest support.  In the following pages, some of the most salient
characteristics of this era of alternative problem-solving are described, compared,
and analyzed with respect to generally accepted principles in institutional problem-
solving.  This effort yields some several observations about the proper matching
of problems and problem-solving strategies, knowledge that suggests new
metaphors (or models) potentially useful in the investigation of specific case
studies.  
Note that given the dynamic quality of institutional problem-solving, it can
sometimes be difficult to maintain the distinction between the operational choice
level rules and those at the collective choice (and higher) levels, especially given
the fact that the output (or substantive result) of a rule-making exercisei.e., the
operational choice rules resulting from collective choice level activityis often
largely shaped by the nature of the decision-making process.36   Because of this
connection, the following discussion of alternative problem-solving strategies
freely moves between elements which are largely procedural in nature and those
which are more substantive in nature.  Many of the argumentsseveral of which
are provided belowin favor of new, alternative strategies of problem-solving
follow this pattern, suggesting that these strategies are best characterized as
complex mixtures of institutional rules of several types and at multiple levels.
This imprecision is generally not problematic for descriptive purposes, but in some
cases needs to be addressed as part of the institutional analysis
processparticularly when the issue of concern is the matching of problems to
appropriate problem-solving strategies.
    37   A variety of different terms are used to describe this criterion.  For example, see the
schemes of Dahl and Lindblom (1957) and Wildavasky (1987).  
    38   Of course, rules of all types are important to the functioning of the overall institutional
regime.
    39   For example, seemingly autonomous decision-makers—such as regulatory
agencies—must, as a practical matter, engage in a certain amount of multi-party negotiation
and bargaining as part of rule-making.  A certain amount of deal-making is also seen in
judicial settings.  At the other extreme, while free markets often involve thousands of
decision-makers (i.e., buyers and sellers), systems characterized by monopoly or oligarchy
may not be so clearly non-hierarchical.
    40   The concept of hierarchy can be somewhat confusing given the levels concept, which
assumes that all problem-solving exercises feature an inherent “hierarchical quality,” since
activity at higher levels (particularly the collective choice level) is needed to produce rules
at the operational choice level.  This observation does not invalidate or undermine the use of
the hierarchical/non-hierarchical criterion, but it does suggest that the concept is most
relevant in the analysis of decision-making strategies when defined with respect to a specific
level.  The focus in this section of the report is primarily on collective choice level
activities.
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The Rise of Alternative Problem-Solving Strategies
A tremendous variety of strategies can be utilized to implement
institutional solutions to natural resource and environmental problems.  These
problem-solving strategies can be classified based on a wide variety of criteria.
One criterion frequently utilized in the social sciences literature is to distinguish
between approaches that are hierarchical (or vertical) and those that are non-
hierarchical (or horizontal).37  In terms of institutional rules, the degree of
hierarchy utilized in a problem-solving approach is usually best determined by
reviewing the aggregation, position and boundary rules.38  The most hierarchical
approaches recognize only a single decision-maker, whereas in a highly non-
hierarchical system, several parties will be directly involved in decision-making.
The formal aggregation rule in a hierarchical system is thus quite simple; a single
decision-maker makes the decision.  Other actors may have significant
responsibilities (e.g., providing information) and significant rights (e.g., the power
to appeal decisions), but the ultimate power to decide is highly concentrated in
one individual or body.  Conversely, in non-hierarchical systems, the aggregation
rule must transform the preferences of a large group of decision-makers into a
common or collective decision.  Approaches such as judicial and agency rule-
making are generally classified as hierarchical, while strategies such as
collaboration and market systems are considered non-hierarchical; however, these
are generalizations with many exceptions.39  The hierarchical/non-hierarchical
categories are best viewed as points on a continuum, rather than as discrete
options.40
    41   Of course, in many cases the underlying incentive may be to avoid the restrictions and
penalties that may result if a compulsory strategy is later employed to address an unresolved
problem.  For example, landowners of critical habitat often voluntarily agree to Habitat
Conservation Plans to protect endangered species, an action that is undoubtedly prompted in
many cases by the desire to be protected against future regulatory actions associated with
the Endangered Species Act.  Thus, even the non-compulsory strategies are likely to have
compulsory elements, at least for some parties and/or relating to some types of actions.
    42   However, as observed earlier during the discussion of hierarchical/non-hierarchical
approaches, all rule types are important.
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Another criterion is between the compulsory approaches based on
proscriptions, and the non-compulsoryor voluntaryapproaches based largely
on incentives.  Compulsory approaches are typically hierarchical, employing the
coercive power of the state to specify behaviors which are either required or
forbidden.  Violations of specified behaviors lead to formal sanctions designed to
punish disobedience and prevent further transgressions.  In contract, non-
compulsory (i.e., voluntary) problem-solving approaches do not explicitly require
or forbid certain behaviors, but instead provide incentives for problem-solving that
are highly reliant on voluntary action.41  Compulsory approaches are often best
described by focusing on authority rules, while payoff rules are of particular
salience in the non-compulsory approaches.42  Regulatory programs, administered
largely through administrative rule-making and judicial actions, are typical
examples of compulsory strategies, whereas market-based and collaborative
mechanisms are typical of the non-compulsory approaches.  
In the context of problem-solving, the compulsory/non-compulsory
criterion has relevance at both the collective choice and operational choice levels.
In compulsory strategies at the collective choice level, decision-makers are
required to make decisions.  For example, water pollution control regulations
typically require federal or state agencies to set and enforce standards, and if they
do not, then a judge is normally compelled through litigation to force such action.
These actions often result in compulsory operational choice level rules, frequently
codified in permits.  Non-compulsory strategies at the collective choice level of
an institution are those featuring decision-makers acting voluntarily.  These
interactions may occur in the context of collaborative groups, the functioning of
markets, negotiations, and similar activities usually reliant upon bargaining.  At
the operational choice level, non-compulsory strategies include agricultural
subsidies to encourage soil conservation practices, heightened admission fees to
ration the use of overcrowded parks, and water rate structures designed to
encourage conservation.  
As suggested earlier, there is frequently a correlation between the
collective choice process and the resulting nature of the operational choice level
rules.  The compulsory/non-compulsory concept can be useful in illustrating this
connection, as compulsory collective choice processes often result in compulsory
operational choice level rule rules, and non-compulsory collective
    43  A group which acts only as an advisory body to a more established and authoritarian
decision-maker is better classified as a hierarchical system.  Many of the well-known
collaborative groups arising in the 1990's, especially those concerned with watershed
restoration, are significant in that they are highly non-hierarchical in comparison to typical
advisory bodies.  It is these modern collaborative types are prominently featured in this
report.
    44  ADR is generally defined to include a broad spectrum of voluntary procedural options,
usually featuring the services of a neutral party, utilized for settling disputes by finding
mutually acceptable options (Bingham, 1997).
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choice processes often result in non-compulsory operational choice level rules.
This, of course, is simply a generalization based on observation, and is not a
normative assumption about how natural resource and environmental problems
should be addressed.  
The distinguishing characteristic of those problem-solving strategies that
have risen to prominence in recent decadesthe so-called alternative problem-
solving strategiesis that they are predominantly non-compulsory (voluntary) in
nature.  These strategies are alternative in the sense that they have largely arisen
as an alternative to well established compulsory strategies used in many subject
areas, including, for example, most command-and-control regulatory programs.
Prominent examples of alternative problem-solving strategies include many market
mechanisms, which can range from somewhat hierarchical to highly non-
hierarchical depending on the number of parties involved in making transactions,
and various forms of collaborative groups, many of which in the modern era are
largely non-hierarchical in that decisions are made through processes stressing
group consensus.43  Other examples include various forms of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR), which can range from the highly hierarchical option of binding
arbitration to much more non-hierarchical means such as mediation and facilitation
(Bingham, 1997).44  ADR processes are frequently entered into voluntarily in
hopes of avoiding a more compulsory strategy, such as litigation.  
The Use and Limitations of the Compulsory Tools
An extremely wide variety of compulsory strategies are used in all facets
of public policy to address or head-off problematic situations.  In the natural
resources and environmental realm, many of these approaches either involve
restricting access, prohibiting certain types or levels of use, mandating specific
actions, requiring investments in public resources and services through taxation,
or various policies of redistribution.  Included in this range of actions are
operational choice level rules prohibiting motorized vehicles in designated
Wilderness Areas, regulations outlawing water diversions by non-riparians or non-
rights holders, catch limits (or catch-and-release policies) in public fishing
grounds, property taxes to finance regional flood control programs, mandatory
use  of  pollution-control   equipment,   and  management   plans  that   formally
    45   This idea has also been clearly articulated by the Western Governors’ Association
(1998): “As large, easily identified sources of pollution are controlled, the threat to the
environment has shifted to diffuse, numerous, and smaller scale sources that are more
difficult to control through enforcement-based command and control regulation.”  
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prioritize various uses at the expense of other potential activities.  Among the
most well-known and controversial of the compulsory strategies are those
programs pertaining to water and air pollution control, which are primarily driven
by a command-and-control regulatory framework.  In a command-and-control
program, users of a particular resource are required to meet specific standards,
often specified in a permit and, in an effort to achieve administratively simplicity
and equity, often defined in terms of a technology requirement.  For example, a
requirement that all municipal wastewater plants utilize a form of secondary (i.e.,
biological) treatment is a classic command-and-control strategy.
Technology-based command-and-control programs for pollution control
in the United States have, in many situations, been highly effective (if not always
efficient) in protecting natural resources.  For example, investments of tens of
billions of dollars between 1970 and 1985 increased the percentage of the nations
population served by wastewater treatment plants from 42 to 74 percent, resulting
in a net decrease in municipal organic waste discharges of 46 percent despite
significant population increases; similarly, investments in industrial wastewater
treatment plants have reduced discharges of toxic metals into the nations water
supplies by almost 98 percent (Adler et al., 1993).  Similar technology-based
programs pertaining to air pollution have also produced notable gains in
environmental quality, especially in high-profile cases such as smog control in Los
Angeles.  
However, two related weaknesses of compulsory problem-solving
approaches frequently provide a strong stimulus in favor of other (i.e., alternative)
problem-solving approaches to supplement, or even replace, command-and-
control and other compulsory strategies.  The first weakness is one of efficacy.
This concern has been aptly summarized in the context of pollution control by the
National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA, 1997:200):
The command-and-control approach works relatively well when
it is focused on large point-sources of pollution which have
limited, homogeneous and well understood options for pollution
control, such as industrial facilities or the manufacture of mass-
produced products, such as cars.  Command-and-control
approaches work less well when the targets are more numerous
and diverse, and when there are many options for control.45 
This concern is perhaps best illustrated by the declining effectiveness of the
nations water quality control programs due to the inability of existing
arrangements to effectively deal with nonpoint source pollution.  Nonpoint source
    46   During the period 1974 to 1985, nearly 200 environmental disputes were mediated in
the United States, a sharp increase from previous eras (Bingham, 1997).  Beginning in the
mid-1980s, federal and state governments began to explore mechanisms for incorporating
ADR processes into many facets of public policy decision-making, including natural
resource and environmental issues.  Prominent examples at the federal level include the
Negotiated Rule-Making Act (NRMA) of 1990 and the Administrative Dispute Resolution
Act (ADRA) of 1996.  NRMA provides a framework and procedural requirements within
which agencies are encouraged to assemble stakeholder groups for the purpose of
administrative rule-making, while ADRA requires agencies to fully investigate and consider
opportunities for utilizing ADR in a variety of decision-making settings, including rule-
making, issuing/revoking licenses and permits, contract administration, and dispute
resolution. 
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pollution is largely responsible for the increased concentration of many pollutants
nationally, such as nitrogen and dissolved solids (Adler et al., 1993).  Many
ambient water quality standards have not been meet, and deadlines for compliance
have been frequently extended (NAPA, 1994).  The same pattern can also be seen
in air pollution control.
The second concern involves the economic inefficiency of many
compulsory strategies.  Again, this issue has been most exhaustively addressed in
the literature of pollution control (Baumol and Oates, 1988).  Programs which
provide uniform restrictions on behavior are notoriously inefficient in that they
ignore the fact that the regulated community is rarely homogeneous.  Some
parties have greater opportunities to minimize problem-causing behavior than do
others.  Due to their inherent lack of incentives, however, the compulsory
strategies provide no mechanism or stimulus for these parties to strategically
exploit their different situations and to promote economically efficient pollution
reduction.   
Concerns over efficacy and inefficiency not only apply to operational
choice level rule sets, but can also be applied to the collective choice level
processes that are used to establish these on-the-ground resource management
regimes.  For example, litigation, a largely compulsory and hierarchical problem-
solving approach, is often considered to be poorly suited to addressing
multidimensional problems so typical of natural resource situations.  The legal
system is designed to manage conflict, but not to manage resources, and although
one side may block another from achieving its aspirations, neither side can count
on the courts for ongoing planning and management.  Complaints over high costs
and inadequate representation of all interests are also common.  According to
Bingham (1997:12), it is these types of concerns that best explain the proliferation
of ADR processes in the 1980s 46:
Why have so many individuals, groups, and governmental
institutions become interested in ADR?  The answer tends to fall
into two categories.  People are either deeply frustrated by the
length of time and costs associated with getting to a decision
(efficiency concerns), or they judge that the decisions that are
    47   Ironically, emissions charges have been utilized much more frequently in several
European nations, including those with a history of suppressing free market initiatives.
    48   As Hoffman (1996:10) observes, permit trading programs for water quality have a
high potential, but raise many troubling administrative issues: “Because the watershed
concept looks at the ecosystem as a whole, including all of its pollutant inputs, assimilative
capacities, and biological and geophysical features, it has the potential to be more equitable
in that, in theory, the most critical or most easily (or cost-effectively) controlled sources of a
pollutant would be targeted for reduction.  However, in practice, the scientific and
enforcement tools needed to make watershed permitting function as envisioned are absent. 
For example, there are few effective means of enforcing nonpoint source controls of rural
discharges; and urban and suburban stormwater flows are hard to define and quantify.  The
pitfalls, then, may include resorting to imposing more controls on readily identified and
quantified point sources, while the real culprits continue to discharge unabated.” 
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made do not meet the needs of those involved as well as they
could (quality concerns).  Most are concerned about both. 
Similar concerns have prompted the emergence of collaborative groups in the
1990s (Kenney, 1999; John, 1994).  
The Emergence of New Tools
Over the past two decades, one of the most prominent of the alternative
problem-solving approaches has been the emergence of market-based mechanisms
to manage resources and address natural resource problems (NAPA, 1994;
NAPA, 1997; Hockenstein et al., 1997).  As suggested above, many of these
incentive-based innovations have been utilized to address the externality problems
associated with water and air pollution.  Air quality, in particular, has been the
focus of several notable experiments in incentive-based problem-solving, based
largely on strategies featuring pollution taxes, marketable permit systems, and
offsets.  Among the most successful efforts cited by the National Academy of
Public Administration are the sulfur dioxide reductions achieved through the cap-
and-trade system established in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the
elimination of lead from gasoline though a cap-and-trade phaseout system, and the
rapid end to the production of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons through a
tax-and-trade system (NAPA, 1997:25).  
Despite the strong theoretical justification for such tools and their notable
successes in several areas, incentive-based tools are still relatively uncommon in
many natural resources and environmental issue areas (Hockenstein et al., 1997;
NAPA, 1997).  The permit trading systems which have been used in air pollution
control are still relatively uncommon in most of the United States,47 and similar
programs for water quality are virtually non-existent (Hockenstein et al., 1997;
Hoffman, 1996).48  Modern policy initiatives concerning TMDLs (total maximum
daily loads) may  provide the stimulus needed to encourage market-
    49   The total maximum daily load (TMDL) concept is an approach to water quality
management that bases the amount of total discharges allowed on the natural assimilative
capacity of a particular water body.  Once this level is determined through biophysical
research, permits with specified emission quantities that collectively match this total are
allocated among dischargers, a process sometimes known as a waste load allocation (WLA). 
The process of allocation can be a subject of considerable debate, as can the rules regarding
the reallocation of permits through market processes—a feature of some WLA
proposals/systems.  Marketable permits have been traded on the Fox River (Wisconsin)
since 1982 (Tietenberg, 1992; Gregg et al., 1991), and several entities—including EPA—are
actively investigating opportunities for further applications of this tool (Hoffman, 1996).
    50   The term “subsidy” is used in many different ways in a variety of contexts, but is most
commonly applied in the realm of natural resources management to one of two particular
situations (Kenney et al., 1998).  The first is when beneficiaries of a resource use do not pay
the full costs associated with providing the resource benefit (e.g., irrigation water subsidies,
below-cost timber sales).  The second situation involves the transfer of public resources to
private hands for a price that is below what would have been achieved through a free market
transaction (e.g., preference hydropower rates, hardrock patenting procedures).  
    51   For more conceptual and case specific information on this subject, see the work of the
Political Economy Research Center.    
    52   Martin et al. (1984) review the potential for urban water conservation through
improved pricing mechanisms.
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based programs in water quality management.49  Relatively little success has been
achieved to better utilize market forces to modify resource using practices
involving federal water, rangelands, timber, hydropower, and recreational
resources, all of which are typically subsidized (Munson, 1994).50  In theory, many
depletion problems on public lands and waterways could be addressed, at least in
part, through incentive-based programs that discourage excessive consumption.51
One of the areas where market mechanisms have been most aggressively
utilized in the West is in the reallocation of water resources.  Acting on the belief
that many of these resources have been maldistributed in economic terms, water
markets have facilitated the transfer of water supplies from low-valued uses
(mostly agricultural) to high-valued uses (mostly urban) in some regions of the
West (NRC, 1992).  Incentive-based tools have also been used in municipal water
rate codes to discourage excessive use,52 and to encourage waste reduction in
agricultural networks.  One of the best known of these experiments is the
arrangement between the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) and the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California (MWD) in which MWD finances water-
conservation practices on IID lands, with the conserved water leased to MWD at
favorable rates (Wahl, 1989).  Interestingly, this arrangement was the brainchild
of an environmental organization, the Environmental Defense Fund, the type of
group that has historically been hesitant to deviate from traditional compulsory
approaches in natural resources and environmental management.
    53   This is the situation that has prompted the recent calls for TMDL management based
on the waste load allocation concept.
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Many of the incentive-based programs emerging in recent decades fall into
the category of management options known as performance-based tools (NAPA,
1997:2):
[Performance-based tools] include information management
systems, market-based controls, compliance-assurance strategies,
regulations which encourage firms to choose among compliance
strategies, and new partnerships with states and businesses.  What
those approaches have in common is that they provide incentives
for regulated parties to improve their overall environmental
performances without specifying how they should do so. ...  The
increased emphasis on performance-based management responds
to two social goals: increasing the cost-effectiveness of pollution
controls, and ensuring that those controls are targeted at
improvements in the environment.
This class of alternative problem-solving strategies differ from many of the
compulsory strategies not only in their reliance on incentives, but in their refocus
on the ends and means of program operation.  Many compulsory strategies,
particularly the technology-based command-and-control programs, operate
exclusively by specifying the means of problem-solving (e.g., required use of a
technology), rather than focusing on the ends (i.e., the field-level outcomes).
Programs such as the NPDES (National Pollution Discharge Elimination System),
for example, have the implicit goal of reducing pollution, but are not often
administered in practice with an eye toward meeting a specific water-quality
standard.  Failure to do so has resulted in many basins that do not meet water
quality standards, even though all dischargers may be in compliance with the
technology-based effluent requirements.53  This approach is inconsistent with the
performance-based philosophy.  
Incentive-based (non-compulsory) approaches are often better suited to
performance-based management in that they frequently utilize the marketplace,
rather than a regulatory entity, to determine the most efficient means of achieving
goalsencouraging innovative bargains, new technologies, investments, and
other actions that are conducive to on-the-ground problem-solving (Osborne and
Gaebler, 1992).  Of course, market-based mechanisms can also be utilized to
determine the ends in a natural resource management situation; for example, the
amount of aluminum mined each year is not determined in a policy-making setting,
but is instead driven exclusively by market forces.  Unfortunately, on many
occasions in U.S. history, an over-reliance on market mechanisms to determine
the ends of natural resource and environmental policy has lead to market
failures resulting in depleted or degraded public resources, providing
    54   Osborne and Gaebler (1992) address this issue in the terms of “steering” and
“rowing,” arguing that public bodies are best suited to the steering role while market forces
are adept at rowing.  
    55   Seventy-six case studies of western watershed initiatives are provided in The
Watershed Source Book (NRLC, 1996), published by the Natural Resources Law Center,
with an ongoing revision of that work expected to yield at least 300 additional cases.
    56   Hundreds of case studies can be found on-line at sites maintained by Purdue
University’s Conservation Technology Information Center (<www.ctic.purdue.edu/>) and
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (<www.epa.gov/surf/>), among others.
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the stimulus behind the creation of many management and regulatory agencies and
associated programs (Hays, 1957).  For this reason, in most problematic situations
it is considered appropriate to utilize some form of governmental decision-making
process to determine the overall goal (i.e., the desired ends of resource
management), utilizing the marketplace exclusively to focus on the means
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Hockenstein et al., 1997).54  
Many of the other alternative strategies (other than market-based tools)
are more appropriate for addressing the challenge of determining the desired ends
of resource management.  The most prominent of these tools in the modern era
are various forms of collaborative groups concerned with resource management
or restoration.  One example is provided by watershed groups (also known as
watershed councils, partnerships, alliances, or initiatives), which are generally ad
hoc, voluntary associations of both governmental and non-governmental parties
organized to address water-related problems at regional scales such as
watersheds.  At least 100, and probably as many as 400, active watershed
initiatives can now be found in the West, almost all having originated since 1990.55
Many additional watershed initiatives nationally are described in the work of
Yaffee et al. (1996).56  Groups concerned with forestry management are also
increasingly common (Wondelleck and Yaffee, 1994).  
While these collaborative groups may find a role in addressing both the
ends and means of  problem-solving strategies, it is the role of identifying common
aspirations (i.e., ends) that is frequently the most salient contribution to the
management environment.  Too frequently in the modern era, the inability of the
resource management agencies to successfully manage conflict leads to clogged
courts and paralyzed resource managementalso known as gridlock.
Collaborative groups are often a more practical way for the affected interests
themselves to resolve their differences and help to set new goals for the resource
management community (NRLC, 1996).  
To the extent that mutually acceptable goals can be established, these
multiparty groups can also frequently be useful in designing implementation
strategies (means) that avoid many of the traditional bureaucratic roadblocks to
effective resource management (NRLC, 1996).  Among the most serious of these
impediments   is   intergovernmental   fragmentation   (Kenney, 1997).    These
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potential roles and benefits of collaborative groups have been highlighted in
several scholarly works and agency reports, including those of National
Performance Review (NPR, 1993:14), established to reinvent government in all
subject areas, including natural resources:
The traditional approach to managing ecosystems and the
resources contained within them has been piecemeal.
Responsibility has been fragmented across numerous federal and
non-federal agencies and jurisdictions.  An improved federal
approach to ecosystem management would be based on
ecological, not political, boundaries.  It would then seek and
consider input from all stakeholders affected by federal
responsibilities in the area.  Within such a framework, federal
agencies, state, local, and tribal governments, businesses, public
interest groups, citizens, and Congress could work in
collaboration to develop specific strategies, refocus current
programs and resources, and better ensure the long-term
ecological and economic health of the country.
A New Paradigm of Natural Resource and Environmental
Problem-Solving?
To say that many alternative problem-solving approaches currently enjoy
broad political support would be an understatement.  Rather than forcing a trade-
off between economic efficiency and social equity (a traditional point of debate
among conservatives and liberals), the alternative problem-solving approaches
promise to aid both causes, promoting improved efficiency by using incentive-
based tools (including markets) to devise the means of resource management
and problem-solving, and utilizing inclusive, collaborative, and largely bottom-up
collective choice processes to craft ends which are increasingly defined in
practical (i.e., performance-based) terms.   
At the federal level, many of the most important innovations are occurring
as part of the Administrations ongoing efforts to reinvent government through
the National Performance Review (NPR, 1996).  Among the agencies most
significantly impacted by this changing philosophy have been the Environmental
Protection Agency, a point recently expressed by Deputy Administrator Fred
Hansen (1997:4):
When President Clinton came to Washington, one of his first
orders of business was to begin reinventing the process and the
systems of [environmental] regulations. . . .  For five years we
have been doing just that, and in early 1997 we announced the
creation of EPAs Office of Reinvention and gave it the mission of
coordinating, enhancing, and expanding our efforts to reform the
environmental regulatory system.  
    57   Project XL and the Common Sense Initiative are EPA’s “flagship” efforts.  Project XL
(a loose acronym for “excellence”) is a pilot program encouraging regulated parties to
devise and implement alternative strategies of environmental compliance.  The Common
Sense Initiative is notable for tailoring pollution control strategies on an industry-by-
industry basis, rather than a pollutant-by-pollutant approach (NAPA, 1997).
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The agency has responded to this challenge by creating many new initiatives,
including Project XL, the Common Sense Initiative, and the National
Environmental Performance Partnership System (NAPA, 1997).57  
In addition to these largely market-oriented programs, the agency has also
been a leader in promoting community-based, collaborative decision-making
processes, such as watershed initiatives, as a useful supplement to traditional
regulatory schemes:
The agency has both a national interest in and responsibility for
supporting watershed approaches.  The interest stems from the
belief that the diverse sources of aquatic ecosystem impacts will
best be brought under control through a combination of
cooperative and mandatory measures tailored to the needs in
specific watersheds with wholehearted support from watershed
stakeholders.  EPAs responsibilities include definition and
ensured compliance with basic water programs; development of
national standards and tools; funding; and national assessment of
status and progress.  (EPA, 1996:5).
Perhaps the best example of the broad political acceptance of the
alternative problem-solving approaches, however, is found in a recent policy
resolution of the Western Governors Association, which begins with the assertion
that the nature of environmental and natural resource problems is changing and
that innovative solutions hold the prospect of achieving the desired
environmental outcome and increasing economic wealth (WGA, 1998).  Among
the key elements of these innovative solutions, according to the governors, are
replacing command-and-control programs with incentive-based systems,
increasing the role of sound technical and socioeconomic information (especially
relating to costs and benefits) and public education in decision-making efforts, a
greater reliance on physically relevant administrative boundaries (i.e., a
problemshed focus), and perhaps most importantly, a commitment to
collaboration, not polarization:
The old model of command and control, enforcement based
programs is reaching the point of diminishing returns.  It now
frequently leads to highly polarized constituencies that force
traditional actions by governmental authorities without first
determining if they are the most effective way to protect
environmental values.  Successful environmental policy
    58   The governors have expressed similar ideas elsewhere.  One example is found in a
1993 publication calling for an environmental policy framework “based upon improving the
way we establish environmental priorities, creating better pricing signals, encouraging
voluntary initiatives, working within ecosystems, and resolving disputes without litigation”
(WGA, 1993:i; remarks of WGA Chairman, Fife Symington).  More recently in the Summer
of 1998, the Governors endorsed a “philosophy” known as Enlibra, a term used to describe
a new approach to environmental and natural resources management stressing balance,
creativity, cooperation, and results.
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implementation is best accomplished through balanced, open and
inclusive approaches at the ground level, where interested public
and private stakeholders work together to formulate critical issue
statements and develop locally based solutions to those issues.
Collaborative approaches often result in greater satisfaction with
outcomes, broader public support, and lasting productive working
relationships among parties.  Additionally, collaborative
mechanisms may save costs when compared with traditional
means of policy development, and can lessen the chance that an
involved party will dispute a final result.58
Additional calls for alternative problem-solving approaches can be found in the
work of the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission, EPAs new
Clean Water Action Plan, and in recent efforts to amend the Endangered Species
Act (ESA)one of the most controversial of all natural resource regulatory
programs.  Of particular note is the recent Kempthorne (R-Idaho) bill, which calls
for a move away from the ESAs regulatory tools to mechanisms based on
incentives, such as tax breaks, to encourage voluntary cooperation of private
landowners in species recovery.  
To the extent that these new proposals and policy statements focus on the
command-and-control elements of the compulsory strategies, especially those
dealing with pollution control, the alternative problem-solving strategies enjoy
almost uniform support.  When the eyes of reformers focus more on the
management of public lands, then the debate is livelier, as the goals of resource
management are not so easily defined as they are in the pollution control arena,
and the merits of utilizing market forces and collaborative processes are less clear.
One concept that illuminates this debate is that of subsidies, which are frequently
asserted to be a contributing factor to problems of resource depletion.  This
concern was recently articulated in a short-lived bill authored by Representative
George Miller (D-California) proposing that no timber, minerals, forage, or other
natural resource owned by the United States, no Federally owned water,  and  no
hydroelectric energy generated at a Federal facility may  be sold,
    59   H.R. 919, the Public Resources Deficit Reduction Act of 1997, § 101(a).
    60   Another element that is occasionally part of these arguments is the idea market-based
instruments lack any notion of right or wrong, and inappropriately provide a sense of
legitimization to activities that impart some degree of environmental damage (Hockenstein
et al., 1997).
    61   Implementation of the Endangered Species Act frequently highlights the conflict
between regulatory programs designed to express public interests and private property
rights.  This source of conflict was addressed, in part, by the 1982 amendments to the act
providing the opportunity for landowners and federal agencies to jointly devise Habitat
Conservation Plans (HCPs) that provide some resource protection while allowing some land
development and use.
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leased, or otherwise disposed of by any department, agency, or instrumentality of
the United States for an amount less than fair market value, as determined by such
department, agency, or instrumentality.59  
Proposals of this type often lack political viability in that they promise to
redistribute costs and benefits (through modified payoff rules) in a zero-sum
manner that harms current position-holders, and since they are vulnerable to
criticisms that market prices are insufficient to capture all resource valuessuch
as the values of public goods (Kenney et al., 1998).  A similar class of arguments
assert that economic efficiency is not an appropriate goal of resource management
or problem-solving, and that governmental intervention (usually of a regulatory
nature) has often been preceded by significant environmental problems associated
with market failures or inappropriate privatization.60  Privatization and related
property rights initiatives are perhaps the most controversial of all modern
institutional problem-solving options, in that they promise to achieve the benefits
of incentive-based, market transactions of resources or resource-use rightsyou
cannot sell what you cannot ownat the societal cost of position rules that
exclude some parties from decision-making activities.61  The system of property
rights needed to implement water markets, for example, ensures that some third-
parties will undoubtedly be powerless to participate in decisions that will affect
them (NRC, 1992; Oggins and Ingram, 1990). 
While concerns of this nature focus most directly on the market-based
elements of the alternative problem-solving strategies, the emphasis on
collaborative actiona featured element in many alternative strategiescan also
be controversial.  The criticism of several national environmental organizations
directed at western watershed initiatives is illustrative.  One of these criticisms is
that locally-oriented, collaborative processes change the locus of decision-making
power in some situations, working to the disadvantage of interests that are more
comfortable (and effective) acting through congressional lobbying and litigation
than through the community-based efforts.  As explained by Sierra Club chairman
Michael McCloskey (1996:7):
    62   For example, Hockenstein et al. (1997) advocate the creation and application of a new
breed of market-based tools for pollution control only while conceding that the track record
of past efforts is somewhat spotty and disappointing.  Bingham (1997), while promoting a
greater use of ADR in implementing the Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and
National Environmental Policy Act, cautions that ADR may be a poor alternative in
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Few of the proposals for stakeholder collaboration provide any
way for distant stakeholders to be effectively represented.  While
we may have activists in some nearby communities, we dont have
them in all of the small towns involved.  It is curious that these
ideas would have the effect of transferring influence to the very
communities where we are least organized and potent.  They
would maximize the influence of those who are least attracted to
the environmental cause and most alienated from it.
Also of concern is the reliance on consensus, an aggregation rule that presumably
can promote lowest common denominator decision-making, and the related
suspicion that many groups organize simply to promote an avoidance of needed
environmental regulations (Benson, 1996). 
Concerns of this nature are aptly illustrated by the Oregon Plan, a
strategy of endangered species recovery endorsed by the state and federal
government (Larmer, 1997; National Association of State Foresters, 1997).  In
Oregon, state leaders were initially successful in convincing the U.S. National
Marine Fisheries Service not to list as endangered wild coastal salmon populations
in central and northern Oregon, but to instead let the state pursue restoration of
these imperiled populations through its Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative
(CSRI).  Given that the CSRI is largely reliant on the activities of voluntary
watershed initiatives and private landowners, the strategy marks a significant
deviation from the competing regulatory approach defined under the Endangered
Species Act, which critics describe as inefficient, ineffective, and disruptive to
private rights.  Opponents of the Oregon Plan fear that the sole motivation of the
effort may be to simply avoid the negative costs of regulatory compliance, with
salmon restoration being, at best, a secondary goal.  Proponents generally counter
that salmon restoration is indeed a major goal, while concedingbut not
apologizing forthe fact that avoiding the high costs of compulsory strategies is
also an important objective.  
Recent judicial challenges of the Oregon Plan have successfully limited the
scope of the effort.  Nonetheless, the plan is still widely viewed as a model for
future natural resource and environmental management in the West by several
parties, including the Western Governors Association (WGA, 1998), supporting
the concern that many of the alternative problem-solving strategies are being
unduly promoted not due to their proven track record, but rather to the
disappointing record of many of the traditional approaches more highly reliant
on compulsory strategies.  Even many proponents of alternative problem-solving
are quick  to acknowledge that the application of these tools is limited.62  It is a
situations where compromise is impractical.  Kenney (1997) describes a “guarded
optimism” for western watershed initiatives, sufficient to merit additional experimentation
and support, but also suggesting a need for more critical and detailed analysis.
    63   For example, a dam cannot be built (modifying the physical environment) until it is
formally authorized (a modification of the institutional environment).
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challenge of institutional analysis to determine which strategies are most
applicable for solving which problems, rather than to simply endorse new
strategies by documenting the shortcomings of traditional (usually compulsory)
approaches.  As Bingham (1997:4) has observed:
In the legitimate search for alternatives to improve our capacity to
resolve complex issues, we should not make the mistake of
assuming that existing tools should be disregarded.  If something
must be alternative to be worthwhile, we will miss the value in
what we are doing right already.
Institutional Problem-Solving Approaches
Natural resource or environmental problems can be solved by manipulating
one or more of the three elements of the action situation: the physical
environment, the actor/behavioral  component, or the institutional rules.
Technologically advanced societies typically look towards the manipulation of the
physical environment first, because it is frequently less controversial, less difficult,
and less uncertain than are attempts to manipulate behavior.  Cutting trees,
chaining rangeland, and building dams are all examples of manipulating the natural
environment, as are planting trees, nurturing grasslands, and removing
impoundments.  In many cases, however, opportunities for a technological fix are
not readily available, or if they are theoretically available, can only be pursued
after significant institutional reforms.63  
Often, the best long-term solutions are those based on manipulating the
behavior of resource users, discouraging (or prohibiting) problem-causing actions
while promoting problem-solving behaviors.  Again, these types of solutions
cannot normally be pursued without first modifying institutional rules, as it is
these rules which, when combined with the opportunities and constraints provided
by the physical resource, largely shape human behavior.  Resource use and
environmental protection regulations are examples of using rules to shape
behavior, as are market prices, taxes, subsidies, and other forms of non-
compulsory strategies so popular in the modern era of alternative problem-
solving.  
    64   In fact, this typology can conceivably be applied to a broad range of public problems
that has little or nothing to do with natural resources. 
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Approaches to Solving Operational Choice Level Problems
The typology of operational choice level problems introduced earlier
(depletion, underinvestment, maldistribution, and externality) does not define
natural resource and environmental problems in terms of the resource itself64; i.e.,
this report does not talk about water problems versus endangered species
problems versus forestry problems, and so on.  These terms typically lack
analytical value, and are consequently better suited to practical discourse than
scientific communication.  Instead, this report primarily defines operational choice
level problems in terms based on desires and behavior, having observed that
human motivations are normally closely correlated to the set of opportunities,
constraints, and incentives (or disincentives) provided by the interaction of the
physical environment and the institutional rules, both of which can, to varying
degrees, be manipulated in given situations.  This perspective is typical of the
discipline of economics, which is particularly well suited to the study of the
individual decision-making behavior characteristic of the operational choice level.
As described below, each of the four operational choice level problem types
present unique challenges in problem-solving.   
Solving Depletion Problems  
While depletion problems can theoretically arise in a variety of situations,
they are most commonly associated with so-called open access and common pool
resource situations.  An open access resource is one which is open to one and all.
Access and use is not controlled, and overuse can therefore not be regulated or
otherwise prevented.  This open access state may be due to the natural
characteristics of the resource itself, as in the case of fugitive resources which
cannot be readily contained (e.g., ocean fisheries), or may simply result from a
situation in which rules have not yet been adopted to prevent access to a given
resource (e.g., public lands in the frontier West).  In those cases where access can
be regulated, at least in part, a common pool resource (CPR) situation can arise
if the rules serve to limit access to a given group or class of individuals, but do not
regulate resource use by individuals within the specified group.  This situation is
often found in systems featuring communal ownership of range, forests, water,
wildlife, and other resources (Bromley, 1992; Ostrom et al., 1994).  From the
standpoint of problem-creation and problem-solving, a CPR situation is normally
highly analogous to an open access situation.
Open access and CPR situations need not be problematic if levels of use
are low in relation to levels of available supply; these situations can be stable
(Bromley, 1992).  In many of these situations, however, individuals will
excessively consume natural resource goods or services, causing the depletion
problem that Garrett Hardin (1968) termed a tragedy of the commons.  In large
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part, this situation arises due to a lack of congruence between individual and
collective incentives.  Those individuals who consume resources at the highest
(and most unsustainable) levels receive all the benefits of consumption, but bear
only part of the costsproviding an incentive for this continued behavior.  In the
case of an open access resource, the costs of resource depletion are spread across
society as a whole; in the case of a CPR, costs are borne by the specified
population entitled to utilize the resource.  As long as costs are spread equally,
but benefits are directly proportional to levels of use, all individuals have an
incentive for excessive consumption and depletionand perhaps more insidiously,
have a disincentive for conservation, knowing that the resources they conserve
will only serve to provide additional benefits to the more profligate and
uncontrolled consumers.
From the standpoint of institutional analysis, the distinguishing
characteristics of open access and CPR problems are the absence of any or
adequate boundary rules to control entry to the position of resource user, and/or
the lack of authority rules specifying adequate limits on levels of consumption by
these position-holders.  The result is a payoff rule encouraging depletion.  Taken
together, these rules deficiencies almost ensure that a problem will eventually
occur as demands on resources grow.  This is a condition of avoidable and
undesirable social costs: early exhaustion and/or resource degradation in the case
of a stock resource such as a confined aquifer, and overusewith attendant lower
productivity or even extinctionin the case of a flow resource such as a fishery.
The remedies for such problems must feature a change of operational choice rules
which create barriers to entry (boundary rules) and/or which restrict the rate of
use by all entrants (authority rules).  Potential solutions can include management
regimes featuring permit, fee, and/or private property systems controlling access
or use; the informal adoption of social standards or norms advocating restricted
consumption; and non-institutional solutions such as fence-building.  
Solving Underinvestment Problems
Much like depletion problems, underinvestment problems can occur in a
variety of contexts, but are most commonly associated with resource situations
and rule sets of a particular type.  Often, these situations are described using the
term public goods and the related concept of the free rider.  A public good is one
that, once provided to one party, is automatically available to all, with increasingly
usage not influencing supply in an appreciable manner.  While this may seem like
an uncommon situation, it is notespecially in the realm of natural resources and
the environment.  Examples include the preservation of endangered  species and
the  protection of a given region from a natural hazard
    65   The classic examples of public goods are national defense and public television/radio.
    66   Note that the concept of benefits is not limited to economic return, but can include
other types of values.  For example, the rationale for protecting endangered species
prominently features the non-economic “benefit” known as “existence values,” as well as
more explicitly economic benefits associated with ecosystem stability (Daily, 1997; Kenney
et al., 1998).
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(e.g., a city protected by a flood control project).65  The human benefits66
associated with these actions can be enjoyed by all partiesno one can be
excludedand this enjoyment does not deplete the level of the benefit or
resource.  
These situations are problematic only in that it is difficult to secure
necessary investments in these actions, since those parties who chose not to
paythe so-called free riderscannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of
the investments made by others.  The typical result is underinvestment; i.e., a
situation in which total societal investment in a resource or good is lower than
would otherwise be expected given the magnitude of the expected societal returns
from such investments.  In some cases, this problem of underinvestment may
simply reflect a lack of societal resources available to devote to a desired action
or program, a situation most commonly associated with depressed economies or
developing nations.  These problems may defy an institutional solution.  In the
developed world, however, underinvestment problems are frequently amenable to
an institutional solution.
Institutionally, the distinguishing characteristics of underinvestment
problems (such as public goods situations) are the absence of  boundary rules
which control entry to the position of resource user (i.e., beneficiary) and the
nature of the payoff rules, which state that the marginal benefits from increased
entry, and thus increased resource use, are costless.  Taken together, and in the
context of resources which are often costly to maintain and manage, these rule
deficiencies lead to underinvestment and, thus, under-provision of the resource.
The problem is not only that private investment is impossible, because it can
produce no return (due to the impossibility of excluding non-paying users), but
that public investment is problematic because there are no market signals as to the
level of benefits produced by different levels of investment.  The typical remedy
for this problem is not to change the boundary or payoffs rules, options which are
often technically infeasible or uneconomical.  Rather, it is to adopt new
information rules (and/or create the new position of information provider) which
result in the production of better information about the magnitude of potential
benefits and to facilitate the use of this information in public decision-making, a
higher level consideration.  The educational activities of many public interest and
environmental organizations, for example, have been key to the partial resolution
of several underinvestment problems involving clean air and water, endangered
species protection, historic landmark preservation, and other resource-related
goods and services characteristic of public goods situations.
    67   The term externality is used so frequently and inconsistently in the economics
literature that a definitive definition is highly elusive (Baumol and Oates, 1988). 
Consequently, the use of the term in this report may not be completely consistent with other
documents, an unfortunate but largely unavoidable situation.
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Solving Maldistribution and Externality Problems
The distinction between maldistribution problems and the special sub-set
of maldistribution situations known as externalities is somewhat tenuous and
frequently insignificant.  However, the issue of problem solvingand more
accurately, the literature of problem-solving can illustrate some important
distinctions.  All maldistribution situations, including externalities, feature
situations in which one or more parties are denied access to a limited resource due
to the actions of another resource using party.  Desires exceed available
resources, and the needs of some parties are not satisfied.  This is a very general
type of problem, perhaps most frequently seen in the West in water quantity
disputes.  
The natural resources literature generally distinguishes externality
problems from other maldistribution problems in that in externality situations, the
use (or abuse) of the resource by one party inadvertently or indirectly diminishes
the ability of other parties to utilize the resource in question in a different way,
location, or time.67  Furthermore, this cost imposed on the externality bearer is not
compensated or otherwise offset by the externality generator, thereby creating no
incentive for the generator to modify his/her behavior (Baumol and Oates, 1988;
Pigou, 1938).  The most familiar examples of externalities involve pollution of air
and water resources by industrial activities, and the associated impacts borne by
recreationists, water supply providers, and a host of other affected parties.
However, many other types of externality situations exist.  One of the more
interesting examples is the cedar applerust problem, in which owners of wild lands
harbor cedar trees, the alternate host for the apple rust fungus, and thereby
impose costs of reduced yields, diminished fruit quality, or high protection
expenses upon nearby apple growers.  The costs associated with this spatial
externality may exceed the benefits yielded by the presence of the cedar trees, at
the margin if not in total. 
Solving an externality problem generally requires either enacting a partial
or full prohibition on the externality causing behavior, or establishing a system of
private rights to the resource in question, allowing the different parties to arrive
at an appropriate allocation through some form of bargaining (e.g., a market
transaction).  As discussed later, it is this second approach that is favored in the
economics literature, as the regulatory, command-and-control, programs for
environmental protection are typically shown to be inefficient (Baumol and Oates,
1988).  To achieve these reforms usually entails changing the position and
authority rules, as the distinguishing characteristics of externality problems are an
absence of position rules which recognize the position of externality bearer and
the  absence of  authority rules  which require  the externality generators to
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consider the effects of their actions upon others.  Boundary and payoff rules can
also be important.  Taken together, especially in the context of a resource which
is mobile in space or time, these rule deficiencies can lead to social costs in excess
of the benefits with which they are associated, as well as to possible inequities
among resource users. 
The underlying assumption in the literature of externalities is that reforms
need to be pursued to promote a greater efficiency in resource use and allocation.
Determining the appropriate level of externalities is a rich subject in economics
(Baumol and Oates, 1988; Coase, 1960).  Generally, it is assumed that the
appropriate balance between externality generation and mitigation is the point at
which the marginal costs of preventing the externality equals the marginal benefits
of mitigation, a point which is best (i.e., most efficiently) reached using market
mechanisms.  Implicit in this perspective is that some level of externality
generation (and harm to the bearer) is appropriate, an idea already codified in the
existing institutional rules which have allowed the externality-causing behavior to
occur.  Some scholars, such as Schmid (1978), argue that by taking the existing
distribution of rights for granted, many of the most important problems may be
completely overlooked by the classic economic problem-solving rationale.
Perhaps the problem is not simply one of inefficiency in allocation and use, but is
one of distributional inequity, or more generally, an inappropriateor
maldistribution.  The term maldistribution is utilized to capture this general
notion of inappropriateness in distribution, which can conceivably be defined in
terms of efficiency or equity, unlike the term externality which is almost always
applied in the scholarly literature to situations defined as efficiency problems.  In
both situations, needed institutional reforms typically entail modification of
position, authority, and/or boundary rules, actions which can collectively address
the problematic incentive structure underlying the payoff rules.  
Approaches to Solving Collective Choice Level Problems 
The rules at an institutions collective choice level describe the
mechanisms and forums available for changing the operational choice level rules
and, thus, for solving operational choice level problems.  Several types of
arrangements for group interaction and decision-making typically exist at the
collective choice level, including legislatures, courts, markets, and various forms
of formal and informal committees.  Often, efforts to solve operational choice
level problems are impeded by conflict at the collective choice level.  As discussed
earlier, three types of conflict can be identified: interest conflict, value conflict and
cognitive conflict.  The types of mechanisms and forums most useful at the
collective choice level in a given situation are largely determined by the nature of
the conflict they must address.  
    68   One of the best case studies illustrating the changing face of western water
development politics is provided in Ingram’s (1990) account of events surrounding the
enactment of the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, an event occurring during a
major era of transformation in the western water development industry.
    69   Of course, the impacts of water marketing may not be so universally positive to those
parties excluded from the decision-making environment (Oggins and Ingram, 1990; NRC,
1992).  Rural communities and the natural environment, for example, are “parties”
frequently excluded from water marketing arrangements, a situation that could be
characterized as resulting from deficient position and boundary rules at the collective choice
level that only recognize buyers (i.e., those with financial resources seeking water for
legally recognized beneficial uses) and sellers (i.e., those with marketable water rights). 
Many states have attempted to remedy this institutional deficiency by creating the position
of “public interest reviewer,” a role normally falling to State Engineers or the judiciary.
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Solving Interest and Value Conflicts
Interest conflicts typically result when different parties are in competition
for control of a finite resource or benefit.  Interest conflicts differ from value
conflicts in that the latter involves conflicting parties who share philosophically
incompatible ideals about the appropriate distribution of resource uses, whereas
interest conflicts typically involve disputes about how to divide the pie among
potential beneficiaries with largely similar goals.  
Many of the best natural resources examples of interest and value conflicts
in the West can be found in the realm of water development politics.  Participants
in regional water development planning processes, for example, may conflict over
the appropriate location of water projects and allocations, or the cost-sharing
rules associated with the development scheme.  Prior to the environmental era,
these disputes were primarily interest conflicts, as different sets of water
development proponents battled to secure maximum benefits for their
constituencies (Terrell, 1965).  In more recent decades, environmental interests
have worked to inject a preservationist ideal into these disputes, bringing an
strong element of value conflict to water development politics (Gottlieb, 1988).68
Typically, interest conflicts are addressed through bargaining activities,
which can occur in the context of market exchanges, planning processes, the
authoring of legislation, and related mechanisms of give and take.  These efforts
are most successful if the zero-sum nature of the conflict can, at least partially, be
ameliorated, allowing for some positive-sum (ideally, Pareto optimal) exchanges.
The modern reallocation of western water supplies through water markets, for
example, provides benefits for both buyers and sellersotherwise the transactions
would not occurthereby allowing new benefits to be obtained in a manner that
does not otherwise increase the overall water supply.69  Frequently, new
information and/or authority rules must be established to facilitate these
exchanges, providing data about potentially viable exchanges, and authorizing
(and enforcing) bargains.  
A slightly different way in which interest conflicts involving western
natural resources are frequently addressed also involves changing seemingly zero-
    70   For example, a positive-sum water transfer between the Imperial Irrigation District
and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California was made possible by a canal lining
effort that greatly reduces seepage losses in the irrigation district (Wahl, 1989).
    71   Munro (1988) and Kenney (1993) are among those authors that emphasize the
importance of paradigmatic change in shaping long-term natural resource management
policies.
47
sum situations into positive-sum outcomes.  In this particular situation, the
conflict is made positive-sum for the participants by enlarging the benefits
package, with costs shifted to the federal taxpayer.  This approach is described by
Lowi (1964) as the distributive political mode, but is perhaps more commonly
known as pork barrel politics.  In these situations, all involved participants are
provided with perks of some sort (such as subsidies)i.e., the pie is
expandedand the situation is made positive-sum.  
Of course, the key in this and many related situations is to make the
problem positive-sum by shifting costs to unrepresented parties, a strategy that is
difficult to justify as it is reliant on position and boundary rules of questionable
merit.  In many other situations, however, advances in information services or
technologies may be able to create a positive-sum situation by eliminating
inefficiencies, a strategy with greater normative appeal.70  If no viable mechanism
for creating a positive-sum outcome can be discovered, then the problem may go
unresolved, or it may only be resolved through a mechanism that does not require
agreement among conflicting parties, such as a judicial proceeding. 
Value conflicts are notoriously difficult to address since they rarely offer
any opportunities for bargaining or compromise.  Bargaining away differences is
impossible, since the values involved are non-compensatory.  Additional factual
information usually has little impact upon the positions of the contending parties,
because the conflict is not over facts, but over how those facts are valued.
Resolving these disputes, therefore, can often be a lengthy and contentious
process, frequently driven by prominent judicial decisions, incremental legislative
or administrative rule-making, and perhaps most importantly, a long-term change
in prevailing societal values.71  These may require action at the so-called
constitutional choice level of the institution, where fundamental issues of process
and substance are typically addressed.  Changes of this magnitude often arise from
broad movements (e.g., civil rights movement, environmental movement), rather
than arising from a single, isolated resource use controversy.  
Solving Cognitive Conflicts
Cognitive conflicts arise due to a lack of common understanding of key
processes or data associated with a given problematic situation.  The current
national (perhaps global) epidemic of frog deformities and mortality is a
particularly confusing problem, as was the earlier national crisis over bird
population declines eventually traced to the use  of pesticides, namely DDT.
Other situations may not feature a lack of scientific understanding, but only a lack
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of communication among stakeholders about concerns or preferences.  In
cognitive conflict situations, the decision-making group organized to address the
problem cannot determine an appropriate action to take because of a lack of data
(facts) or differing understandings (metaphors) of the implications of those facts,
deficiencies that can be addressed in a variety of ways that, in one way or another,
prominently involve the information rules.  
Cognitive conflict resolution requires resort to information sources which
are credible to all participants, such as scientific authorities (e.g., expert
consultants or panels) or perhaps simply collaborative efforts where different
opinions, concerns, and values can be communicated.  The success of these efforts
is likely to be largely driven by the rules that describe the type of information that
is required for decision-making, how and by whom it will be produced, and how
it will be shared and utilized.  Adaptive management is an increasingly popular
framework of institutional rules for dealing with these situations, based on a
cyclical strategy of research, pilot projects, monitoring, and program reassessment
(Lee, 1993).  
Additional Considerations in Matching Problems and Solution
Strategies
Natural resource and environmental problems occur when the various
elements of the action situation interact in a manner that causes some needs or
desires to go unsatisfied.  As discussed earlier, various institutional problem-
solving strategies can be employed to address each of the four operational choice
level problem types.  Before considering which institutional reforms can or should
be pursued, however, it is important to appreciate that certain factors can be
particularly salient in creating these problems and in limiting the opportunities for
problem-resolution.  
Scholars have identified many characteristics that distinguish natural
resources and which can be utilized to classify them with respect to problem
analysis and resolution (Bromley, 1992).  One conventional distinction
introduced earlier in the discussion of depletion and underinvestment
problemsis that between renewable (a.k.a. flow or reproducible) resources,
such as plant and animal populations, and non-renewable (a.k.a. stock or
irreproducible) resources, such as mineral deposits.  A useful sub-categorization
is to distinguih between those flow resources which have a critical zone and those
that do not (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1970).  For example, all plant and animal
populations have a certain minimum viable population (MVP) threshold that
must be met or exceeded, otherwise extinction is inevitable.  A water supply
source may have no such limitation.  Another common distinction is between
resources that are mobile and those that are fixed in space or time.  Migratory
birds and flowing water (sometimes known as fugitive resources) are good
examples of mobile resources.  Unlike fixed resources such as land, mobile
resources can be difficult to physically possess in a given place or time, creating
special challenges in resources law and management.  For example, mobile
    72   The distinction between renewable and non-renewable is not an absolute one.  For
example, the deep aquifers underlying many southwestern cities are technically renewable,
but the rate of recharge is so minor compared to current withdrawals that these resources
should probably be considered non-renewable.  As a practical matter, a resource is
renewable only if can regenerate at a rate that has significance in relation to a human
management time frame. 
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resources are often associated with externality problemsparticularly, spatial
externalities. 
While all of these characteristics can be used to describe the quality of
physical resources and environmental systems, a slightly different set of concepts
is needed to describe the interplay of environmental characteristics with other
elements of the action situation.  From this perspective, three related concepts
emerge as being particularly salient: manageability, excludability, and symmetry.
The concept of manageability refers to the extent to which the physical
properties of a resource in a particular situation lend itself to deliberate
manipulation (i.e., management).  From a problem-solving standpoint, this is often
the significant feature of the renewable/non-renewable criterion.  Renewable and
non-renewable resources can feature very different management issues attributable
to their different physical characteristics.  For example, both renewable and non-
renewable resources are subject to depletion.  However, renewable resources such
as forests, fisheries, and flammulated owls are able to reproduce and renew their
stocks, whereas non-renewable resources such as petroleum pools, gold-bearing
veins, and limestone deposits are fixed in quantity.72  Consequently, the
management challenge of renewable resources is generally to achieve
sustainability, which can be pursued through the manipulation of supply, demand
or both (Clark, 1976).  For non-renewable resources, the challenge is typically to
achieve an optimal rate of exhaustion (or preservation), which may be influenced
by the development of new technologies or substitute goods (Dasgupta and Heal,
1979).
A closely related concern is excludability.  Excludability refers to whether
the resource in question (in a given situation) lends itself to the physical exclusion
of some potential users from the flows of goods and services which it yields.  For
example, in the modern West it is now relatively easy to exclude possible timber
harvesters from logging a particular tract of forest land, something which was not
true a century ago (and is not true of the Amazon jungles today).  By contrast, it
is virtually impossible to exclude anyone from breathing the air in a metropolitan
airshed.  Clean air, once provided to some, is then available to all.  Defined in this
way, excludability is not a static physical characteristic of a resource, but is a
description of how that characteristic relates to the current state of technology,
infrastructure, and/or social organization seen in a given action situation.
The importance of excludability is due to the management techniques
which it permits or proscribes.  For example, private property and market-based
management techniques cannot be employed in the case of non-excludable
resources, for property is meaningless and marketing is impossible if resource-
    73   Note that the underlying resource characteristic in this case is the mobility of river
water, which carries pollutants away from the paper mill. 
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related goods and services cannot be withheld from those who will not pay for
them.  Public goods, mentioned earlier, are an important type of non-excludable
resources.  So are open access resources, like ocean fisheries, which are not joint
in supply but which, because of their non-excludability and their depletability, are
especially vulnerable to exhaustion and extinction (Steelman, 1998).
The third salient characteristic of a resource use situation is symmetry.  A
resource may be said to be asymmetric if the use of resource-related goods or
services by one user group impacts other user groups, but not vice versa.
Conversely, in a symmetric situation, users are likely to simultaneously imposes
costs on themselves as well as others.  The classic example of asymmetry is the
upstream paper mill which uses the river to dispose of residuals, which in turn
affect downstream fish populations, and thus the catch rates of downstream
fishermen.73  The classic symmetrical situation is provided by the case of the
commonly-owned grazing land which is susceptible to overuse, and consequent
degradation (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom et al., 1994; Bromley, 1992).  In these
situations, individuals are likely to simultaneously (and reciprocally) impose costs
upon themselves as well as others.  
Symmetry or asymmetry is important because it strongly shapes the
possibilities for conflict resolution and problem resolution.  It is much easier to get
agreement to reduce shared costs than to reduce costs imposed only upon others.
Depletion and underinvestment problems tend to have symmetric elements which
favor certain kinds of conflict management and resource management solutions,
while externality and maldistribution problems, being basically asymmetric,
encourage a different set of problem-solving strategies.  Understanding
relationships of this type is central to the challenge of matching problems and
problem-solving strategies.  This issue is explored further in Section IV, as three




Introduction to the Three Case Studies
In the following pages, three case studies are presented to demonstrate the
utility of the institutional analysis concepts described herein, and to identify a few
different ways in which the tenets of alternative problem-solving have found
expression in modern natural resource and environment conflicts.  The first case
examines problems associated with groundwater overdrafting in the South Platte
Basin of Colorado.  In that region, the failure of Colorado law to adequately
manage groundwater usage resulted, for a time, in a situation in which senior
surface water rights holders became fearful of reduced flows due to water table
declines attributable to unregulated groundwater pumping.  This essentially
created a spatial and temporal externality situation, in which the water demands
of junior groundwater appropriators were elevated above those of senior surface
rights holders.  Groundwater overdrafting also created depletion problems
affecting groundwater pumpers.  While scientific uncertainty about the surface
water/groundwater connection slowed efforts to address these highly related
problems, legislative action eventually established a framework of rules under
which technical expertise and a new collaborative groupGroundwater
Appropriators of the South Platte (GASP)have produced a solution heavily
reliant on cooperative action, negotiation, and market incentives, all nested within
a framework of private property rights and regulatory oversight.  
The second case study presented addresses issues of forest management
in the Applegate region of Oregon.  The Applegate region is utilized to provide
a specific context for an issue that is widespread in the West: determining
appropriate timber harvesting levels.  In this case, the depletion problem takes on
a special character as a high-profile endangered species controversy is injected
into the debate, raising highly familiar issues about the balancing of economic and
environmental interests.  These environmental concerns highlight underinvestment
and externality problems characteristic of the modern environmental movement.
While enactment of the Northwest Forest Plan of 1994 is the culminating event
in the institutional history provided, it is the role and presence of collaborative
groups in the region that is of particular interest, as many natural resource
scholars see the Applegate region as an important laboratory in alternative
problem-solvinga perception that is only partially accurate.  As shown by the
case study, it is the relationship between the alternative problem-solving strategies
and the traditional means of conflict resolution that is of particular analytical
interest.
The most complex of the three cases involves environmental restoration
in the Truckee-Carson River Basins.  In that region, the distribution (or
maldistribution) of a limited water resource has created a host of problems,
    74   Since 1996, several issues have remained under debate; the conflicts in the Truckee-
Carson Basin will likely continue for many years.  By stopping the analysis at 1996, it is
possible to provide some closure to the analysis.  A similar rationale is utilized to stop the
South Platte case in the early 1990s, and the Applegate case in early 1998. 
    75   This case study is primarily adapted from the work of Lord in Gregg et al. (1991). 
Additional background information is available in Hillhouse (1975), Young et al. (1986),
and MacDonnell (1986, 1988).
    76   “Tributary” groundwater, also known as alluvial groundwater, is groundwater that
interacts with surface water flows, presumably by contributing to surface water flows during
low-flow periods and by receiving inflows from surface systems during wet periods.  Non-
tributary groundwater, in contrast, refers to water resources located in deep aquifers and
lacking a significant hydrologic connection to surface waters.  Tributary groundwater is
generally considered a renewable resource, while non-tributary groundwater is considered
non-renewable—at least given the normal time frames upon which water allocation and
management decisions are based.  The focus in this study is primarily on tributary
groundwater.
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including underinvestment problems associated with endangered species and
migratory waterfowl.  The interplay of water allocation regimes and species
protection is a problem found throughout the West; the Truckee-Carson case
provides one specific context for analyzing a set of issues that is discouragingly
universal to the region.  In order to focus on the most illuminating aspects of this
situation, the case study primarily focuses on events surrounding the Truckee-
Carson Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, but places this event
in an approximately 100 year context beginning with the initial development of the
region under the auspices of the prior appropriation doctrine and Reclamation Act
and ending with the situation as of 1996.  Prior to this time period, an open access
situation presumably existed, as did a broad set of issues associated with the
settlement of Anglo populations in territories inhabited by Native Americans.  The
initial settlement of these issues is largely outside the scope of this case, which is
on the modern goal of environmental restoration.74   
Conjunctive Management of Water Resources
in Colorados South Platte Basin
Case Study Description75
A variety of institutional arrangements are utilized by western states to
coordinate the management of surface and tributary groundwater.76  Some states,
such as Arizona and California, rely heavily upon water supply districts or similar
organizations while others, such as Colorado and New Mexico, pursue this
integration primarily through complex frameworks of water rights law.  Given the
frequently different regimes for water allocation and management between surface
water and groundwater, conjunctive managementi.e., the coordinated
management of surface and groundwatercan be a formidable institutional
    77   While the resolution of water supply issues through a form of conjunctive
management is the focus of this case, it is worth acknowledging that in recent decades, the
primary natural resource issue in the Platte Basin has involved environmental issues:
namely, the fate of the endangered whooping crane, and the responsibilities of the federal
government and Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska in addressing this problem.  Actions to
address this problem are ongoing, and include efforts to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement.  The omission of this issue from this case study is not intended to suggest that
environmental issues are unimportant, but simply reflects a desire herein to illustrate a
different set of concerns.  Environmental issues involving endangered species are
prominently featured in the following two cases involving forest resources in Oregon and
water/wetlands resources in Nevada.
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challenge, especially when this challenge is addressed during a period of conflict
and with incomplete scientific understanding.  This case examines some of the
strategies used to achieve conjunctive management in the South Platte Basin in
northeastern Colorado, from the earliest days of the Colorado territory to
approximately 1990, with the greatest emphasis on events from 1957 to 1974.77
Colorado Water Law: The Initial Framework of Property Rights
In the latter half of the 19th century, as Colorado evolved from a territory
into a state, a framework of laws regarding water emerged (MacDonnell, 1986,
1988).  In Colorado, as in other western territories and states, the common law
riparian doctrine was judged to be inappropriate given the frequently arid and
semi-arid conditions of the West.  Riparian law was not well suited to dealing with
conditions of scarcity, or to situations in which water usage occurred far from the
stream channels.  Consequently, out of the mining camps of California (circa
1848) emerged a series of rules known as the prior appropriation doctrine, first
recognized by Colorado in 1879.  The prior appropriation regime for surface
water is based on the notion that all surface waters are owned by the state but can
be appropriated by individual water users under certain conditions, resulting in
the establishment of private usufructuary rights.
Acquiring a surface water right under prior appropriation requires a party
to make a diversion from a natural stream course and put it to a beneficial use,
such as irrigation.  The amount of the right corresponds to that amount
beneficially consumed, and in times of shortage, those rights established first are
satisfied completely before more junior rights holders receive any water (i.e.,
the so-called first-in-time first-in-right, or seniority, principle).  The enforcement
process is known as a call on the river, and is administered by the State
Engineer.  Surface water rights are transferrable through market exchanges, given
that such transfers do not impair the rights of other recognized appropriators, a
determination in Colorado made by a system of water courts.  While Colorado is
unique in its use of a water court system, these other elements of prior
appropriation are found in similar form in all western states.
In stark contrast, rules governing the allocation and use of groundwater
resources in Colorado were largely non-existent until recent decades, in part due
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to a lack of scientific understanding about the workings of the hydrologic system
underground, and in part due to a lack of apparent conflicts among water users
(MacDonnell, 1986, 1988).  Closely following English common law, access to
groundwater resources was viewed as a right of land ownership.  Landowners
enjoyed broad discretion in pumping and using groundwater underlying their
lands, and unlike the prior appropriation doctrine for surface water, these
groundwater rights were not effectively quantified or limited in any way.
Emergence of Water Supply Controversies
The failure of Colorado law to establish limits or other rules (other than
land ownership) regarding groundwater pumping rights was not initially
problematic, as the demand for ground waterand perhaps more importantly, the
technology of groundwater pumpingwas insufficient to support large
withdrawals.  However, surface waters in the South Platte Basin were fully
appropriated by the start of the 20th century, ensuring that demands on
groundwater reserves would inevitably climb.  That climb began in earnest in the
1930s with the development of high lift submersible pumps and the widespread
availability of affordable electricity, and accelerated with the economic boom
following the conclusion of Word War II.  Major droughts in the 1930s and 1950s
also contributed to growing demands, which were only partially satisfied by
increased transmountain surface water imports (MacDonnell, 1988).
Growing water demands created a host of problems and conflicts, pitting
groundwater pumpers against each other, and groundwater pumpers against
surface water appropriators.  This first type of conflict emerged as escalating
pumping levels resulted in declining water tables for all groundwater pumpers in
a given region, regardless of their individual levels of use.  The second type of
conflict emerged, in part, as scientific understanding of the surface water-
groundwater connection progressed.  In many systems, including the South Platte,
tributary groundwater is critical in maintaining the base flow of the surface water
system during low flow (and peak use) periods.  To the extent that groundwater
withdrawals diminish the yield of the underlying aquifer, both groundwater and
surface water users were thus impacted by the growing consumption of
groundwater in the basin.  Given this hydrologic connection, a comprehensive
solution to these problems was needed.
Search for Institutional Solutions
A variety of institutional solutions was potentially available to reduce
groundwater pumping.  For example, a regulatory framework could be installed
prohibiting the usage of certain pumping technologies, or perhaps restricting
withdrawals in excess of a given standard.  Or, the property rights regime
currently governing groundwater could be augmented by quantifying groundwater
rights associated with land parcels.  Still another approach would be to utilize
market-based incentive systems to discourage excessive use.  The solution first
crafted by the Colorado Legislature in 1957 contained elements of both a
regulatory and property rights solution by empowering the State Engineer, under
    78   Colo. Session Laws, ch 289,  § 5; codified at Colo. Rev. Stat.,  § 148-18-2 (1963).
    79   Note that prior appropriation, in general, is a mixture of property rights and regulatory
elements, since administrators (i.e., State Engineers, water departments, and/or water courts)
have a role in program implementation.  A pure property rights regime would leave all
enforcement actions to civil liability lawsuits. 
    80  Act of May 3, 1965; 1965 Colo. Session Laws, ch 318, § 1. 
    81   Fallhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
    82   Colo. Rev. Stat. § 148-2-9 (Supp. 1967).
    83   Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-101 to -602 (1973), et seq.  
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certain circumstances, to establish and implement a permitting system, declaring
tributary groundwater subject to the basic rules of appropriation.78
This approach, a mixture of regulatory and property rights strategies,79
was significantly flawed in two ways.  First, the new rules only applied to new
wells, an innovation which did nothing to provide pumping limits on those existing
wells already causing problems.  Regulation of new wells was a wise step, but was
clearly an incomplete and politically-motivated solution.  Second, new rules
calling for the State Engineer to restrict groundwater pumping when senior
surface water rights were impaired was of no practical benefit due to long time
delays associated with the underground movement of water.  The call system,
which can work quite well for surface water regimes, was not well suited to the
conjunctive management situation in the South Platte or in most other parts of the
state, prompting the State Engineer to conclude that no groundwater pumping
restrictions could be justified during shortage situations.  Despite the sound
technical basis of this decision, the legislature saw the action of the State Engineer
as insubordinate, and ordered the public servant in 1965 to implement the 1957
solution by shutting down wells in accordance with a call on the river.80  When
this was subsequently done in the Arkansas River Valley, it initiated a legal
challenge that upheld the original position of the State Engineer: Pumping could
not be restricted unless it could be shown to materially benefit senior
appropriators.81  
Learning from past mistakes, and from a detailed study authorized in
196782 exploring the surface water-groundwater connection, the legislature in
1969 finally incorporated all nontributary groundwater wells into the prior
appropriation system.  The Water Right Determination and Administration Act
of 1969 established a three-year process during which all undecreed wells would
be adjudicated with a priority date of initial diversion.83  Also, new points of
diversion for surface water rights, including new wells, were authorized as
necessary to avoid injuries to senior rights.  Finally, the Act and related legislation
provided two strategies groundwater pumpers could utilize to avoid
    84   Initially, the State Engineer attempted to implement the law by establishing a system
of zones, defined in terms of transit time of tributary groundwater to the closest surface
water source.  Wells in zones with the shortest transit time were to be subject to the most
frequent curtailments during surface water shortages, while those farther away would often
not be curtailed since these reductions would not benefit surface flows in a timely manner. 
Although approved by the Colorado Supreme Court, these proposed rules were withdrawn
before they could take effect due to concerns over administrative complexity, the likely
continuance of some injury to senior rights holders, and to a reluctance to impose the
greatest restrictions on wells closest to the river channels—often the most productive lands
(Gregg et al., 1991; MacDonnell, 1988).  Interestingly, a similar system was adopted in the
Gila River Adjudication by Judge Goldfarb.
    85   GASP operates under rules specified in S.B. 105, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1196 (ch
370, § 8), later codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-80-120 (1973).  Similar organizations exist
elsewhere in Colorado (MacDonnell, 1986).
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having their pumping rights curtailed.  The first was to adopt and follow a court-
approved plan for augmenting water supplies; the second was to provide
replacement (or substitute) water of sufficient quality, quantity, and timing to
forestall injuries to the senior surface water rights holders.  
After considering various strategies, draft rules for implementing the
Water Right Determination and Administration Act were issued in 1972.84  Final
rules were issued two years later.  As first articulated in the 1969 legislation,
groundwater users were required to pursue one of the two strategies for avoiding
injury to senior surface rights holdersaugmentation or replacementor face
complete loss of groundwater pumping rights within three years.  This was a
significant regulatory limitation on the property rights of groundwater pumpers.
Parties developing a court-approved augmentation plan would be allowed to
continue pumping indefinitely; those pursuing a strategy of finding replacement
water supplies needed to annually negotiate an acceptable strategy with the State
Engineer.  
Groundwater Appropriators of the South Platte (GASP)
After publication of these new rules, one group of pumpers deciding to
utilize the replacement water supply strategy organized into an association known
as Groundwater Appropriators of the South Platte (GASP).85  By the 1990s,
GASP had grown to include over 1,400 members, operating over 3,000 wells
withdrawing over 400,000 acre-feet annuallyabout 95 percent of the basins
pumping.  GASP functions by collecting funds from pumpers to lease and
purchase water rights and reservoir storage rights, to purchase recharge credits,
to drill new wells (and extract water from them), and take related actions needed
to delivery adequate quantities of replacement water to surface water interests
impacted by groundwater pumping.  Funds are raised from a tax on water
pumped, generally around one dollar per acre-footat least 20 times lower than
the market value of water in the region.  
    86   To understand how this system works, consider the case of the senior rightsholder
(holding a 1873 priority date) far downstream in the basin near Sterling Number 1 ditch. 
When that party faces a reduction in surface water supplies, a nearby well owned and
operated by GASP pumps groundwater directly into the ditch to satisfy the call.  This water
is provided to replace surface water depletions presumably caused by groundwater pumping
throughout the basin.
    87   This is consistent with the recommendations by Young et al. (1986).  
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About 100,000 acre-feet of replacement water is annually provided in this
way to the State Engineer and eventually to surface water users.  Over half of this
supply comes from wells operated by GASP.86  This level of replacement water
required has been increased over time, by order of the State Engineer, in response
to learning over the quarter century of operation.  Initially, a stipulated decree
called for a replacement level of 5 percent (Hillhouse, 1975).  However, largely
through a process of trial-and-error, this level of replacement was shown to be
inadequate, leading to new rules by the 1990s requiring a 25 percent replacement
level.87  At least for the present, this new set of rules appears to provide a
workable institutional framework for conjunctive management in the South Platte.
Case Study Analysis
Review of the Operational Choice Level Problems
As is true for most cases involving complex resources over an entire
century, many different types of operational level problems can be identified.  This
analysis is primarily concerned with that set of problems that emerged in the post-
WWII era pertaining to water supply management, and the relationship between
surface water and tributary groundwater.  With those qualifications, only two
major problemsboth largely solvedmerit a focused analysis:
 (1) Externality Problem.  The primary problem in this case was the harm
(i.e., externality) imposed upon surface water rights holders by junior
groundwater pumpers.  This problem was not effectively addressed until
the early 1970s when Colorado water law finally was modified to reflect
the physical reality of the groundwater-surface water connection, and a
workable mechanism for conjunctive management was established.
 (2).  Depletion Problem.  The other, and closely related, problem in this
case involved the inadequacy of institutional rules to provide any real
limits on groundwater pumping, creating burdens for not only surface
water users (i.e., the externality problem described above) but also for the
community of groundwater users.  Burdens borne by particular pumpers
included both short-term and potential long-term deficiencies in
groundwater supplies, and due to the externality problem, institutional
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reforms that placed potentially significant restrictions and increased costs
on the use of groundwater (i.e., the augmentation and/or replacement
requirements). These problems have largely been resolved in the study
region through groundwater laws and the GASP mechanism.
Key Attributes of the Problematic Situation
The externality and depletion problems experienced in the South Platte
Basin can largely be thought of as two sides of the same coin, caused by the same
deficiency: i.e., the inability of Colorado water law to adequately control
groundwater usage.  Prior to the institutional reforms beginning in the 1950s and
after the technological revolution in pumping technology of the 1930s,
groundwater pumping was limited only by the cost of electricity (subsidized in
rural areas) and by groundwater availability (which was now declining in some
areas).  This was a payoff rule encouraging and facilitating groundwater overuse.
For many decades, the prior appropriation doctrine had merged private property
rights with some regulatory elements to effectively control direct use of surface
waters.  However, the land ownership requirement of groundwater pumping, a
boundary rule, was not married to authority rules capable of similarly controlling
total levels of groundwater usage.  
While it is the externality problem that is of particular salience in this case,
the depletion problem is perhaps more useful in reviewing some of the terms and
metaphors that can be used in institutional analysis.  For example, the depletion
problem here has qualities typical of both open access and common pool resource
(CPR) situations.  These terms are typically utilized to describe scenarios in which
access to a resource is inadequately controlled, thereby allowing and even
encouraging individual actions resulting in overuse of a shared resource.  The
requirement that groundwater pumpers be landowners is a notable limitation on
access; thus, this is not a classic open access situationa term better reserved for
the situation in the first half of the 19th century prior to the formal awarding of
public domain lands to individuals and the latter enactment of water law doctrines.
However, the community of groundwater pumpers in this case do not readily meet
the typical characterization of a CPR either, in that this community was not
organized in any sort of distinguishable collective until creation of GASP.  Thus,
neither metaphor is clearly superior to the other in this case, as both are useful in
illustrating the outcomes that can occur when institutional rules (particularly
boundary and authority rules) fail to control access and use of finite resources. 
The depletion problem in this case is also useful in illustrating how the
symmetry concept influences the definition of externalities.  As used throughout
this report (and most similar discussions), the term externality is normally reserved
for asymmetric situationsi.e., those in which one party imposes a burden on
another, but not vice versa.  That is clearly the case in problem # 1 as
    88   A related complicating factor not discussed in the case study description is that many
surface water users are also groundwater pumpers.  These are not entirely separate groups. 
For the purposes of analysis, however, it is useful to describe surface water and groundwater
users as distinct groups (i.e., positions), given that each features a different corresponding
set of institutional rules.
59
junior groundwater pumpers were allowed for a time to diminish needed surface
water flows to which other parties had recognized rights.  The second problem
(i.e., the depletion problem) also describes a situation where the actions of some
parties lead to burdens borne by others.  However, since there is considerable
overlap between the generators and bearers of these externalitiesi.e., both
belong to the community of groundwater pumpersthe relationship is reciprocal
(or symmetric), and features a set of incentives and qualities that distinguishes this
situation from the classic externality definition.88  
The Institutional Solution
The two problems discussed in this case were primarily addressed by that
set of innovations bounded by the Underground Water Act of 1957 and the
publication of implementing rules in 1974 pertaining to the Water Right
Determination and Administration Act of 1969.  Rules codified in those efforts
finally created a framework for prohibiting, or at least constraining, the problem-
creating behaviors seen in the South Platte.  The primary contribution of GASP,
a collaborative group operating at the collective choice level, has been in
providing a workable administrative mechanism for implementing conjunctive
management.  This is no small accomplishment, given the technical demands of
conjunctive management, and the sheer magnitude of the water users involved. 
Problem-Solving Prior to GASP
As growing groundwater usage threatened the integrity of the surface
water allocation regime, the Colorado legislature became aware of the externality
situation and the need for conjunctive management.  That bodys 1957 action
sought to address this problem by empowering and subsequently requiring the
State Engineer to prohibit groundwater pumping in times of surface water
shortage.  Although these new reforms did provide a seemingly reasonable
approach to limiting groundwater rights, they proved to be unworkable due to the
poorly understood (by the legislature) time lag between groundwater pumping and
surface water depletions.  Given this fact, not only would enforcement of this rule
not address the underlying externality problem, but if implemented, it threatened
to create a new type of externality problemthat of groundwater pumpers
needlessly burdened by restrictions on pumping imposed on behalf of senior
surface rights holders suffering from low surface water flows.  The failure of the
1957 legislation to consider pre-1957 wells was also a huge omission. 
Only after the technical nature of the problem had become obvious did the
legislature  enact  the  skills of technical experts  to  help define those rules that
    89   While GASP is normally viewed as an innovative creation, some parties have called
GASP the “illegitimate son of the State Engineer” in part due to the rules, designed by the
State Engineer, that encouraged (some would say coerced) groundwater users to join GASP
and similar arrangements or risk forfeiture of pumping rights.  (For example, see the
comments of Bart Woodward, President of GASP, in MacDonnell, 1986:68.)
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eventually became the Water Right Determination and Administration Act.  This
was an important turning point, as a key feature of this case study is the salience
of cognitive conflict in collective choice (and constitutional choice) level problem-
solving.  While value and interest conflicts also existed in this case, they were
quickly addressed by the state legislature and the judiciary in asserting that the
priority tenet of prior appropriation was to be applied between surface water and
groundwater.  There was some hesitancy about treating new and old groundwater
users in similar terms; however, that debate was short-lived, and was consistently
overshadowed by the more formidable cognitive conflict rooted in the lack of
understanding in the state legislature about the hydrologic connection of surface
water and groundwater.  Resolution of this cognitive conflict did not occur until
the legislature invoked the greater technical knowledge of the State Engineer,
along with an ad hoc committee of water engineers and lawyers, in the drafting
of rules associated with the Water Right Determination and Administration Act.
Key among the innovations found in that body of law was the requirement
that groundwater pumpers had to either devise acceptable plans for augmenting
or replacing surface water flows, or face complete loss of groundwater pumping
rights.  This was a tremendously important modification of the rules associated
with groundwater pumping, especially the boundary and authority rules, and
created a need for a new position: regional replacement water manager.  This
position, filled by the creation of GASP, was needed given that the technical
demands of implementing a replacement water strategy can be most efficiently
addressed through collective action.89 
GASP serves as a vehicle for implementing solutions to the two
operational choice level problems, as well as for addressing lingering collective
choice problems of cognitive conflict.  GASP, working closely with the State
Engineer, contributes to the resolution of the first externality problem by
implementing what is known as the physical solutioni.e., providing
replacement waters in the amount, timing, and location needed to offset surface
water declines attributable to the pumping actions of GASP members.  As the
legislature learned in 1957, it is one thing to require surface and groundwater
users to both adhere to the priority system of water allocation, and quite another
to successfully implement this concept through conjunctive management.  Thanks
to the joint actions of the Colorado legislature, the State Engineer, and GASP, no
longer can surface water users in the South Platte assert that groundwater
pumping impairs their senior rights recognized under prior appropriation.  
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GASP contributes to the partial resolution of the depletion problem
primarily by linking fees to levels of water withdrawals, providing individual
pumpers with an economic incentive for conservation.  True, a roughly $1/acre-
foot charge is hardly sufficient to dramatically modify behavior, although
increasing aquifer depletion may lead to further raises in the amount of
replacement water required (already having risen from 5 to 25 percent), providing
further incentives discouraging groundwater depletion.  Likely more significant
on this front is the fact that GASP membership brings the actions of many
individual groundwater users into a framework of collective planning and
management, raising many opportunities for GASP and state officials (acting
through the State Engineer) to pursue further innovations as needed.  At the
present time, it is not clear if additional future action will be needed to address
issues of tributary groundwater depletion in the South Platte, as agricultural water
demands have stabilized or even declined in some areas due to broad economic
trends and good weather, interbasin imports to the region have increased, and as
environmental mandates and urban water planning programs already provide a
strong stimulus for more efficient water use and conservation.
Old Growth Timber Management
in the Region of Applegate, Oregon
Case Study Description
Early History
Timber and other forest products have been of extreme value in the
development and maturation of many societies, and issues of deforestation have
frequently been of great social and economic concern.  In the United States,
deforestation first emerged as a national issue in the mid to late 1800s, as waves
of timber barons moved westward along the expanding American frontier,
producing needed timber for a growing nation at the expense of denuded
landscapes and modified hydrologic regimes.  These practices were not only
alarming for their environmental destruction, but due to the huge empires being
amassed from the largely unregulated exploitation of the frontier.  Both of these
issues of were of particular concern to the progressives who came into power
late in the nineteenth century.  One of the first products of the progressive
conservation movement was an initially uncontroversial and obscure amendment
to a 1891 timber act that empowered the President to withdraw public lands
within states or territories and place them into a system of national forests (Clarke
and McCool, 1985; Hays, 1959).  By the end of President Clevelands presidency
in 1897, almost 40 million acres had been withdrawn and a Division of Forestry
had been created in the Agriculture Department.  In 1905,
    90   Recreation is the dominant use of Forest Service lands in the modern era.  In fiscal
year 1996, the agency recorded over 859 million visits to Forest Service lands (Forest
Service, 1997).
    91   Timber interests responded with the accurate but politically sensitive argument that
converting the old growth forests to secondary growth would be more efficient in the long-
term, since this would result in faster growing second generation trees.  This perspective
failed to acknowledge the increasingly high values being placed on the non-timber
properties of these old growth forests.
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these national forests were transferred from the Interior to the Agriculture
Department as the Forest Service was born.
From its inception, the Forest Service operated under a mandate to
provide a continuous supply of wood products.  Over the long term, this can
only be accomplished by a program of sustained yield management.  Sustained
yield managementi.e., only cutting timber in amounts equal or less than amount
of natural regenerationevolved into an increasingly formal part of the agencys
mandate in the Sustained Yield Forest Management Act of 1944 and the Multiple
Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960.  However, in the post-WWII economic boom,
timber harvests grew at unsustainable levels, prompting a host of citizen
complaints and lawsuits questioning the agencys interpretation of its mandate and
its increasingly cozy relationship with the timber industry at the expense of other
interests, namely recreation and wilderness (Carroll, 1995).90  Increasingly, these
complaints focused on the practice of converting old growth forests (i.e.,
previously unharvested forests) into stands of secondary growth.  Beginning in
1973, the Forest Service responded to pressure by environmentalists by issuing
Emergency Directive 16 which called for a special type of sustained yield
management called non-declining even flow (NDEF).  The non-declining part
of this management approach calls for reduced levels of cutting in old growth
forests, since the large mature trees in these forests do not grow quickly and
consequently can not easily replace the volume of any trees removed.91  
The Spotted Owl Crisis in the Pacific Northwest
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of NDEF was a common
focal point for the more fundamental debate about appropriate uses of the Pacific
Northwest old growth forests.  Eventually, the gradual implementation of the
Endangered Species Act (1973) brought a shift in focus, as concern grew over the
status of the northern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina), a species
dependent upon the old growth forests along the western slopes of Washington,
Oregon, and northern California (Carroll, 1995).  In a precursor of larger coming
events, an interagency task force of U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land
Management (BLM), and Fish and Wildlife Service officials in 1978 proposed a
management strategy calling for the maintenance of owl habitat primarily on
    92   The U.S. Bureau of Land Management is a major player in this issue due to its
jurisdiction over the so-called O&C Lands.  These highly productive timber lands reverted
back to the public domain when the Oregon and California railroad land grants were
revoked by Congress in 1916 (Kenney et al., 1998).
    93   The Fish and Wildlife Service originally determined in 1987 that a listing was not
warranted, but this decision was later ruled to be “arbitrary and capricious.”  This opinion
was reinforced by a GAO (1989) study that concluded that the agency’s decision not to list
the owl was determined by political pressure. 
    94   This history of litigation between 1987 and 1991 is tremendously complex, but can be
accurately summarized as a series of suits in which the U.S. Forest Service, Fish and
Wildlife Service, and to slightly lesser extent, Bureau of Land Management were each
routinely found to be in violation of environmental laws and the Administrative Procedures
Act in delaying action in the protection of the spotted owl and its habitat.  Presumably, these
actions were reflective of policy directives from the Administration.   (For more
information, review the hearings before the Subcommittee on Forests, Family Farms, and
Energy of the Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives, held May 29th nd
30th, 1991;  Serial Number 102-33, U.S. Government Printing Office.)
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federal lands in Oregon.92  This action was viewed by old growth forest activists
with great interest, as the spotted owl was quickly emerging as a useful tool for
pursuing this broader agenda.  Concerns over the spotted owl were used to bring
the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act (1969)
into the forest planning process specified in the National Forest Management Act
(1976).  In response to the litigation and delays brought about by these tactics, the
Forest Service agreed to prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
addressing the spotted owl issue.  When the document was released in 1988, it
pleased few parties involved in the increasingly divisive issue, and sparked greater
use of the Endangered Species Act provisions by forest preservation activistsa
strategy that was given renewed strength when the Fish and Wildlife Service
reluctantly listed the owl as an endangered species in 1990.93
The listing of the spotted owl led to several sweeping court injunctions
against timber harvesting in the Pacific Northwest, and resulted in an intense
period of conflict, with environmentalists being pitted against loggers, and
outsiders against locals.94  Of course, the issues involved were much more
complex, but the bunker mentality did not provide a welcoming environment to
thoughtful dialogue and objective research.  Senator Mark Hatfield,
Representative Les AuCoin, and Governor Neil Goldschmidt (all of Oregon)
brought the feuding parties together for summit meetings in 1989, but no
compromise position could be reached.  The Forest Service responded by drafting
the so-called ISC Report,  authored  by  wildlife biologistand future Forest
    95   The report of the Interagency Scientific Committee (ISC) is listed in the references as
Thomas et al., 1990. 
    96   Congress debated several forest management bills in 1991, including The Community
Stability Act (H.R. 1309), The Forest and Family Protection Act (H.R. 2463), Ancient
Forest Act of 1991 (H.R. 1590), and Ancient Forest Protection Act of 1991 (H.R. 842). 
None of these bills were able to strike a widely acceptable balance among competing
interests, and each was opposed by the Administration in hearings before the Subcommittee
on Forests, Family Farms, and Energy of the Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of
Representatives.  These hearings were held May 29th and 30th, 1991 (Serial Number 102-33).
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Service chiefJack Ward Thomas.95  The ISC Report called for the establishment
of habitat conservation areas to protect owl habitat, at the expense of 30 to 40
percent reductions in regional timber harvests.   While this strategy alarmed timber
interests and did not result in the acceptable compromise all parties had hoped
was possible, the Forest Service reluctantly agreed to follow the majority of the
reports recommendations.  Subsequent litigation ensured, however, that no
management strategies (or timber harvests) would be implemented until a formal
recovery plan was in place, and a variety of study efforts were initiated to develop
the necessary plan.  Planning efforts were soon expanded to include the threatened
marbled murrelet in the planning process, due to the similar habitat requirements.
Throughout the summer of 1991, Congress considered a variety of bills
aimed at addressing the increasingly intractable conflict.96  These efforts drew
considerable attention, but were not effective in resolving the underlying conflicts.
The same could also be said of the action taken in 1991 by the Endangered
Species Committee (more commonly known as the God Squad) when asked by
the director of the BLM to consider exempting BLM lands from the owl recovery
efforts.  As was seen in earlier efforts, the Committee reached a compromise
decision that pleased no one (and was ultimately abandoned) and sparked further
litigation.
While that issue was pending and while the Final Environmental Impact
Statement on spotted owl recovery was being circulated in 1992, a new
Administration was preparing to take office and a new round of compromise
efforts were initiated.  Honoring a campaign promise, incoming President Clinton
convened a highly publicized forest summit in 1993, and established interagency
committees to address particular issues.  One of these groups, the Forest
Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT), identified ten management
options, of which the administration selected Option 9 (FEMAT, 1993).  The
option calls for timber harvest levels of approximately 1.2 billion board feet
annually, about one-fourth the average of harvests in the 1980s.  This strategy,
now known as the Northwest Forest Plan, is based on a broad perspective
concerned with the needs of owl and marbled murrelet survival, preservation of
old growth forests, salmon recovery, and the economic viability of northwest
timber-oriented communities.
    97   The plan was formally adopted in the April 13, 1994 Record of Decision for
Amendments to Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management Planning Documents
Within the Range of the Spotted Owl (DOI/DOA, 1994).  Judge Dwyer of the Federal
District Court for Western Washington, the source of most of the timber harvesting
injunctions of the early 1990’s, upheld the Plan upon review in December of 1994.  
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The Northwest Forest Plan was officially adopted in 1994, and had since
survived judicial review and public scrutiny.97  Timber harvesting has resumed in
the region on public lands, albeit on a scale significantly lower than historic levels
(Kenney et al., 1998).  While part of this declining harvest is clearly associated
with the owl crisis, broader economic trends and the gradual exhaustion of easily
harvested stands are also significant factors contributing to reduced harvest levels.
Environmental issues accelerated and exacerbated these larger trends.  Estimates
of lost jobs in the regional timber industry range considerably, with as many as
30,000 eliminated positions being attributed to owl protection efforts (Carroll,
1995).  This larger economic problem is addressed, in part, by the Northwest
Economic Adjustment Initiative component of the Northwest Forest Plan, which
proposes new federal expenditures exceeding $1 billion over five years for a
variety of job training, family assistance, and economic development activities. 
Implementation of the Northwest Forest Plan in the Applegate
Watershed
An important strategic element of the Northwest Forest Plan is to reserve
and manage sufficient quantities of federal forest lands to protect environmental
values so that restrictions on timber harvesting on non-federal lands can be eased.
Part of this strategy calls for relaxed restrictions on the incidental taking of
spotted owls on non-federal lands, as long as the management of these areas is
done in accordance with habitat conservation plans (HCPs) approved by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service.  While this approach offers the potential to limit
governmental intervention in private timber operations, it has further burdened
timber-based communities located in areas comprised mainly of public lands.  One
such area is the Applegate watershed, an almost 500,000 acre region in southwest
Oregon that is home to about 12,000 residents.  Over two-thirds of the Applegate
watershed is federal land, located within the Rogue River and Siskiyou National
Forests and the Medford District of the BLM.  
A History of Collaborative Efforts: Origins of the Applegate
Partnership and AMA  
Due in large part to the high concentrations of federal lands and spotted
owls found in the watershed, timber harvesting activities in the Applegate region
have been highly contentious and litigious for many years.  Frustrated by the
gridlock that surrounded  all  forest  planning and management activities in the
    98   This statement and other information about the Partnership can be found on the world
web wide at http://id.mind.net/community/app/ghome.htm.
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valley, a local logger joined with a local environmentalist in 1992 to form the
Applegate Partnership, which describes itself as follows:
The Applegate Partnership is a community-based project involving
industry, conservation groups, natural resource agencies, and
residents cooperating to encourage and facilitate the use of natural
resource principles that promote ecosystem health and diversity.
...  Through community involvement and education, this
partnership supports management of all land within the watershed
in a manner that sustains natural resources and that will, in turn,
contribute to economic and community stability within the
Applegate Valley.98 
In addition to promoting thoughtful discussions and building relationships among
traditionally adversarial parties, the Partnership has initiated many field-level
actions to promote environmentally sensitive land management while, to the
extent possible, supporting local timber economies.  The Partnership has also
pursued an agenda of aquatic habitat restoration through the Applegate River
Watershed Council, created by the Partnership in 1994.  Participants organized
through the largely overlapping memberships of the Partnership and Watershed
Council have completed a wide variety of field-level projects, including riparian
plantings on private lands, installation of fish screens, fencing of riparian areas,
reseeding of timber roads, and wildfire risk reduction programs.  
During the drafting of the Northwest Forest Plan, the Applegate
Partnership and similar organizations were identified as highly useful and
innovative experiments in local collaborative problem-solving, and were largely
responsible for the Plan calling for the establishment of ten Adaptive Management
Areas (AMAs) in regions with communities with close ties to federal timber
lands.   These are experimental areas where creative management is encouraged:
The overarching objective for Adaptive Management Areas is to
learn how to do ecosystem management in terms of both technical
and social challenges. ... It is hoped that localized, idiosyncratic
approaches that may achieve the conservation objectives of this
plan can be pursued.  These approaches rely on the experience and
ingenuity of resource managers and communities rather than
traditionally derived and tightly prescriptive approaches that are
generally applied in the management of forests.  (FEMAT, 1993,
III-24).
    99   Collectively, the ten AMA’s cover 1.5 million acres or about 6 percent of all federal
land in the spotted owl range.  The AMA’s are one of five land classifications given to
federal forest lands in the region.  The other categories are Late-Successional Reserves,
Managed Late-Successional Areas, Riparian Reserves, and Matrix lands.  Several “key
watersheds” were also identified in the Northwest Forest Plan.  These land classifications
are primarily based on the habitat needs of spotted owls, the marbled murrelet, and salmon
(DOI/DOA, 1994).
    100   While generally applauding efforts to include greater public participation in resource
management efforts, some parties have suggested that the Applegate Partnership, and
similar collaborative efforts, often fail to adequately involve national groups and other
potentially affected parties (e.g., unborn generations) in their efforts, and consequently fall
short of true multiparty collaboration (Kenney, 1997).  In the case of the Applegate, this
concern is most frequently raised with respect to environmental group representation. 
Several environmental activists participate, but no national environmental group has a
formal representative on the Board.  The Partnership has made several efforts to secure the
involvement of these representatives, however, many of the national groups have been
hesitant to abandon a reliance on litigation—a strategy used to great success by many
national environmental groups (Rolle, 1997).
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The second largest of the AMAs, covering 325,000 areas, is found in the
Applegate watershed.99  The particular focus of the Applegate AMA is to develop
and test variations on established forest management practicesincluding partial
cutting, prescribed burning, and low-impact approaches to forest harvest (e.g.,
aerial systems)in an effort to provide for a broad range of forest values
(DOI/DOA, 1994).  
Modern Coordination and Implementation of Regional Problem-
Solving Efforts 
The establishment of the AMA was an effort to formally encourage more
creativity in local problem-solving efforts.  The Applegate Partnership and
Applegate AMAas well as the Applegate River Watershed Council and other
local groupsare independent and largely informal entities that work together in
a cooperative fashion (Shannon, Sturtevant and Trask, 1995; Rolle, 1997).  The
Applegate Partnership is primarily an organization of local stakeholders (i.e., a
community of place) concerned with the future of the Applegate region, while
the AMA is a governmental entity headed by an interagency group of five federal
officials representing the Forest Service and BLM: three District Rangers
(Applegate, Ashland, and Galice) from the Rogue River and Siskiyou National
Forests, and two Resource Area Managers (Ashland and Grants Pass) from the
BLMs Medford District.  
The importance of closely coordinating federal land management practices
with the efforts of local nongovernmental stakeholders interested in the Applegate
is well recognized.100  Originally, representatives of the Forest Service and Bureau
of Land Management served as Board Members on the Partnership, but  later
resigned  these  positions  when  concerns  arose  regarding  possible
    101   The act outlines a series of specific structural and process requirements that must be
satisfied by groups established or utilized by federal agencies in an advisory capacity.  In an
effort to avoid the requirements of the act, federal agencies in many cases are hesitant to
become formerly involved in local collaborative groups, even in those situations that
promise mutual benefits (Rieke, 1997).
    102   Only on rare occasions does the Partnership submit a formal position statement or
recommendation to the AMA leadership (Rolle, 1997).  Generally, efforts are made to
encourage an informal dialogue among interested parties, rather than the more formal and
adversarial interactions characteristic of past decades of forest management in the region.
    103   Adaptive management is a learn-as-you-go approach to resource management in the
face of uncertainty.  In adaptive management, actions are taken and the results are closely
monitored with the understanding that the next iteration of management activities will be
tailored based on what was learned in the previous iteration  (Lee, 1993).  Since adaptive
management is highly information intensive, research and monitoring are major AMA
functions.  As of 1997, over 260 research and monitoring projects were underway in the ten
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violations of the Federal Advisory Committees Act (FACA).101  While this setback
temporarily interrupted progress in the region, the Partnership and AMA have
since devised several effective mechanisms for interaction and collaboration.  As
a normal and required public participation component of resource planning and
management, the AMA coordinates frequent interactions between Forest Service
and BLM officials with Partnership members and other local groups regarding a
variety of research, planning, and management programs.102  Additionally, several
ad hoc committees organized under the AMA framework and designed in
accordance with FACA requirements provide further opportunities for interaction.
The AMA framework does not provide for the formal transfer of authority
among agencies or between the public and private sectors, but does encourage the
agencies to pursue field-level innovations identified by Forest Service and BLM
personnel working together and in cooperation with local stakeholders (USDI et
al., 1997).  In the Applegate region, these innovations have primarily focused on
managing and restoring damaged landscapes, in part through actively involving
community members in planning and monitoring.  Specifically, strategies have
been identified for utilizing thinning cuts to harvest and market small diameter
trees in a manner responsive to environmental concerns and economic constraints.
Through improved technologies and processes, including aerial harvesting
methods (using cables and/or helicopters) and the development of new composite
timber products (e.g., laminates), attempts are being made to support local timber
economies with selective harvests from stands of thin, but densely packed, trees.
This strategy is consistent with the environmental goals of maintaining large old
growth forests (and owl habitat) and reducing fire and insect damage on other
lands.
Participants in the AMAs are also encouraged to pursue innovative
bureaucratic arrangements, something primarily accomplished in the Applegate
AMA through research partnerships.103  For example, studies of old growth forest
AMA’s (USDI et al., 1997).
    104   The emergence of the AMA as a vehicle for promoting new patterns of collaborative
and scientifically driven resource management was somewhat threatened for a time by the
so-called “salvage rider” (Shannon, Sturtevant and Trask, 1995).  Originally a small and
little known attachment to an appropriations bill (P.L. 104-19), the provision called upon
federal land managers to quickly prepare and offer timber sales in areas with a significant
amounts of dead, damaged, or disease-infected trees during an approximately seventeen
month “emergency period” beginning on July 27, 1995.   Approximately 4.6 billion-board-
feet (b.b.f.) of timber were offered nationally under the program, about 1.2 b.b.f. more than
was planned prior to the enactment of the salvage rider (GAO, 1997).  Not only was the
program a sore point among environmentalists, but as Shannon, Sturtevant, and Trask
(1995:18) observed, it temporarily put the AMA’s in an awkward position: “Local agency
staff are now compelled to act according to two conflicting policy directives: the President’s
Forest Plan which relied on analysis to establish appropriate sites and methods for timber
harvest and Congress’s Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act ... which required
salvage timber sales to be immediately put up for sale relying on past analysis to prepare
documents specified in the act.”  In the Applegate region, resource managers primarily
followed the directives found in the Northwest Forest Plan (rather than the salvage rider),
not wanting to derail the emerging planning processes heavily reliant on local public input
(Rolle, 1998). 
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functioning have featured the involvement of researchers from the Forest
Services Pacific Northwest Research Station and Oregon State University, while
community and sociological research has been conducted with the participation
of researchers from the Rogue Institute of Ecology and Economy, Southern
Oregon State College, and Lewis and Clark College.  Community involvement is
also encouraged in several facets of the AMAs formidable research agenda, a
connection illustrated by a two-day Bringing Science Home to the Applegate
conference held in March, 1996.  Significant research accomplishments (as of
1998) include the completion of a regional fire hazard assessment, a demographic
assessment, an ecosystem health assessment, and a variety of other site and issue-
specific environmental assessments, including those focused on the creation of late
successional habitats and the functioning of riparian systems.  Also of note is the
successful integration of the natural resource databases of the Forest Service,
BLM, state agencies, and information from private sources into a unified
Geographic Information System (GIS), and the subsequent publication of an
Applegate resource atlas. 
A New Era in Timber Harvest and Forest Management
Through innovative management programs highly dependent upon
collaborative problem-solving efforts, issues of old growth preservation,
environmental restoration, and community sustainability are now being addressed
in the Applegate region in processes characterized by science and cooperative
decision-making.104  While many parties see this as a welcome change to the
preceding eras of litigation and political forestry, several significant problems
remain (Rolle, 1997).  In part due to comprehensive efforts to protect old growth
    105   By 1988, over 55 m.b.f. of timber has been sold in the AMA (Rolle, 1998).
70
forests and spotted owls, the timber industry in the Applegate region remains in
decline, with harvests from federal lands having dropped to less than twenty
percent (by volume) of those seen prior to the spotted owl listing.  For example,
in fiscal year 1996, only 42.2 million-board-feet (m.b.f.) were offered for sale in
the Applegate AMA, with 29.5 m.b.f. actually sold.  Resource managers continue
to struggle to offer economically viable timber harvesting opportunities in an era
emphasizing old growth protection and a virtual elimination of clearcutting.105
Other challenges include funding shortages for restoration projects, legal barriers
(e.g., those pertaining to stewardship contracting), and fostering adequate
collaboration among involved parties.  Despite these shortcomings, however, the
Applegate region remains a highly regarded pioneer in the resolution of modern
forestry conflicts.
Case Study Analysis
Review of the Operational Choice Level Problems
This historic review of timber management in the Applegate region
illustrates three types of operational choice level problems: depletion,
underinvestment, and externality problems.  
 (1).  Depletion Problem.  The first and most chronic problem in the
Applegate region involves disagreements over the appropriate level of
timber harvesting in the region, and the concern that harvest levels are
unsustainable or otherwise inappropriate.  This concern has taken on many
forms over the past century, becoming particularly heated in the modern
era as the focus increasingly shifted to the largely non-renewable
component of the resource: the old growth forests.  Modern reforms have
made this issue largely inseparable from the underinvestment and
maldistribution problems described belowproblems arising only in
recent decades.
 (2).  Underinvestment Problem.  As society began to recognize existence
values for the spotted owl and marbled murrelet, and more generally, for
old growth forests, a public good situation emerged regarding these
environmental resources.  While each of these resources are of concern to
activists, the spotted owl has received the bulk of attention simply due to
the formal recognition and protected status afforded that species by the
Endangered Species Act.
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 (3).  Externality Problem.  Closely related to the underinvestment
problem is the externality problem, which in this case involves externalities
imposed by commodity users of the forest on the non-commodity users.
As these forests increasingly become valued for their non-commodity
uses, particularly as recreational resources, the commodity orientation
(i.e., timber emphasis) of forest management has become increasingly
controversial and problematic.  
Key Attributes of the Problematic Situation
As is frequently the case, the mix of operational choice level problems in
the Applegate region evolved over time in response to a variety of factors,
including changing patterns of resource use, evolving societal norms and values,
and incremental institutional reforms.  Up until the modern environmental
movement, the chief concern was one of depletioni.e., a fear that existing levels
of timber harvesting would lead to future timber shortages.  Congress first
addressed this problem nationally in the late 1800s by creating a series of forest
reserves, thereby addressing the open access situation that characterized the
western frontier.  Similarly, Congress later decided to retain federal control over
the O&C lands upon foreclosure in 1916, following an emerging 20th century
trend favoring land retention over land disposal (Kenney et al., 1998).  The
creation of federal forest reserves, managed in the Applegate region by both the
U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management, partially addressed the
deficient boundary and authority rules characteristic of open access situations by
empowering the agencies to establish rules and requirements for timber
harvesting.  Subsequent legislationincluding the Sustained Yield Forest
Management Act of 1944, the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960, the
National Forest Management Act of 1976, and the Federal Lands Policy and
Management Act of 1976and administrative rules such as the tenet of non-
declining even flow helped to shape and reshape specific rules regarding harvest
levels (Carroll, 1995; Kenney et al., 1998).
These reforms created a system of federal timber marketing that
successfully regulated access and harvest levels, however, they did not eliminate
all concerns relating to harvesting levels.  Many critics maintained that the
frequently cozy relationship between the two federal agencies and the timber
industry perpetuated high and presumably unsustainable harvesting levels,
suggesting that the boundary and authority rules were still largely deficient.
Additionally and ultimately of greater salience, however, was the growing feeling
that the federal natural resource agencies were still preoccupied with timber
management in a new era of forest management, the latter recognizing a much
more diverse set of values and interests in forests than simply commodity
production.  A complex planning system established through the National Forest
Management Act was established to address such concerns, but has satisfied few
parties due to the costs and delays in decision-making, and the penchant for
encouraging litigation.  
    106   This case study illustrates the historic divergence in environmental thinking between
conservationists and preservationists.  The original depletion problem, for example, was
very much an issue of concern to the conservationists active around the turn of the 20th
century, who believed resources should be managed on a sustainable basis to meet human
needs.  While this belief is not necessarily rejected by the preservationist ideology more
characteristic of the modern environmental movement, it is supplemented by the opinion
that a certain degree of additional resource preservation—above and beyond that needed to
satisfy long-term human consumptive needs—is needed to protect intrinsic and non-
commodity values, and to satisfy ethical responsibilities toward the environment.
    107   Litigation, however, is often only a necessary first step, paving the way for other
actions establishing an improved framework for articulating and institutionalizing emerging
social values. 
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The events leading up to and culminating with the adoption of the
Northwest Forest Plan were primarily driven by this larger set of issues.   No
longer were high harvest levels being questioned solely on the grounds of
threatened reductions in future harvests (i.e., a concern over depletion), but were
challenged due to impacts to public good resources with intrinsic values (e.g.,
endangered species) and to other non-commodity uses (e.g., recreation).  These
concerns, described in our terminology as underinvestment and externality
problems, were both forcefully articulated by the environmental community,
which by the 1980s had accumulated significant strength from public opinion and
legal precedentsnamely, the Endangered Species Act.  
The Institutional Solution
Congress, resource managers, and other concerned parties arguably were
making reasonable progress toward solving the underlying depletion problem until
the emergence of the environmental philosophy in the 1960s and beyond changed
the nature of the debate.  At that point in history, the concern for resource
conservation was joined by a strong desire for resource preservation, which
significantly altered the context in which timber harvesting decisions could be
made.106   Specifically, this transformation injected a strong element of value
conflict into resource management decision-making.  Generally, value conflicts
are difficult (if not impossible) to resolve in processes reliant on bargaining,
something perhaps best illustrated by the widespread dissatisfaction with forest
planning processes when utilized to address commodity/non-commodity conflicts.
Instead, those conflicts are normally resolved, to various degrees, through
litigationa tool well suited to value conflicts.107  This is the context into which
the modern conflict in the Applegate region is best evaluated. 
    108   The term “resolution” is not used to imply that a problem has necessarily been
corrected or that controversy has ceased, but only indicates that a set of rules have been
imposed that has significantly reduced the magnitude and intensity of conflict.  Value
conflicts, by their very nature, are not likely to completely dissipate quickly, but rather
change slowly in accordance with societal norms. 
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The set of institutional reforms comprising the Northwest Forest Plan
derived from efforts to move beyond the value conflicts.  Resolution108 of the
value conflict came slowly, largely through the incremental recognition of
environmental values in legislation such as the Endangered Species Act and the
multiple-use mandates of the Forest Service and BLM, and later enforced by the
timber harvesting injunctions in the late 1980s.  This was a contentious period of
institutional evolution, resulting in several new rules (particularly scope, position,
and boundary rules) ensuring all parties and perspectives a role in collective
choice decision-making efforts.  That evolution, however, came at a steep yet
predictable price: gridlock (i.e., the absence of effective mechanisms and/or
forums for collective choice level decision-making).  
The establishment of the Applegate Partnership in 1992 was, at the time,
a novel response to this problem.  It began with the assumption that both
commodity and non-commodity uses of the forest lands are valid; i.e., it does not
revisit the value conflict about which type of use should prevail.  Instead, the
Partnership decides to search for the most creative and efficient means of
simultaneously achieving both sets of objectives.  This type of arrangement,
inherently positive-sum in nature, is the only type of bargain that is possible in this
setting, as the underlying values of each perspective are largely non-
compensatory.  Thus, it is no surprise that this model was largely replicated in the
Northwest Forest Plan, which formally recognizes the legitimacy of all forest
values in an attempt to end the divisive debate over which set of values to
protectthat issue is now resolved and taken off the tableand to instead shift
the focus to how to best achieve the full spectrum of forest management goals.
By bringing some degree of closure to the value conflict, the Plan focuses
attention on the remaining cognitive conflicts associated with crafting sustainable
forest management practices. 
As a new century rapidly approaches, the Applegate region still struggles
with issues about how much timber to cut, but the context has clearly changed.
Now, the desirability of a proposed harvest is not evaluated solely in economic
terms or even in terms of the sustainability of the industry, but also in terms of
environmental objectives such as fire suppression and habitat improvements.  A
new set of collective choice level organizations and processes are now in place to
seek strategies and technologies that can satisfy these diverse criteria.  In theory,
the collaborative group approach being taken in the Applegate region seems
appropriate for this task; yet, tangible progress under the Partnership/AMA is not
readily evident at this time.  Clearly, the more significant accomplishment
    109   Recent events suggest that the delicate truce embodied in the Northwest Forest Plan
may be unraveling, as conflicts regarding harvest levels begin to re-emerge.  (For more
information, see the November 23, 1998 issue (volume 30, number 22) of High Country
News.)  
    110   These reservoirs are components of the Newlands Project, Truckee Storage Project,
and the Washoe Projects.
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has been the resolution (perhaps temporary109) of the value conflict, an
achievement more closely associated with national congressional politics and
litigation.  
Environmental Restoration in the
Truckee-Carson River Basins
Case Study Description
The Region and Resource
The Truckee River originates in eastern California, flowing into and
through Lake Tahoe on the California-Nevada border in a northeastern direction
through the rapidly growing Reno-Sparks metropolis on the way to Pyramid
Lake, Nevada.  This terminus is the central geographic, cultural, and economic
resource of the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation created in 1859.  Following a
generally parallel course to the Truckee, both geographically and politically, is the
Carson River, which originates to the south of the Truckee and terminates in a
complex of wetlands which includes the Carson sink, the Stillwater National
Wildlife Refuge, Stillwater National Management Area, Carson Lake and Pasture,
and other wetlands in the Lahontan Valley.  The Newlands Project, a turn-of-the-
century Bureau of Reclamation facility, has connected the two basins into a single
plumbing system, with about 172,000 acre-feet/year of the Truckees flow being
diverted in the Carson Basin where it is used for irrigate over 55,000 acres in the
Lahontan Valley.  This plumbing system is essential for agriculture in the region,
which averages only nine inches of rainfall (CCC, 1997).  
The key structural elements of the Newlands Project are Derby Dam
(below Reno-Sparks) on the Truckee River, which serves as the diversion point
through which water is conveyed through the Truckee Canal to the Carson system
(WPRS, 1981).  Water diverted into the Carson Basin is stored in Lahontan
Reservoir, from which irrigation water is withdrawn in accordance with demands.
Storage is also provided in a series of federal reservoirs located in the Truckee
River headwaters in California.  Key storage facilities in the Upper Truckee
system include Lake Tahoe, Stampede Reservoir, Boca Reservoir, Prosser Creek
Reservoir, and Donner Lake.110
    111   The cui-ui is a large lakesucker found only in Pyramid Lake.
    112   The water level in Pyramid Lake has dropped approximately 80 feet, forming a delta
where the Truckee River enters the lake.  This is the primary physical barrier to migration.
    113   Nonetheless, this wetland complex continues to be an important stopover point for
migratory birds along the Pacific Flyway.
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The major water user in the basin has historically been the Truckee-Carson
Irrigation District (TCID), the primary recipient of Newlands Project water.  A
small amount of irrigation water is also now made available to the Fallon Paiute
Shoshone Tribes, although the Fallon Reservation has never been provided with
the quantities of irrigation water originally promised.  In recent decades, the
rapidly expanding metropolis of Reno-Sparks, as well as several smaller
communities, have dramatically increased demands for municipal and industrial
water.  As discussed below, these demands have generally been satisfied at the
expense of the environmental resources at Pyramid Lake and the Lahontan Valley.
The Resource Problems
For many years, water demands in this region have outstripped dependable
supplies.  The result has been water quality and quantity degradation which has
caused dramatic declines in fish and wildlife species (and habitat), threatened tribal
rights, and raised water supply concerns for many other parties.  Pyramid Lake,
at the terminus of the Truckee River in Nevada, has been the focus of the most
intense controversy (Doermann, 1993; Wilds et al., 1994).  Pyramid Lake
historically supported large quantities of cui-ui fish and Lahontan cutthroat trout,
species of tremendous economic, cultural and spiritual value to the Pyramid Lake
Pauites.111  Historically, both species traveled up into the lower Truckee to spawn.
Barriers to migration, water quality declines, water quantity reductions, and
modifications to flow regimes and riparian vegetation have placed the Lahontan
cutthroat trout on the threatened species list (since 1970), and the cui-ui on the
endangered species list (since 1967).112  The original strain of the Lahontan
cutthroat trout has been extinct since the 1940's, and the current stocked strain
is entirely dependent on the Pyramid Lake fishery operated by the tribe.  
Environmental degradation is also an issue in the complex of wetlands
found in the Lahontan Valley, the terminus of the Carson River system and the
Newlands Project.  Most of the irrigated lands in the valley were originally
wetlands.  The size of the historic wetlands varied from 100,000 to 300,000 acres,
depending on flows from the Carson.  Since completion of the Lahontan Dam in
1911, the wetlands have dwindled by 85%, being sustained only by agricultural
return flows and spills (Doermann, 1993).113  Since the Lahontan Valley wetlands
are highly dependent upon return flows and spills from irrigation activities,  these
wetlands  actually  benefit from inefficient irrigation practices. 
    114   Due to the structure of the Newlands Project, environmental activists concerned with
Pyramid Lake and those interested in the Lahontan Valley wetlands often found themselves
in a situation where proposals to aid one resource had the potential to harm the other.
    115   United States of America v. Orr Water Ditch Company, Final Decree, 1944.  The
tribe challenged the decree on the grounds of a federal conflict of interest (between
Reclamation of Indian Affairs), but this argument was rejected in Nevada v. United States,
1983.
    116   Pyramid Lake Pauite Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 1973.
    117   The State Engineer agreed that return flows (when available) could be used for
environmental purposes, but irrigators were not required to provide a specific quantity.
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When water use efficiency standards for the Newlands Project were tightened
beginning in late 1960's, inflows to the wetlands decreased, while concentrations
of trace elements (including arsenic, boron, lithium, molybdenum, mercury, and
selenium) increased.  Ironically, these increases in irrigation efficiency were
primarily sought in order to minimize diversions from the Truckee system, thereby
increasing flows into Pyramid Lake.114  The more pronounced result, however, has
been an accelerated loss of Lahontan Valley wetlands and a build-up of several
trace elements to toxic levels, which has led to increased deformities and mortality
among migratory waterfowl, fish and wildlife. 
Initial Efforts at Environmental Problem-Solving
The Pyramid Lake Tribe has been concerned about the decline of the
Pyramid Lake fishery ever since the Newlands Project began to significantly
reduce flows on the Lower Truckee.  As early as 1913, efforts were initiated to
adjudicate Truckee River flows among California, Nevada, the federal
government and tribes, and established water users (NRC, 1992).  Among the
most notable outputs of these efforts was the Orr Ditch Decree of 1944, which
established tribal rights to irrigation water, but did not address water needs
associated with the fishery and related environmental and cultural resources.  In
the 1960's, the tribe began to challenge these omissions in the original decree,
without success.115  The tribe was successful, however, in convincing a federal
judge that the government had a responsibility to try to maintain Pyramid Lake
levels by requiring efficient water use in the Newlands Project.116  This was
attempted by implementing new operating criteria and procedures for the
Newlands Project, which only marginally increased inflows to Pyramid Lake while
dramatically reducing needed agricultural return flows into the Lahontan Valley
wetlands.  As early as the 1940's and 1950's, federal and state fish and wildlife
agencies and other environmental interests had initiated efforts to ensure that the
Lahontan Valley wetlands would continue to receive these return flows; however,
formal water rights to specific quantities of return flows were not granted by the
office of the Nevada State Engineer (Yardas, 1992, 1997).117  Efforts to address
environmental problems in Pyramid Lake brought new urgency
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to efforts to protect the Lahontan Valley wetlands, and reiterated the need to view
the Truckee and Carson Rivers as a single system.
In the late 1980's, a diverse group of environmental organizations
primarily led by The Nature Conservancy and the Environmental Defense
Fundbegan to promote a new strategy for addressing Lahontan Valley wetland
issues: market-based water transfers from agricultural to environmental purposes.
This approach promised to aid the wetlands while not harming Pyramid Lake, a
philosophy that was used to mobilize a broad coalition of environmental interests
in the Truckee-Carson region into an organization known as the Lahontan Valley
Wetlands Coalition (1992, , 1997).  The Lahontan Valley Wetlands Coalition
quickly became a powerful political force in the region, advocating the creation
of a water rights acquisition program in the Carson Valley.  This effort began
to take shape in the late 1980's when Congress appropriated approximately $2.7
million for this purpose.  In 1989, the State of Nevada allocated about $9 million
to settle water rights disputes and to protect natural resources, and in a 1990 bond
election, Nevada voters authorized an additional $8 million for the acquisition of
water rights for the wetlands (CCC, 1997).  The state also modified its water code
in 1989 to recognize environmental protection as a legitimate beneficial use of
water.  An acquisitions program was born.
The Truckee-Carson Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement  
While political and market mechanisms were being utilized to initiate
recovery efforts in the Lahontan Valley wetlands, litigation provided the stimulus
for action on Pyramid Lake issues.  It was the Endangered Species Act that
eventually provided the Pyramid Lake tribe with the needed leverage to encourage
a comprehensive problem-solving effort in the basin.  Through a complex and
bitter series of administrative decisions and lawsuits in the 1970s and early 1980s
focusing on the application of the Endangered Species Act to the cui-ui situation,
the tribe was able to ensure that Stampede Reservoir (upstream on the Truckee
in California), built in the 1960s primarily to supplement and stabilize the Reno-
Sparks water supply, had to be managed primarily to promote spawning of the
endangered fish.  This decision alarmed many parties, including the Sierra Pacific
Power Company which provided water and power to the Reno-Sparks area, and
to Nevada and California who had been adhering to an unratified interstate water
allocation compact on the Truckee since 1970.  The compact had never been
congressionally ratified due to federal concerns surrounding tribal water rights and
the environmental degradation in and around Pyramid Lake.  The Stampede
Reservoir decision prompted negotiations in the mid-1980's among Nevada and
California interests concerned with environmental, tribal, and M&I water issues.
These efforts made little progress until Senator Reid of Nevada became an active
participant and proponent of the negotiations (Doermann, 1993; Wilds et al.,
1994).
Senator Reid realized that solving the many disputes required utilizing a
problemshed  focus  (that  included  both  the Truckee  and  Carson  basins),
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addressing many issues simultaneously, and getting all the key parties that could
veto a settlement involved in the negotiating process.  The following parties were
identified as the key players: the Pyramid Lake Tribe, Sierra Pacific (representing
the interests of Reno-Sparks), the State of Nevada, State of California, TCID
(representing irrigation interests and most water rights holders), and the federal
government (i.e., Interior Department).  The tribe sought increased flows into
Pyramid Lake, clear title to the beds and bank of the lake, and funding for
fisheries management and habitat restoration.  Sierra Pacific was primarily
interested in obtaining upriver storage on the Truckee to provide drought
protection for Reno-Sparks (something it had originally thought would be
provided by Stampede Dam).  The states wanted greater certainly in regional
water allocation matters, something that could be achieved by congressional
ratification of the interstate water allocation compact.  Parties associated with
TCID generally wanted to maintain the status quo and their senior water rights.
The federal government presumably sought to honor all federal obligations and
protect all federal rights in an efficient manner. 
Almost immediately, the negotiations ran into two problems.  First, the
Pyramid Lake Tribe and TCID could not find common ground on issues of water
rights, and agreed that these issues should be addressed as needed and at a later
time through judicial mechanisms or separate negotiations.  With this
understanding, TCID was not a major player in subsequent negotiations.  A
second problem was the differences of opinion held by the multiple federal agency
representatives at the negotiating table, a problem that was later resolved by
appointing one Interior Department spokesman to present a unified federal voice
in negotiations.  Efforts to address these problems did not slow the negotiations
between the Pyramid Lake Tribes and Sierra Pacific concerning the operation of
Stampede Dam.   These negotiations quickly led to a preliminary settlement
agreement dealing with the management of the Truckee River facilities, primarily
Stampede Dam, in an effort to satisfy both the cui-ui spawning interests of the
tribes and the drought water supply issues of Sierra Pacific through integrated
reservoir management.  Essentially, this agreement allows Sierra Pacific to utilize
Stampede Reservoir in drought years as long as adequate releases are provided
in normal years to support cui-ui spawning, and as long as Reno-Sparks develops
and implements a water conservation plan aimed at minimizing future water
supply controversies in the region.
With this key issue resolved, the Pyramid Lake Tribes, Sierra Pacific, and
the two states were able to quickly find common ground on the other issues, and
prepared a bill (S.1554) to implement the settlement.  At this time, however, it
became apparent that the scope of the negotiated agreement had failed to
adequately consider related resource issues at the end of the Carson system.  One
issue was the failure of the federal government to provide new irrigation water
from   the  Newlands   Project  to   the  Fallon  Tribes,  as  promised  in   earlier
    118   The dispute involved broken promises from the turn of the century (CCC, 1997).  The
reservation was divided into 160-acre allotments in the 1890s, as called for under the
General Allotment (or Dawes) Act of 1887.  When the Newlands Project was authorized in
1902, the tribe entered into an agreement in which most allotment holders agreed to
exchange their 160-acre allotments for 10-acre allotments to be serviced, at no charge and in
perpetuity, with water from the Newlands Project.  This arrangement was to provide the
tribes with a water supply, while creating land for non-Indian beneficiaries of the
reclamation project.  Despite the clear terms of the agreement, no water was ever
delivered—although the size of the tribal land holdings was augmented on a few occasions. 
In 1978, the federal government formally recognized its failure to honor the agreement (P.L.
95-337), but by 1990 no action had been taken to rectify the situation.
    119   The Truckee-Carson Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act is Title II of the
Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-618).
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legislation.118  This issue was linked to the Truckee River issues since any
increased irrigation in the Lahontan Valley, either for tribal or non-tribal interests,
would potentially require greater diversions from the Truckee system, creating a
potential conflict of interest between the Fallon and Pyramid Lake Tribes.  The
Fallon Tribes water rights issue was being addressed in a separate negotiation
which appeared to enjoy greater political support than the Pyramid Lake
negotiations.  For this reason, negotiators chose to incorporate S.1554 as part of
the proposed water rights settlement for the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian
Tribes, an action that not only increased the political viability of Pyramid Lake
settlement, but which also brought greater regional consistency to the negotiated
agreement (Doermann, 1993).  The other major omission in the preliminary
settlement was the failure to consider the declining health of the Lahontan Valley
wetlands.  Negotiators concluded that the best way to address the wetlands issues
was through the use of improved reservoir operations systemwide, the
establishment of funds for habitat and species restoration, and by giving increased
support to market-based reallocations through the water rights acquisition
program.
The final agreement enacted by Congress in 1990 satisfied the major needs
of the negotiating parties (Doermann, 1993).119  The allocation of water between
Nevada and California was achieved in a manner consistent with the 1970
compact.  The Secretary of Interior was directed to negotiate and develop a new
operating agreement for the Truckee River reservoirs, in accordance with the
preliminary agreement developed by the Pyramid Lake Tribe and Sierra Pacific.
The agreement also allows the Secretary to lease storage capacity in these
reservoirs for parties with non-project water (e.g., Sierra Pacific), with the aim of
improving efficiency and raising funds for environmental restoration.  Pyramid
Lake funds of $25 million and $40 million were established for fisheries
management and economic development, respectively, as was a $43 million fund
for expanding irrigation on the Fallon Reservoir through the improvement and
expansion of distribution facilities and the purchase of other active water rights
    120   Total tribal water use is limited to approximately 10,500 acre-feet per year.
    121   The 1990 legislation authorized $400,000 in expenditures by the Corps on restoration
projects.
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in the regiona strategy that will allow increased tribal irrigation without
requiring additional diversions from the Truckee system.120  The Secretary is also
authorized to acquire water rights from willing sellers in additional and ongoing
efforts to further increase flows into Pyramid Lake and the Lahontan Valley
wetlands.  The Lahontan Valley wetlands water rights acquisition program was
given a formal mandate, as the Secretaryprimarily working through the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service and in conjunction with the State of Nevada and other
interested parties was instructed to acquire sufficient water to support 25,000
acres of wetlands.
Implementation of the Settlement Act
The many studies, negotiations, and specific agreements required to
implement the overall agreement are generally proceeding on schedule, however,
many difficult issues must still be resolved.  In 1994-1995, a round of second
generation negotiations were held to discuss remaining issues.  Using a
professional facilitator, Senator Reid convened a negotiating group of the key
stakeholdersi.e., the Department of Interior, the State of Nevada, the Pyramid
Lake Tribe, the Fallon Tribe, Sierra Pacific Power Company, Lahontan Valley
farming interests (including TCID), county governments, and the so-called
conservation caucusto address issues concerning environmental restoration
and the future of agriculture in the region.  With the exception of a water quality
agreement, these negotiations were only marginally productive (CCC, 1997).
Progress in many other areas, however, has been substantial and dramatic.
It appears that the negotiated settlement has provided an effective problem-
solving framework which fosters the application of many alternative problem-
solving strategies.  Two examples are given below.
Lower Truckee River Restoration Steering Committee 
One example of the growing role played by collaborative groups in the
region is the Lower Truckee River Restoration Steering Committee (Steering
Committee), formed in 1993 to help identify and pursue river rehabilitation efforts
along the Truckee from Wadsworth, Nevada to Pyramid Lake (Gourley, 1997).
This group formed at the urging of The Nature Conservancy, and in response to
language in the Settlement Act that called on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
to develop a program to restore the ecological health of the Lower Truckee
River.121  The Steering Committee is working closely with the Corps to develop
a restoration program, and is also active in identifying and implementing other
field-level projects designed to promote and accelerate river restoration and cui-ui
recovery. 
    122   An earlier EPA program known as the Truckee River Strategy helped to create an
environment conducive to interagency cooperation.
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A wide variety of public and private parties have been involved in the
work of the Steering Committee.  In addition to the Corps of Engineers, federal
participants include the Fish and Wildlife Service, Natural Resources
Conservation Service, Bureau of Reclamation, Environmental Protection
Agency122, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.  The tribes are represented directly
by the  Pyramid Lake Fisheries Office and the Pyramid Lake Tribe.  Among the
participating state and local agencies include the Nevada Division of
Environmental Protection and the local conservation district.  The activities of the
committee are primarily directed by a core group of representatives from the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Pyramid Lake Tribe, Washoe County, and The
Nature Conservancy.  These entities provide the majority of funding and in-kind
services utilized by the group, including the support of a watershed coordinator.
The Steering Committee is an extremely informal group operating without a
formal mandate or procedural rules, capable of action only when participants
voluntarily agree to utilize their independently held authorities and resources.
In addition to assisting the Corps in planning efforts, the Steering
Committee has investigated and implemented several field-level projects that
involve modifying the stream channel, restoring the riparian forest communities,
and improving water quality and flow regimes.  The work of the Steering
Committee to this point has primarily focused on two specific problems: the
decline of riparian cottonwood stands, and migration barriers impacting the cui-ui
fish (Gourley, 1997).  A creative and experimental cottonwood forest
regeneration program has been initiated which calls for federal water managers to
release water from flood control storage (in wet years only) in a pattern that
mimics the natural flood regimes necessary for cottonwood germination.  The first
test of this voluntary program successfully resulted in the establishment of a new
stand of seedlings.  Fences have also been erected to aid in cottonwood
restoration.  The problem of migration barriers to cui-ui fish is being addressed
by the Steering Committee through the development and installation of an
experimental fish channel.  The cui-ui is not a physically strong fish, and cannot
effectively utilize fish ladders designed for strong salmonids.  The Steering
Committee has found that gradual, meandering bypass channels are more
effective, as recently shown by a successful demonstration project at the Pyramid
Lake delta, which in turn, is now being used to in the design of an new bypass
structure at Newmana Dam.  The problem of fish passage is also being addressed
through other efforts pursued by the Steering Committee and other parties
(including the Truckee-Carson Coordination Office) aimed at increasing flows and
improving water quality (Zippen, 1997).
    123   One of the benefits of these strategies is that it allows water to be reallocated away
from TCID rights holders in voluntary market transactions, rather than through more
contentious, time-consuming, and potentially unsuccessful legal challenges based on
environmental laws, federal reserved rights, or tribal obligations.
    124   The Alpine Decree, which allocates water use on the Carson system in conjunction
with the Orr Ditch Decree, asserts that individual Newlands Project landowners have the
legal right to those water supplies used beneficially.  United States v. Alpine Land and
Reservoir Company, 1980.
    125   Efforts to attract private funding have generally not been successful.
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The Lahontan Valley Water Rights Acquisition Program  
Since being formally recognized in Section 206 of the Settlement Act, the
acquisition program has grown into a significant regional problem-solving
mechanism based on the tenets of voluntary action and market-based decision-
making processes.123  Reservoir re-operations and water conservation are also
being investigated.  The settlement act requires these water acquisitions to comply
with relevant federal and state laws, with the notable clarification that wetland
protection is acknowledged as a legitimate use of water and that landowners
served by the Newlands Project have the right to sell water rights.124  A variety of
agreements and regulations have been crafted in an effort to ensure that water
(and water rights) acquired for wetlands restoration does not result in increased
project demands, since increased demands would require additional diversions
from the Truckee River system at the expense of the fishery and environmental
resources of the lower Truckee and Pyramid Lake.  Efforts are also underway to
develop strategies for increasingly the long-term certainty of agricultural return
flows in the wetlands complex.  Flows obtained through the acquisition program
are seen as a necessary complement to baseline agricultural return flows, upon
which the Lahontan Valley wetlands are still reliant.
Prior to its formal recognition, the program was highly dependent upon
the work the Environmental Defense Fund, The Nature Conservancy, the Nevada
Waterfowl Association, and many other non-governmental groups to raise funds
and to identify and implement water rights purchases.  Now, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service has established its own Water Rights Acquisition Program,
employing realtors, negotiators, and other professionals skilled in the functioning
of water markets (Yardas, 1997).  The role of non-governmental groups such as
the Lahontan Valley Wetlands Coalitionnow more commonly known as the
Lahontan Valley Coalitionhas consequently been significantly reduced, as a
publicly financed and implemented acquisition program is now firmly in place.125
State agencies, primarily the Nevada Department of Wildlife, are also active in
efforts to implement this component of the federal Settlement Act. 
Two related issues have been problematic in the implementation of the
acquisition program (Yardas, 1997; CCC, 1997).  The first is the determination
of how much water must be acquired to meet the goal of the Settlement Act,
which  is  to  restore  and  maintain  25,000 acres of Lahontan Valley wetlands.
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While it is widely assumed that this translates to a water demand of approximately
125,000 acre-feet/year, it is unclear what quantity of water rights must be
purchased to achieve this level of inflow.  Even in the absence of water rights
acquisitions, some return flows, seepage, flood spills, and other discharges are
likely to continue reaching the wetlands.  This amount can potentially be modified
by changes in reservoir operating criteria, efficiency standards, economic
incentives, and perhaps most fundamentally, by changes in the magnitude of
irrigated acres in the Lahontan Valley.  This leads to the second issue of concern,
which is the potentially negative third-party impacts to communities in the
Lahontan Valley dependent upon declining revenue streams generated by irrigated
agriculture.  
These issues were featured topics of a recent Environmental Impact
Statement, completed in 1996 (DOI, 1996).  While the EIS generally finds that
community economic interests are being satisfactorily addressed through
arrangements such as payments in lieu of taxes and revised operation and
maintenance reimbursement agreements, the study does support the Fish and
Wildlife Services self-imposed purchase limit of 75,000 acre-feet, and calls for
periodic assessments of socioeconomic impacts as the level of acquired water
rights increases.  By the end of 1996, approximately 20,000 acre-feet of water
rights have been acquired, with purchase prices generally falling in the range of
$435 to $812 per acre-foot (CCC, 1997).  There is some interest, particularly
among Lahontan Valley farmers, to enter into lease agreements rather than to sell
rights; although this raises many issues concerning the viability and dependability
of long-term funding sources.  Funding mechanisms for environmental restoration
will likely remain a key element of future negotiations, as basic issues of
authorities and problem-solving strategies have now largely been resolved.
Case Study Analysis
Review of the Operational Choice Level Problems
This case features a complex mixture of problems and rules deficiencies.
For purposes of analysis, it is useful to identify five related operational level
problems that have evolved in the Truckee and Carson River valleys since the
early days of this century.  Three of those problems are of the asymmetric
maldistribution type and two are symmetric underinvestment problems
characteristic of public goods situations. 
 Maldistribution Problems:
 (1).  The diversion of Truckee River water into the Carson Basin
and Lahontan Reservoir by the Newlands Irrigation Project
created a maldistributionspecifically, an externalityin that
water use by the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID)
denied adequate inflows into Pyramid Lake.  As a result, the water
    126   It could be argued that the wetlands also bear a “positive” externality in that they
benefit from return flows from agricultural activities.  This situation was illustrated by
efforts to impose greater conservation requirements on irrigators.  Undermining the positive
externality argument, however, is the observation that the cessation of consumptive uses of
water by irrigators would provide a greater benefit.
    127   Note that this situation was as much a problem of law enforcement as it was of
institutional deficiency.  It is listed here as an institutional problem in order to highlight the
fact that enforcement of the agreement was, in large part, due to the failure of institutional
arrangements to provide adequate position and boundary rules regarding the Fallon tribe.   
    128   Thus, the “public good” component of this problem relates to the  “existence value”
granted all species by the Endangered Species Act.
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level fell by eighty feet, drastically reducing populations of
cutthroat trout and cui-ui upon which the Pyramid Lake Paiutes
depend.
 (2).  Along similar lines, the second maldistribution problem
involves damages imposed on the Lahontan Valley wetlands as a
consequence of irrigation expansion by the TCID.  Over time, the
loss of wetland area and water supplies was compounded by the
introduction of pollutants in return flows into the remaining
wetlands, most of which were by then incorporated in the
Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge and the Carson Lake Wildlife
Management Area.  Thus, federal interests in wetlands bore the
externality of Lahontan Valley irrigation.126  
 (3).  The third maldistribution problem arose when federal
operators of the Newlands Project failed to deliver irrigation water
to the Fallon Paiute Shoshones as promised in earlier agreements.
Instead, limited irrigation supplies were provided to non-Indian
irrigators and municipalities, all of whom had water rights junior
to those of the tribe.127
 Underinvestment Problems: 
 (4) The first of two public goods situations derives from the first
externality described above; namely, the diversion of water out of
the Truckee and into the Carson Basin.  With the passage of the
Endangered Species Act and the subsequent listing of the
cutthroat trout and cui-ui, the federal government asserted a
national interest in protecting these species that went beyond their
value to the Pyramid Lake Paiutes.128  In pursuit of that national
interest, it has changed the allocation of storage in Stampede
Reservoir and taken other steps at public expense to protect these
    129   The migratory waterfowl resource is a public good in this situation in that it is a
resource from which many benefit freely and without possibility of exclusion, and for which
the benefit to an additional beneficiary is costless.
    130   See, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1543 and 661-667, respectively. 
85
two fish species.
 (5).  The other underinvestment problem arose as a consequence
of the second externality problem (loss of Lahontan Valley
wetlands) and the adverse effects upon the migratory waterfowl
which depend in part upon those wetlands during their seasonal
migrations.  The federal government, in the creation of the
national wildlife refuge system, assumed the costs of acquiring
water rights and otherwise protecting remaining waterfowl
habitat, recognized the national interest in protecting waterfowl (a
public good).129
Key Attributes of the Problematic Situation
While this scheme of five related problems may seem somewhat awkward
at first glance, it is highly useful in discussing the evolution of the problematic
situation over time.  For example, the western states water law doctrine of prior
appropriation, as it existed at the turn of the century, can be shown to have led
directly to the maldistribution problems later addressed in this case.  Of particular
concern are authority, position and boundary rules that recognized only a limited
subset of interests in western water.  At the time of initial water development and
allocation in the region, water rights could be acquired only by diverting water
from its natural course to support a narrow range of consumptive, or off-stream,
uses.  Water rights could not be acquired to maintain streamflows or lake levels
for fishery purposes.  Similarly, water rights could not be acquired for the purpose
of maintaining wetlands or other forms of wildlife habitat.  Finally, the diversion
and seniority principles of the doctrine effectively excluded most Indian tribes
from acquiring water rights.  Eventually, federal law did recognize Indian water
rights (beginning in the Winters decision, 1908), but few such rights were
successfully adjudicated or enforced for several decades.  
In similar fashion, natural resource laws in the region did not initially
recognize a national interest in endangered species or migratory waterfowl
protection.  Only later were these public goods given formal recognition by virtue
of federal laws such as the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, respectively.130  In this case and elsewhere, it
is these federal statutes regarding species protection that have been utilized to
address  many  of  the  problems associated with antiquated state rules for water
86
allocation and management.  Federal statutes (and court decisions) regarding
tribal water rights were also particularly salient in this case, helping to eventually
level the playing field and create incentives for a negotiated settlement.  
By the late 1980s, the institutional environment was conducive to the
pursuit of a comprehensive solution to the five problems.  Not only had new
federal rules regarding tribal rights, wetland resources, and endangered species
modified the balance of power in the region, but initial and uncoordinated
attempts at problem-solving had quickly illustrated the folly of pursuing
incremental solutions to a multifaceted problematic situation.  This was perhaps
best illustrated by efforts to address those problems associated with decreased
inflows into Pyramid Lake.  These efforts had been greatly aided by passage of the
Endangered Species Act, and the subsequent court decision requiring Stampede
Dam to be managed to support cui-ui spawning.  However, as is often the case
with narrowly focused problem-solving efforts, this judicial solution had the
effect of creating a new externality situation for Reno-Sparks and Sierra Pacific
Power, in that the decision took away a key component of their water supply
system to resolve a problem that was primarily attributable to the action of
irrigators (with federal assistance) in the Carson Basin.  The situation also
disrupted the unratified interstate water allocation compact scheme in use by
Nevada and California.  A similar externality phenomenon occurred when the
Lahontan Valley wetlands lost part of their water supply when the new irrigation
efficiency requirements were imposed  to increase flows into Pyramid Lake.  By
the late 1980s, these problems, when combined with pre-existing institutional
deficiencies, created an institutional environment problematic (in widely varying
ways and magnitudes) to almost all key parties.  One notable exception was TCID
irrigators, who predictably chose not to participate in the subsequent negotiations
and instead advocated a protection of the status quo.  
The Institutional Solution
The Settlement Act 
The 1990 Settlement Act (P.L. 101-618) provided a partial solution to the
five underlying problems in the region, and opened the door for subsequent
problem-solving efforts reliant heavily on alternative problem-solving strategies.
For example, the first maldistribution (externality) problem concerning inflows to
Pyramid Lake and the consequences of the Stampede Dam decision were
addressed through new reservoir operating rules requiring water releases to
support cui-ui spawning in normal hydrologic years, but suspending such releases
in drought years to protect Reno-Sparks water supply needs assuming municipal
water conservation programs are implemented.  Federal funding for improved
fishery management and tribal economic development were also provided.  The
second maldistribution (externality) problem concerning the health of Lahontan
Valley wetlands has been (and is being) addressed through a host of federally-
funded   measures,  including   improved  reservoir   operations,   water   rights
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acquisitions, retirement of land, water transfers, water banking, and the
establishment of funds for habitat and species restoration.  The third
maldistribution problem associated with the unfilled rights of the Fallon Paiute
Shoshone tribe is addressed in the Settlement Act by again recognizing those
rights, establishing a federal fund of $43 million for purchasing TCID water rights
for conveyance to the tribe, and authorizing a federal program to improve water
distribution facilities to the tribes benefit.
These reforms also address the two underinvestment problems.  New rules
for reservoir operations and water allocation/use promise to aid the Pyramid Lake
fishery, as do increased federal financial commitments for improved resource
management.  Similarly, Lahontan Valley wetlands are likely to benefit from a
variety of new management programs, particularly the establishment and
implementation of the federal water rights acquisition program with the goal of
securing sufficient water to support 25,000 wetland acres.  This program promises
to supplement and largely overtake initial water rights acquisition efforts
undertaken by state and private interests working through the Lahontan Valley
Wetlands Coalition.
Remaining Efforts in Alternative Problem-Solving
The new rules imposed as part of the Settlement Act only partially address
the underlying problems in the institution.  Many important issues still remain to
be resolvede.g., the legislation left the allocation of Truckee River water rights
between TCID and the Pyramid Lake tribe for future adjudication.  Additionally,
many other solutions, such as the acquisition of sufficient water rights to support
25,000 acres of Lahontan Valley wetlands, have not been fully implemented.
However, to the extent that these goals remain unfulfilled by the Settlement Act,
the legislation does provide support for processes to eventually achieve these
objectives.  As described earlier, prominent strategies currently being employed
are highly alternative in nature: i.e., stakeholder negotiations, market exchanges,
and collaborative efforts.
While market-based tools are the most prominent element of the
framework established for resolving long-term problems in water maldistribution,
the collaborative efforts underway do merit some attention.  Collaborative groups
such as the Lower Truckee River Restoration Steering Committee can potentially
make a significant contribution to future problem-solving in the region in several
ways.  One way is to address the cognitive conflicts that undoubtedly surround
complex issues in ecosystem restoration.  By bringing together a host of expert
opinions, and by strategically employing pilot projects and other experimental
management techniques, many technical fixes can potentially be realized.  The
cottonwood reforestation and fish channel experiments of the Steering Committee
are illustrative.  Along similar lines, collaborative groups hold the promise of
promoting greater integration and coordination among (and between) resource
managers and stakeholders, a usual need in problematic situations involving
multijurisdictional resources.  To the extent that positive-sum strategies
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for problem-solving can be identified and implemented, the contribution of
collaborative groups in the region should continue and potentially increase. 
More readily tangible results are likely to emerge from the market-based
elements of the problem-solving frameworkparticularly, the acquisition of water
rights from TCID to support wetlands and endangered fisheries.  In addition to
addressing the underlying problem of insufficient water rights for environmental
interests, this strategy is notable in two ways.  First, it brings the TCID irrigators
into the problem-solving effort, and in a way which is more politically viable than
other potential strategies (given the voluntary nature of the program).  This
approach appears to be equitable, in that it does not penalize irrigators for those
outcomes more appropriately attributed to deficient and antiquated institutional
arrangements.  Second, it transforms the zero-sum nature of water reallocation
efforts into a positive-sum activity by relying heavily on federal dollars to finance
water acquisitions for the environment.  Providing federal investments is a classic
strategy in western water politics for resolving interest conflicts.  In many historic
cases, however, federal dollars were used to subsidize financial ventures of
specific interest groups, an inefficient and inequitable practice routinely chastised
as pork barrel politics.  In this case, however, taxpayers are being asked to fund
programs aimed at restoring public goods (i.e., endangered species and migratory
waterfowl), an appropriate way of addressing those largely unmalleable boundary
and payoff rules that lead to underinvestments in these resources.  Other funds
provided in the Settlement Act to serve tribal interests also appear appropriate and
reasonablegiven the historic role of the federal government in creating those
problems borne largely by the tribesand undoubtedly contributed to the viability
of the problem-solving effort.  
Ultimately, however, the recent problem-solving progress in the region is
perhaps most closely tied to the resolution of two long-term value conflicts
coloring all decision-making efforts at the collective choice level of the institution:
the status of tribes in American law, and the worth of environmental resources
(namely, endangered species) to society.  Formal recognition of tribal water rights
was primarily achieved through litigation, while the recognition of environmental
rights emerged from a broad social movement (i.e, the environmental movement
of the 1960s and 1970s), hard-fought legislative gains during that period, and a
host of subsequent litigation.  These efforts were highly confrontational in nature,
and were essential to establishing the context of the Settlement Act and
subsequent ongoing problem-solving efforts which are well-suited to alternative
problem-solving strategies, given their emphasis on interest conflicts.  These
observations reinforce the assertion that institutional problem-solving and
innovation often occurs in several distinct stages at multiple levels of action, and
that different types of problem-solving tools are likely needed over time as
dictated by the nature of problem types and action situations.  
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SECTION V:
THE NEXT STEP FORWARD:
ANALYSIS AT A MACRO SCALE
Introduction
The preceding discussion of institutional problem-solving case studies
illustrates a formal way of thinking about natural resource and environmental
problems and their solutions, and as such, promises greater analytical utility than
a more unstructured presentation.  Admittedly, the language and metaphors
utilized in analysis are abstract and general in nature and are not always easily
applied to complex real world situations.  This is largely due to the fact that
natural resource concerns often involve operational choice level problems of
several kinds and derivations, and the corresponding collective choice level (and
higher) problem-solving efforts usually feature a complex and evolving mixture
of conflict types.  However, applying metaphors to the analysis of specific cases
is a difficult challenge in virtually all fields of scholarly inquiry; institutional
analysis is no exception.  
These observations certainly do not invalidate the framework presented,
but rather help to describe the context within which this methodological tool is
best applied.  While the conceptual framework can be productively applied to
specific case studies, as done in Section IV, ultimately the best use of the
framework may come in the analysis of large groupings of case study data,
identifying broad trends and truths in natural resources and environmental
problem-solving. This type of macro scale analysis is the logical next step in the
development of tools for institutional analysis.  The three case studies presented
in Section IV hardly constitute a large grouping of data, but they are
representative of a much broader set of cases that, in various ways and
magnitudes, fall under the heading of alternative problem-solvinga particularly
salient macro-level trend in natural resources and environmental institutions. 
In the remaining pages below, some of the issues associated with applying
the conceptual framework to the analysis of larger trends are briefly reviewed.  In
accordance with the problem-solving orientation of this study, this discussion
focuses first on problems, then on solutions.  Some general conclusions regarding
the merits of alternative problem-solving are also provided, highlighting the types
of issues and concerns that should be featured in future research.
    131   Some authors use the term “gap” to refer to the unmet need attributed to an
institutional deficiency (Gregg et al., 1991). 
    132   This list is not intended to be comprehensive or to have particular analytical value,
but is simply a general list generated from the preceding case study data.  Developing a
more exhaustive list is beyond the scope of this report.  
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Institutional Problems
Some Causal Factors of Natural Resource and Environmental
Problems
It is difficult to say anything very meaningful about trends in institutional
innovation in the natural resources and environmental realm without giving some
thought to those factors encouraging institutional change in the modern era.  On
a case by case basis, it is sufficient to say that institutional change is motivated by
the existence of problematic situations, defined broadly herein to include those
situations in which one or more parties is dissatisfied with the existing flow of
goods and/or services associated with a resource.131  While this is a convenient
convention at the micro (case study specific) scale focused tightly on a distinct
geographic region and point in time, it is not terribly illuminating at a larger,
macro scale of analysis, where the scope of the analysis may be to identify broad
regional trends and causal factors underlying the emergence of natural resource
and environmental problems.  This macro perspective, often the focus of parties
involved in the planning of resource management regimes, takes on particular
importance when a long-term goal is to anticipate and thus minimize future
sources of problemsthe best of all problem-solving strategies.  Some of these
causal factors can be identified by reviewing the case studies from Section IV.
At least four types of frequently-related causal factors can be found
underlying the operational choice level problems reviewed in the three case
studies: (1) growing demands on resources, (2) technological change, (3)
changing social values, and (4) previous rule-making exercises.132  These factors,
in various ways, modified the interaction of those element comprising the action
situations of the three case studies reviewed, leading to perceived problems and,
in turn, calls for rules changes.  
The first of these factors, growth, is seen in all of the cases, as the West
evolved from a sparsely populated frontier region to a modern industrialized
component of the United States.  The salience of growth is perhaps best
illustrated by considering the open access situations characteristic of the frontier
West, situations that became problematic only after economic and population
growth led to increased demands on resourcesas shown by dwindling timber
resources in the Applegate region and inadequate water supplies in the South
Platte and Truckee-Carson regions.  These concerns were first addressed in the
19th   century   with   innovations   establishing  forest  reserves  and   the  prior
    133   One of the most fascinating cases of this nature involves efforts to protect ocean
fisheries from depletion, given that modern fishing technologies can produce huge harvests. 
One of the primary strategies utilized to date has been regulations prohibiting the use of
certain technologies that make fishing “too easy,” an option that is often more politically
viable—although less economically efficient—than imposing restrictions on access or
enforcing harvest quotas (Steelman, 1998).
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appropriation doctrine, respectively, still key elements of the modern institutional
rules.  Of course, these innovations were insufficient to completely manage all
concerns over access, allocation and use of finite resources, ensuring a need for
future institutional reforms as growth pressures continued.
Technological change is also a frequent stimulus for institutional change.
This is perhaps best shown herein by the South Platte case, when the development
of high-lift submersible electric pumps greatly accelerated water withdrawals in
the 1930s.  The impact of technology in contributing to natural resource problems
is well established in many other contexts, such as the environmental
consequences of industrialized agriculture and the depletion of ocean fisheries due
to the development of improved harvesting techniques.  Just as frequently,
however, technology is a featured element of solution strategies.  Technologies
such as seawater desalinization, genetic engineering, and renewable energy
development are among a vast and rapidly growing arsenal of tools dramatically
modifying the interface of human societies and the natural environment.  As the
pace of scientific learning and invention continues to accelerate, controlling
technologyrather than being controlled by technologyhas become an
increasingly pervasive challenge in many types of modern institutions.133  
Perhaps the most salient causal factor of institutional problems in the
Applegate and Truckee-Carson cases, and in natural resource and environmental
conflicts generally, is changing social values.  Of particular note is the modern
environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s, a time of great social change.
During that turbulent era in American history, the philosophy of
environmentalism, combined with somewhat related concerns over civil
rightsincluding tribal rightsand antiwar activism, achieved widespread
acceptance, finding expression in a variety of formal and informal institutional
rules (Paehlke, 1989).  To a large extent, many modern environmental conflicts
are simply an attempt to reconcile the ideas legitimized in that era of social change
with institutional arrangements that evolved in a radically different era.  It is this
observation that leads to the characterization of natural resource and
environmental institutions as antiquated, designed to satisfy a set of social
objectives that has largely been abandoned.  As described by Charles Wilkinson
(1992:17) in Crossing the Next Meridian, westwide, natural resource policy is
dominated by the lords of yesterday, a battery of nineteenth-century laws,
policies,  and  ideas  that  arose  under  wholly  different  social  and  economic
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conditions but that remain in effect due to inertia, powerful lobbying forces, and
lack of public awareness (emphasis added). 
Changing social values in the West not only influence our selection of
desired outputs of institutional regimes for natural resource management, but also
shape our ideas about appropriate procedural elements expressed in collective
choice level and other arrangements (Kenney, 1999).  As discussed in Section III
in the context of alternative problem-solving strategies, current normative ideas
in the West call for arrangements featuring bottom-up and non-adversarial
decision-making mechanisms, stressing voluntary action and efficient, often
market-driven, tools of goal achievement.  This was not always the case.  For
example, many of the most salient features of western natural resource institutions
evolved in an era featuring a strong distrust of market processes, and a
correspondingly high faith in independent agency decision-making (Hays, 1959).
These Progressive Era (1890-1920) ideas have not navigated the 20th century
unscathed.  
Along a closely related line is the fourth and most universal causal factor
contributing to the observed problems: previous rule-making exercises.  All
current natural resource and environmental issues are shaped, in part, by that
baseline of rules and arrangements established in earlier problem-solving efforts.
Often, this set of rules may be stable for decades, becoming problematic only after
factors such as growth, technology, social movements, and other factors modify
the action situation within which institutional arrangements reside.  In those cases
it is difficult to be critical of previous rule-makers, as they likely crafted rules
appropriate for the circumstances at that time.  In other cases, however, rules are
enacted that almost immediately prove problematic.  For example, in the South
Platte case, rules enacted in 1957 to remedy the externality situation were poorly
designed, requiring significant and immediate modifications before a workable
solution emerged.  Poor judgementfrom an institutional design standpointwas
also shown in the Truckee-Carson Basin in the 1960s when new operating
criteria and guidelines regarding the Newlands Project were enacted to aid
environmental resources in Pyramid Lake, exacerbating similar problems in the
Lahontan Valley wetlands. 
Relevance of the IAD Framework 
The analyst concerned with issues at this macro level of institutional
change faces many more challenges than the scholar concerned with only one
isolated case study.  Nonetheless, many of the principles of case study analysis are
still relevant at the macro scale.  Of particular note is the continued salience of the
IAD Framework, especially the action situation construct, and the non-substantive
definition of problems types.  
The Salience of the Action Situation
Whether looking at a specific case study at a discrete moment in time, or
evaluating the general contours of a subject area from a more geographically and
    134   Admittedly, this is a highly anthropocentric perspective, but institutional
arrangements are human constructs, something that should be reflected in methodological
tools for institutional analysis.
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temporally broad perspective, it is critical to appreciate the context of the
observed institutional rules.  At both the micro and macro scales, this is best done
by referring to the action situation concept.  Usually of particular concern to the
analyst are that set of rules and levels, described herein as the institutional
component of the action situation, which forms the canvas upon which any
potential new institutional solutions must be painted.  While activities such as
genetic engineering occasionally raise problems for which no well-developed set
of applicable rules already exist, most natural resource and environmental
problems in the West are layered upon a formidable body of rules accumulated
over time.  It is worthwhile for the analyst to not only be familiar with this body
of rules, but to have some understanding about how these rules came into
existence. 
An appreciation of the changing nature of the other two elements of the
action situation is also essential.  In assessing the actor/behavioral component of
the action situation, it is important to identify the presence of new parties over
time.  For this set of actors, it is likely safe to assume that bounded individual self-
interest will remain a dominant and constant force in influencing behavior.
However, the expression of self-interest will change over time, as individual
preferences, values, and circumstances change, as do the ideological composition
of involved participants and the incentive structures provided by evolving rule
sets.  Behavior assumptions may be relatively constant, but behavior is always
changing.  Similarly, the third element of the action situation, the physical
environment, is also constantly changing, as the human imprint on natural
landscapes continues.  An understanding of this physical transformation can be
highly valuable, especially since the management objective in the modern era
frequently features restoration of modified landscapes. 
To fully appreciate evolving trends in each of these action situation
components requires a highly interdisciplinary perspective, perhaps drawing upon
the skills of lawyers and historians to describe rules and rules changes;
sociologists, political scientists, and economists to interpret and predict behavioral
patterns; and biologists, engineers, and geographers to assess the changing
qualities of the physical environment.  
Problem Definition
As aptly demonstrated in Section IV, operational choice level problems
can only be precisely identified in the context of a specific moment in time.  The
underinvestment problems in the Applegate and Truckee-Carson cases, for
example, arguably did not exist until society developed an interest in recognizing
and preserving intrinsic environmental values.134  While this is a partial limitation
on the use of the problem typology for a so-called macro institutional analysis,
    135   Identified problems are, of course, “substantive” in that they are based on the specific
interaction of the three elements contained within the action situation construct, and defined
by the scope rule of the institution.  But the typology itself is not substantive in the classic
sense in that the terms used do not describe familiar “substantive” classes of resources, such
as water, forests, range, minerals, and fish and wildlife.  Those terms, as argued throughout
this report, lack useful analytical qualities.
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the more analytically useful quality of the problem typology is readily
transferrable: namely, the non-substantive nature of problem definition.  This
quality is demonstrated in the aforementioned underinvestment problems in the
Applegate and Truckee-Carson regions, which were shown to be are highly
similar from an analytical standpoint, even though the substantive focus in the
Applegate region is on forest resources while the Truckee-Carson basin primarily
involves water resources.135  
These seemingly distinct cases are, in reality, close siblings, something best
captured by the public good metaphor.  As suggested earlier in the discussion
examining the role of changing social values in creating operational choice level
problems, public good situations appear to be an increasingly common element of
the natural resources and environmental agenda of the latter 20th century, just as
open access situations predominated a century earlier.  Of course, all problem
types can be found in all eras; yet, if the relative mix of problem types does, in
fact, change over time in a given area of concern (such as natural resources in the
West), then this has dramatic implications regarding the appropriate mix of
solution strategies used by problem-solvers.  This is the sort of practical insight
potentially obtainable through a macro analysis. 
Solution Strategies
A Typology of Solution Strategies: An Unmet Need
At the micro (case study) scale, it is typically sufficient to describe solution
strategies simply as all sets of rules changes potentially sufficient to address the
particular institutional deficiencies identified as part of problem definition.  This
broad definition encourages the analyst to cast a wide net in the search for
solutions, and recognizes that solutions, like problems, are highly context specific.
As the focus of analysis shifts to the macro level, however, it is important to note
that certain problems tend to lend themselves to specific solution strategies.  For
example as discussed in Section III, solving depletion problems typically requires
changing boundary and/or authority rules; addressing underinvestment problems
is usually best achieved by reforming information rules; and maldistribution
problems, including the special case of externalities, typically are solved by
modifying position, authority, and/or boundary rules.  These types of reforms can,
collectively, modify the payoff rules characteristic of  the  institution,  either
easing  or  eliminating the concerns giving rise to the
    136   For example, see Gregg et al. (1991) and Dahl and Lindblom (1957).  
    137   The “who” in the alternative problem-solving strategies are typically involved
stakeholders (often defined primarily in terms of local interests), operating with a level of
decision-making autonomy not normally seen in approaches based on regulation, litigation,
or legislative approaches; while the “how” is voluntary, consensus processes, dependent on
positive-sum transactions.
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problematic situation.  Trends of this nature, if properly identified and analyzed,
have the potential to evolve into useful metaphors.  
Developing metaphors that link problems to solutions is an important
research objective of a macro nature, in that it will require the coordinated review
of a large number of representative cases.  One obstacle impeding progress in this
area is the absence of an analytically useful solution typology.  This report is only
a preliminary step in that direction.  While solution strategies are discussed in
many contexts in this report, no explicit typology is offered.  Development of an
analytically useful solution typologyi.e., one that can be linked to our problem
typologyis exceedingly difficult, in part because the ideal scheme (or schemes)
would need, at a minimum, to integrate two types of data: (1) variations in
problem-solving approaches used at the collective choice level to make
operational choice level rules, and (2) recurring patterns of operational choice
level rules enacted to successfully address the problems identified (i.e., the
solutions themselves).  While these are distinct elements, they are closely related
in that the process of collective choice decision-making often influences the types
of operational choice level rule changes possible.   
In this report, both of these elements of an ideal solution typology are
addressed in some detail, although it is the former (i.e., the focus on collective
choice level processes) that is of particular interest.  Many scholars have examined
collective choice decision-making processes, often organizing these data using
categories based on either the locus of decision-making (i.e., who makes
decisions, typically a function of position, boundary and authority rules) or the
mechanism of decision-making (i.e., how decisions are made, largely a function
of aggregation, information and payoff rules).136  Such approaches have led to
distinctions such as hierarchical/non-hierarchical and compulsory/non-
compulsory arrangements, admittedly awkward terms (introduced in Section III),
but potentially of more analytical value than more familiar descriptive schemes
distinguishing between regulatory, property rights, and market-based regimes.
The term alternative problem-solving is also primarily descriptive in nature,
employed herein simply to draw attention to a fairly coherent grouping of
problem-solving strategies that is currently enjoying widespread support.  Much
like the terms used by other authors, the solution strategies falling within the
category of alternative problem-solving are primarily distinguished in terms of the
who and how of decision-making.137  
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General Findings Related to Alternative Problem-Solving
The case studies reviewed in Section IV do provide some insights into the
nature of alternative problem-solving and, more specifically, the type of
environment within which this class of solution strategies can best flourish.  Two
factors appear to be most salient in creating an environment conducive to success:
(1) the earlier resolution of fundamental value conflicts, and (2) the existence of
symmetrical problem-solving incentives.  These observations are offered as
tentative working hypotheses, deserving of further macro-level investigations in
institutional analysis.  
Resolution of Value Conflicts
Unlike interest and cognitive conflicts, value conflicts are noted for being
unsuitable to a negotiated solution, given that the values are non-compensatory.
Thus, given the emphasis of the alternative problem-solving strategies on
consensus processes, it is not surprising that these strategies did not take center
stage in the case studies until resolution of the underlying value conflicts occurred
through other collective choice processes.  This was most clearly seen in the
Applegate and Truckee-Carson cases by the conflict between preservation and
development/use interests.  In both cases, a key step in the resolution of the
conflict came with congressional passage of the Endangered Species Act, and then
later followed in each case by environmental litigation based on this legislation.
Only after the courts upheld the validity of environmental rights was the
fundamental value conflict resolved, prompting action to address the remaining
interest and cognitive conflicts.  
The resolution of value conflicts is something for which the judiciary is
ideally suited, given that litigation is designed to function in those situations where
agreement cannot be reached.  Value conflicts can also be resolved in a legislative
setting, in large part due to an aggregation rule of majority-rule rather than
consensus.  However, legislatures are historically hesitant to address value
conflicts, since any decision is likely to alienate a large percentage of the voting
public.  Much more profitable, from a political standpoint, is so-called distributive
politics, a term used to describe policies that promise clear benefits but largely
hidden costs (Lowi, 1964).  Why then, did Congress enact the Endangered
Species Act, the most controversial and influential piece of environmental
legislation in dozens of natural resource and environmental conflicts in the West
today?  The answer probably lies in the fact that the true impact of the legislation
was not appreciated by the Congress at the time (1973), and that a strong social
movement in favor of environmental legislation was at its zenith.  Today, when
the significance of the legislation is fully realized, and when environmentalism is
not such a potent political force, Congress is struggling with the ongoing and
seemingly endless challenge of revisiting the legislation, something mandated by
the need for periodic re-authorization.  Failure to continue the program will likely
bring the preservation/development value conflict back to the surface, providing
a strong impediment to the further
    138   This is not to imply that alternative problem-solving approaches have no role in
situations involving value conflicts.  The discussion and education that occurs in
collaborative settings can encourage parties to change their value structures, thus
eliminating the value conflict.  This, however, is not likely to happen over short time
periods if at all, and it is difficult to maintain a collaborative effort over time if the
dominant issue is a value conflict.  Work on a more manageable problem will likely be
needed to sustain the group while the value conflict is slowly and cautiously addressed. 
More commonly, the group discussion and education may lead some parties to realize that
the perceived value conflict is, in fact, really an interest or cognitive conflict, or some
actions may be found that serve the interests of both competing factions without forcing a
direct resolution of the value conflict.  In those situations, the group effort is actually
working around the value conflict, a significant, but different, type of resolution. 
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proliferation of alternative problem-solving strategies.  This is ironic given that
many of the proponents of alternative problem-solving see these strategies as the
preferred alternative to the regulation/litigation model embodied by the
Endangered Species Act and similar value-oriented environmental legislation.
As environmental legislation has evolved to quiet value-oriented debates
about whether we, as a nation, should protect environmental resources, the focus
of activists, resource managers, and policy-makers has gradually shifted toward
the implementation of these environmental goals.  In the modern era, natural
resource and environmental policy debates are increasingly about the means of
policy implementation, rather than the ends.  This is significant in many ways,
not the least of which is that the modern era prominently features interest and
cognitive conflicts that are suited to alternative problem-solving, given that both
are amenable to negotiation and experimentation.  The importance of institutional
arrangements in promoting efficient goal achievement is widely recognized.
Where environmental activists of past decades turned to the highly philosophical
writings of Muir or Leopold for inspiration, the bookshelf of todays army of
environmentalists also include works such as Reinventing Government by
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) and The Death of Common Sense (1994) by
Howard.  There is now a premium on institutional knowledge and a preference in
favor of creative institutional problem-solving strategies, salient modern legacies
of an earlier social movement and the rise to prominence of environmental
litigation.  
The Importance of Incentives
To the extent that value conflicts can be resolved or at least tabled, an
opportunity then exists to utilize alternative problem-solving strategies.138  The
first step in such efforts is often to identify incentives to bring all key parties into
the problem-solving effort.  Broadly dispersed incentives are needed given that
each of the mechanisms lumped under the heading of alternative problem-solving
strategies are highly dependent upon achieving agreement among all key
participants.  The aggregation rule in market transactions is unanimity (between
buyers and sellers), and in most ADR and collaborative groups, a decision-rule
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of either unanimity or consensus (usually defined to mean a super-majority with
no forceful dissents) is employed.  Generally, the way to encourage agreement in
rule-making settings is by providing incentives to agree (or disincentives to
disagree).  Thus, a preliminary step in problem-solving is often identifying
potential benefits of the problem-solving effort (i.e., incentives), and devising a
means for distributing those benefits among all the key players.  This is often best
done through discussion, debate and bargaining processes. 
Much of the modern literature of institutional reform focuses primarily on
the value of providing incentives to problem-solvers (Osborne and Gaebler,
1992).  As shown by the three case studies, both negative and positive incentives
can be productively employed.  Negative incentives were utilized in the South
Platte by the legislaturelargely at the behest of the State Engineerto urge
development of a market-oriented collaborative group (GASP) by ordering
groundwater pumpers to replace or augment surface water supplies or forfeit
pumping rights.  The threat of losing rights was a significant incentive to act, and
the economy of scale of providing replacement water was sufficient to encourage
the group, market-driven approach.  Similarly, the impact of environmental
regulations in the Applegate and Truckee-Carson regions, illustrated in part by the
timber injunctions and the Stampede Dam re-operation respectively, provided
strong stimuli for the eventual (and ongoing) problem-solving efforts.  Positive
incentives in these two cases were also prominently featured, through federal
funding provided through the Northwest Forest Plan and the Settlement Act.
Ultimately, however, the most obvious incentive driving problem-solving
efforts is the resolution of the operational choice level problem.  By definition,
operational choice level problems involve situations in which one or more parties
view the current situation as problematic.  Those parties, therefore, have an
obvious built-in incentive for problem resolution.  This simple observation takes
on significance when considered with the symmetry concept introduced earlier.
In the symmetrical situations typical of depletion and underinvestment problems,
for example, all parties can be expected to perceive a personal benefit to problem
resolution.  However, in the asymmetrical situation of maldistribution (including
externalities), some parties are benefitted from the status quo.  Thus, they
perceive no problem, and have no incentive for institutional changeto the
contrary, they have an incentive to discourage institutional change.  It is expected,
therefore, that alternative problem-solving strategies will not emerge in the
asymmetrical situations unless additional incentives (either positive or negative)
are provided, but may independently emerge in the symmetrical situations.
This is exactly the pattern shown in the case studies.  Groundwater
pumpers did not voluntarily organize into GASP and cease impacting surface
water rights holders; they were forced.  Similarly, water rights holders in the
Truckee-Carson Basin did not step forward to voluntarily address the
maldistribution problems, but are now currently participating in the market-based
reallocation since outside public funding has been provided.  The other alternative
problem-solving  efforts  in  the Basin are primarily focused on the
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 restoration of public goods, a situation with symmetrical incentives.  Alternative
problem-solving efforts in the Applegate region are also primarily concerned with
solving the symmetrical problems.  As mentioned above and discussed in Section
IV, in both the Truckee-Carson and Applegate cases, widely-felt burdens
associated with ongoing problem-solving efforts augmented the intrinsic incentive
structure provided by the symmetrical problems, prompting the initiation of the
alternative problem-solving efforts. 
Concluding Thoughts
This report reflects a growing desire among many parties in the natural
resources community to bring a greater level of scientific scrutiny to the
description, analysis and, ultimately, the design of institutional arrangements.  The
conceptual framework described herein, while far from perfect, is an initial step
in that direction.  However, while not minimizing the potential contribution of
institutional analysis to improved resource management, it must be acknowledged
that even the most informed and academically rigorous processes of institutional
design will not be sufficient to craft arrangements stable over long time
periodsespecially at the operational choice level.  The operational choice level
problem causal factors identified in the case studies (and presumably many other
considerations not highlighted herein) are not easily controlled, and to the extent
that their ramifications can be managed, this activity must be viewed as an
ongoing challengemuch as we accept government to be a permanent fixture of
modern civilization. 
Increasingly, a diverse coalition of policy-makers and advocates are
encouraging the use of so-called alternative problem-solving approaches to
address natural resource and environmental problems.  There is reason to be
optimistic about these approaches emphasizing voluntary, incentive-based
decision-making, often occurring in collaborative or market settings.  In many
geographic and substantive areas, these approaches are making a positive
contribution to management regimes, providing problem-solvers with a bigger and
better toolbox.  The enthusiasm for alternative problem-solving strategies,
however, is somewhat disconcerting.  The three case studies reviewed in this
report were sufficient to illustrate two major limitations on the use of these tools:
first, when significant value conflicts are unresolved; and secondly, in situations
primarily featuring problems with asymmetrical incentive structures.  Further
analyses, especially those focused at a macro scale, will likely identify additional
insights into the proper, and improper, application of these approaches.  The
discipline of institutional analysis is the proper setting for these investigations,
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